Bordering, Political Landscapes and Social Arenas: Potentials and Challenges of Evolving Border Concepts in a post-Cold War World

Large-Scale Integrating Project
FP7-SSH-2011-1-290775

Final Report WP 1
Deliverable 1.50

EUBORDERSCAPES Final Report
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# EUBORDERSCAPES Consortium

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1. Introduction and Overview

This final report documents the most important achievements of the EUBORDERSCAPES research project, an international undertaking that has tracked and interpreted conceptual change with regard to state borders. The consortium responded to the European Commission’s call (see below) which indicated a clear concern with the wider political and social consequences of borders. In our specific interpretation of the call, the project consortium understood that de-bordering, itself a hallmark of European integration and an undeniable achievement of enlargement processes, is part of a permanent, recursive and self-referential process of border-making that takes place simultaneously at many different levels. More basically, however, bordering is an intimate part of the constitution of society. Bordering reflects the struggles and contestations inherent in social communication, it is part of that which keeps societies together and recognisable as such, but is also a social force that signals adaptation and transformation. As a result, de-bordering is neither irreversible nor does it necessarily signify a turn towards more cosmopolitan understandings of citizenship and belonging. In this sense, greater awareness of how and why (re)bordering takes place is essential to understanding Europe, the political and social potentials of European Union and the possibility of more open European societies.

As part of our basic methodology, the EUBORDERSCAPES consortium studied the manner in which social, economic, cultural and geopolitical change, particularly since 1989, has influenced understandings of state borders. This has also included an engagement with major paradigmatic shifts in scientific debate, and in the social sciences in particular, will also be considered. State borders are the basic frame of reference but ethnographic/anthropological boundaries are also considered. More importantly however, this approach emphasizes the social significance and subjectivities of state borders while critically interrogating “objective” categories of state territoriality and international relations. The present state of debate indicates that the field of border studies has opened up possibilities for questioning the rationales behind everyday border-making by understanding borders as institutions, processes and symbols. Borders are thus not given, they emerge through socio-political processes of border-making or bordering that take place within society.

Since its inception in June 2012 EUBORDERSCAPES has been studying evolving concepts of borders in three major ways: 1) as an important reflection of political, social and cultural change, 2) as an indicator of possible responses to this change and 3) in terms of the differences that state borders make in societal terms – to the opportunities, aspirations, dignity and recognition of groups and individuals. EUBORDERSCAPES will thus focus on the emerging epistemologies of how state borders are perceived, understood, experienced and exploited as political and social resources.

The project is also exploring different areas of conceptual change that can be assumed to have concrete impacts on the ways borders both condition and are conditioned by different institutions and actors. In progressing beyond the state of the art, EUBORDERSCAPES is attempting to demonstrate that important connections can be uncovered between borders as a “challenge” to national (and EU) policies and borders as potential elements of political innovation through conceptual (re) framings of social, political, economic and cultural spaces. The project provides a nuanced and critical re-reading and understanding of borders as
resources in terms of the exercise of power, the management of conflict, cross-border cooperation, and the everyday negotiation of borders by “ordinary” citizens and non-citizens. State borders also reflect and thus help us interpret tensions as well as points of connection within intercultural and interstate relations.

Reflecting the ambitious agenda as defined by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for Science and Innovation (“The Changing Concept of Borders” - Topic 4.2.1 in the 2011 Call) EUBORDERSCAPES has elaborated a number of research perspectives. The project has also linked a number of social, political and methodological issues in order to develop a truly interdisciplinary approach that includes:

- Socio-cultural dynamics and strategies that inform (and link) regional, national, and supranational/transnational notions of borders (e.g. understanding European borders as symbolic representations of different degrees of cultural affinity, familiarity and “otherness”)

- Questions of governance, democracy, territoriality, solidarity, and legal bases of state sovereignty that are raised by the “securitization” of borders both between Schengen and non-Schengen EU as well as at the EU’s external frontiers

- In similar fashion, the practical consequences of hardening EU external borders at the same time that new regional co-operation mechanisms (such the European Neighbourhood Policy) and more open regional economic spaces are being negotiated

- The development and consequences of everyday forms of transnationalism, border-transcending, border-negotiating and networking, both within the EU and between the EU and “third countries”. Everyday transnationalism is closely linked to issues of intersectionality (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity and sexuality) as part of the negotiation of borders for work, family, emotional and other reasons. This will also have direct impacts on work, welfare and immigrant rights that could challenge national welfare systems

- Processes of conceptual change that condition the production of geographical knowledge and representations of regional and cultural spaces that are used to frame social arenas and political landscapes

- The “mapping” of borders as a methodological challenge that incorporates new ethnographic insights, everyday experience, tacit knowledges of borders and border regions and cultural/emotional encounters at borders into the state of art of border research

- The potential of borders as resources in the development of different forms of cross-border co-operation and conflict amelioration

These different but largely interlinked research dimensions have provided an agenda for a more complex understanding of state borders. The common denominator in these research dimensions is the fact that shifting concepts of borders are challenging received notions of how states, state territories, citizenship and identity relate to each other. As a consequence,
new ways of thinking of and dealing with borders as tools for framing social and political action are required in order to more genuinely reflect their impacts at various spatial levels of socio-cultural, political and economic interaction.

In performing empirical research EUBORDERSCAPES has drawn from various sources, such as key academic debates, political discourses, ethnographic research, media representations and shifting cultural understandings of the construction of national borders, the project aims to shed light especially on tensions between national understandings in terms of demarcations based on ethnicity, citizenship, language and socio-cultural characteristics, etc., and broader supranational/transnational understandings which address borders as areas of contact (and, to an extent, transition) between civilizations, religious and cultural spheres. In doing this, the project will also attempt to illuminate the consequences of restrictive and securitized border regimes for interstate and intercultural dialogue.

Three important strands of research in this area are: 1) the analysis of borders as markers of historical memory and local identity, 2) the analysis of borders as conditioners of local milieu and everyday attitudes and 3) the analysis of community routines that develop around borders or that are disrupted by border (in)security. Border regions (or “Borderlands”) reflect all of these aspects as they are themselves defined by historical memories of life at borders as well as how by the active engagement of borderlanders with changing border symbolisms and functions. Although formal state boundaries often serve as a reference point in discussions of territory, identity and Europe, it is not just the physical border itself but its various representations that are at issue.

Finally, most of the issues discussed above either directly or indirectly involve ethical issues. Indeed, the resurgence of ethical issues in more contemporary border studies is characteristic of the critical turn in the social sciences since the 1980s. The contemporary ethical focus in border studies challenges the militarization and securitization of everyday life as a result of increasing disparities between cultures and societies but also of ideological cleavages. In addition, discriminatory and often even racist exploitations of the border through official border regimes, visa regulations, immigration policies and treatment of asylum seekers are investigated. As such contemporary research demonstrates how borders lend themselves symbolically and physically (in the form of barriers and controls) to xenophobic exploitation of fear and the reproduction of negative cultural stereotypes. This is particularly evident in the European context where the political concept of “open borders” has been decoded as a partial policy of exclusion that emphasizes border management and that has submitted state boundaries within Europe to general policing and security policies. Examples of ethical perspectives in border studies are:

- a focus on state violence and its consequences for groups and individuals
- interrogating potentials for a democratic governance of borders
- exclusion and discrimination

Border securitization directly affects individual rights, privacy and confidentiality. The sharing of information by intelligence agencies and links between different control networks or databases easily elude democratic control; in Europe the Schengen Information System (SIS), has been criticized for its “democratic unaccountability”. Borders also receive critical
scrutiny as they are unevenly permeable for different groups depending on origin, citizenship, material situations and socio-professional background; borders are thus inevitably related with discrimination and social injustice. For instance, the growing closure of EU external borders is compared with legalized apartheid: “the law of birth” determines the people’s mobility across the world.

Even a brief and incomplete outlook on the most important concepts in border studies shows, firstly, their diversity, thematic and disciplinary dispersion and differentiation. Secondly, it demonstrates two impressive paradigmatic shifts: from drawing an optimistic perspective of a “borderless world” (or the “europization” of national borders) to a focus on re-bordering, fencing and increasing securitization which risks to be perpetuated by the growing security-industrial complex and its powerful lobbies and even more by the crisis and the reconfiguration of territorial identities provoked by globalization. New technologies marked the transition in the bordering logics from securing territories and properly borders to securing and filtrating flows. These technologies are erasing the difference between borders and internal regions and are transforming all state territory in a “reticular” borderland. Paradoxically, technological progress did not facilitate human mobility but created new obstacles for it and, moreover, generated new risks on human rights abuse and new moral and ethical problems. The 1990s fad of a “borderless world” was short-lived; on the contrary political boundaries are a bio-ethno-social constant of the human society’s life, because without membranes, it is impossible to regulate the exchange between the ethnic and/or the state territory and the outer world, protecting this territory from the chaos and the waste of human and material resources.

The present state of border studies indicates that recent developments have deeply changed the power of borders; they have modified the dialectical relation between their fixed nature and constantly changing, fluid regime and framed the impact of borders on human activities in a new way. Borders not only have a different meaning for different actors but are a manifestation of power relations in society at different scales. In particular, they reflect the normative power of international organizations, including the EU and the power asymmetry between states in different fields. A review of recent publications shows the lack of comparative and quantitative approaches in border studies. At the same time, border studies open practical ways to the transformation of disputed sections of borders into “borders of peace”. Borders are a crucial condition for openness and cooperation. But these can be achieved only through multilevel, multi-sectoral and long-term approaches that involve transformation at the international, national and local levels. This, in turn, demands cultural changes and new kinds of thinking on both sides of any given border.

Overview of Substantive Workpackages

WP 3 (The Reconfiguration of Post-Soviet Borders and Conceptual Change): The main objective here is to explore the re-bordering of post-Soviet space by examining conceptual change in the rhetoric connected to definition, negotiation and conflict over the (re)formation of post-Soviet and post-Socialist states – and hence their borders. This WP will identify variation and change in the political language of negotiating and legitimizing Post-Soviet borders (based on ethnicity, religion, earlier treaties, international law etc). In addition, work will involve identifying conflicts and debates that have taken place over the just definition of
the borders and what have been the main arguments in situations of disagreement. The WP will also include study of change and continuity in the use of the concept of “border” in Post Soviet states with the aim of recognizing historical layers in present day conceptualizations of these “new” borders.

WP 4 (Europeanization: European Integration and Conceptual Change): focuses directly on European integration and enlargement and its impacts of conceptual change. This involves a critical investigation of bordering processes in terms of how official policies, political debates as well as media representations and more informal local “place-making” practices have contributed to European interpretations of national borders. Work will include uncovering divergences and convergences in various modes of European border representations (political language, media, academic, cultural). What do these convergences and divergences indicate about images of Europe in terms of openness and closedness (e.g. as reflections of transnational tendencies and tensions and anxieties about identity)?

WP 5 (Post-Colonial Bordering and Euro-African Borderscapes): This workpackage explores “post-colonial” strands of the conceptual evolution of borders, particularly as they apply to the Euro-African context. It relates the overall bordering perspective to the conceptual links between EU-internal, EU-external and non-European borders with special reference to the relational geographies between Europe and Africa. The “blurring” of metropolitan and former colonial borders takes concrete shape in growing transnational communities and hybrid urban spaces within Europe. However, dominant representations of Euro-African borders continue to exclude geographies of imagination, emotions, and belief outside traditional visible geopolitical realm. The objective here is to indicate how post-colonial bordering is impacting on local societies on the one hand and relations between the EU and North African states (e.g. within the context of EUROMED dialogue), on the other.

WP 6: (Borders and Critical Geopolitics of Neighbourhood): the work package focuses on shifts in the political language of borders in relations between the EU and its neighbours within the context of geopolitical shifts since 1990. This also involves a perspective of neighbouring states (Turkey, Ukraine and Russia) on relations with EU in terms of their changing geopolitical roles and border-related concerns. In addition, regional practices of defining frames for action in the implementation of EU policies of regional co-operation (e.g. in the guise of the European Neighbourhood Policy) will also be covered.

WP 7 (CBC and Conflict Amelioration): conceptual change will be investigated through the perspective of borders as resources in cross-border co-operation or as means of conflict-resolution: i.e. what opportunities can be identified for the positive transformation of contested border narratives in terms of cross-border co-operation, conflict resolution and intercultural dialogue? How can security-oriented policies (“securitization”) be reconciled with a need for greater cross-border and transnational co-operation? This WP addresses issues of bordering and the framing of co-operation and conflict within inter-related contexts of power relations, governance, funding regimes, political will, culture and ethnicity. In addition, two contrasting examples from the Middle East, Israel/Palestine Authority and Israel/Jordan will expand debate on issues of cross-border governance and conflict resolution.
WP 8 (Rebordering State Spaces: Cities, Borders and Integration Processes): Work package 8 deals with economic and political integration processes associated with European integration and their impacts on the conceptual evolution of borders. This WP will explore bordering as a “rebordering” of the EU in terms of economic networks, cross-border urban regions and “twin cities” on the EU’s internal and external borders. On the basis of conceptual, discursive and practical distinctions between functional spaces and institutional territories, we contrast the functional dimension of cross-border integration from its institutional counterpart i.e. market-driven integration from policy-driven integration. This WP is linked conceptually to WP 4 (Europeanization) and to WP 7 (Cross-Border Co-operation) in investigating if and how politics and policies of the EU have influenced functional interaction across national and external borders.

WP 9 (Borders, Intersectionality and the Everyday): The central objective is to promote hitherto neglected areas of border research agendas that address lived, experienced and intersectional (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity) aspects of borders and bordering processes. The bordering perspective will thus be developed in terms of discursive, practical and interpretational categories that reflect issues of citizenship, identity and transnational migration. This WP will also explore how borders affect groups with regard to gender, race, citizenship, socio-economic status and sexuality. The comparative perspective will encompass in-depth case studies that involve internal Schengen borders (UK/France) and the external EU border (Finland/Russia). In addition, an urban case study (London) of intersectionality and bordering will be carried out. This WP is linked conceptually to WP 5 (Post-colonial) and more directly to WP 10 (Cultural Production) where literary representations of borders by migrants will be studied.

WP 10 (Border-Crossings and Cultural Production): explores forms of cross-border “cultural production” within the overall perspective of bordering. This WP consolidates local perspectives in regard to how culturally produced representations have contributed to cross-border interpretations of state borders as well as challenge official meanings, symbolisms and functions attached to state borders. It analyses cultural and literary works in ways that frame national and European border issues (e.g. citizenship, cultural identities, inclusion, exclusion, co-operation across borders) and contextualize them in terms of historical and changing contemporary relationships. More specifically, this WP will demonstrate how artistic expression and the media address borders and border crossings (migrants, people living at borders, etc.) and their impact for everyday life in Europe (e.g., cultural tensions, cultural hybridization). This WP is most clearly linked to WP 9 (Intersectionality).

WP 13 (Cross-Sectional Analysis): The overall objective of this WP is to consolidate the cross-cutting aspects of the project and thus link in an effective manner the different WPs. The Workpackage relates bordering processes to salient issues of scientific, social and political importance (e.g. migration, securitization and border management, questions of European identity, intersectionality, etc.). With this aim, under WP 13 we scrutinize the research findings gathered during the fieldwork conducted in the course of different work packages, as well as compare different cases. WP 13 also indicates global as well as specifically European challenges that derive from changing conceptualizations and functions of state borders (e.g. challenges that border management imply for national policies in terms of immigration, welfare, labour laws, etc). The WP also aims to inform and raise awareness
on issues that often are neglected in border research. A further major objective in this context is to generate and formulate policy relevant insights, in particular different policy options and their cost-benefit considerations.

Structure of the Report

The Final Project Report has been compiled in a way provides background information into the internal workings of EUBORDERSCAPES in terms of the principal approaches developed and research tasks that have been carried out. Given the fact that the individual workpackages themselves represented fully-fledged research projects in their own right, no comprehensive synthesis can be provided. However, links between the different substantive workpackages are developed in the WP 13 summary as well in the concluding sections of the report which focus on the concept of borderscapes as it has emerged out of the project. It is in fact suggested that the borderscapes perspective can serve to carry forward the results of the project within the context of future interdisciplinary research on borders.

The dissemination list in section 5 provides a selection of the most important publications generated by EUBORDERSCAPES during its four-year existence. By May 2016 several proposals for special issues (e.g. in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Political Geography, Geopolitics) have been submitted which further develop relations between bordering processes, intersectionality, cultural production and migration. Reassessments of the shifting significance of state borders in Europe based on EUBORDERSCAPES work is also planned for an edited volume of the Routledge Border Regions Series.
2. Workpackage Reports

WP 3 The Reconfiguration of Post-Soviet Borders and Conceptual Change

This workpackage has explored the re-bordering of post-Soviet space by examining conceptual change in the rhetoric connected to definition, negotiation and conflict over the (re) constitution of post-Soviet and post-Socialist states – and their borders. WP3 identifies variation and change in the political language of negotiating and legitimizing Post-Soviet borders (based on ethnicity, religion, earlier treaties, international law etc). In addition, the work involves identifying conflicts and debates that have taken place over the just definition of the borders and an analysis of the main arguments in situations of disagreement. The WP will study change and continuity in the use of the concept of “border” in Central and Eastern European states with the aim of recognizing historical layers in present day conceptualizations of Eastern external borders of the EU. The main objective here is to identify major trends and shifts in political language with regard to borders.

During the first project stage, identification of major peaks of discussions concerning post-Soviet borders was completed. Based on this screening, the research teams carried out in the second phase of the project in-depth analysis of the major waves of discussions on post-Soviet borders. Common peaks of discussion for all teams are 1991, 2004-2005, 2008 and 2014. Additionally, country specific peaks of discussion have been analysed, e.g. in the Finnish case 1995, the year Finland became member of the EU.

The in-depth analysis of key discussions concentrated on identifying conceptual shifts during different periods and conceptual clusters characteristic of competing rhetorical strategies (analysis of conceptual clusters and counter-concepts). This included near reading of key texts in order to identify key-authors/actors. Based on the in-depth analysis, each team prepared reports in article form of shifting sovereignty concepts and territorial imaginaries of border related political debates. The coordinating team carried out an analysis of EU policy documents that will help to identify conceptual variation between conceptualizations of the EU and member country approaches to post-Soviet borders. The articles ill be submitted for publication to Routledge series of Borderlands studies in September 2016.

Overall progress of the Research Tasks from project start

In the initial phase of the project, starting in Month 10, all teams involved in WP 3 made suggestions and participated in the specification of the empirical template and material that was used for indentifying major discussions concerning borders in each of the cases that will be studied. The main focus was on RT 1 as a general organizing element. Initial discussion rearding RT 2 also took place. The WP 3 template inputs were confirmed in a workshop organized in St Petersburg in February 2013, and initial review concerning the results of the first phase of identifying key-discussion took place in project workshop in Bergamo in June 2013. In the autumn of 2013 the teams worked to prepare presentations of the waves of discussions to be compared at a workshop in Berlin in December 2013.

During the second phase these discussions were continued in meetings at The Beer Sheva project conference in December 2014 and Grenoble project workshop in May 2015 as well as
at the Association for Borderlands Studies World Conference organized in Joensuu by the coordinating team in June 2014. In addition, members of the workpackage gave several individual paper presentations at these conferences as well as in the Border Regions in Transition conference in Lille in November 2014 and Hamburg and Sønderborg 2016. During project policy conference in London, November 2015, the third project conference in Barcelona, January 2016, drafts and first versions of articles were presented. Plan of the book and articles prepared for publisher peer review were discussed at the EUBORDERSCAPES final conference in Berlin in May 2016.

**Research Task 1: Understanding Post-Soviet Borders**

**1a Conceptual Change in Defining and Negotiating Russian Borders with the Countries of the Ex-Soviet Union**

In accordance to the research tasks set during the first stage of the project the teams completed the fast-screening of daily newspapers. The fast-screening process covered texts marked as relevant for the study of the evolution of the concept of ‘border’ in printed media representations. The screened and collected material was processed and tabulated in accordance with the categories developed in consultation with the WP 3 coordinating team.

During the second period identification of major peaks of discussions concerning post-Soviet borders was completed, the research teams began in-depth analysis of waves of discussions on post-Soviet borders. Common peaks of discussion all teams will cover are 1991, 2004-2005, 2008 and 2014. Reports of the in-depth analysis of these discussion were prepared in article form to be published in a joint edited volume.

**1b: Eastern Partnership and Shifting Borders of Neighbourhood (SHARED TASK TO BE COORDINATED WITH WP 6, RT 2b)**

Research teams have finalized the analysis of the press material linked to major waves of discussion. As part of the in-depth analysis they have identified conceptual shifts during different periods with special attention to changing sovereignty concepts and spatial imaginaries. Conceptual clusters typical to competing rhetorical strategies have been identified by near reading of key texts in order to identify key-authors/actors and competing rhetorical strategies. As part of its EU policy document analysis, the coordinating team carried out a specific analysis of the adaptation of the concept of neighbourhood as one of central territorial imaginaries of EU policies.

**1c: The Impact of the EU on Post-Soviet Bordering Processes (SHARED TASK TO BE COORDINATED WITH WP 4, RT 2d)**

The coordinating team is analysing EU policy documents and conceptual variation between them and member country approaches to post-Soviet borders. This results will be utilized by each team in order to identify the influence of EU impact on political agenda and rhetorical strategies in each case. As part of the final reporting, the coordinating team prepared an analysis of changes in ways of conceptualising borders and sovereignty in the context of
competing projects of building “actorness” of the European Union and the Russian Federation.

Research Task 2: “Stateness” and Contested Borders in the Post-Cold War Context

The case studies indicated in Annex 1 Transnistria, Southern Caucasus (e.g. South Ossetia, Nagorny-Karabakh) have been analysed in the broader context of Russian discussion on post-Soviet borders. In the case the Balkans, it was decided that the case of Kosovo can only be understood in the context of broader conceptual shifts in defining policies concerning the Balkans / South-Eastern Europe. The work was carried out as part of the Sofia team analysis of changing sovereignty concepts and territorial imaginaries attached to borders in the area.

Synthesis of the overall results: Understanding the shifting conceptions of borders
One of the starting points of the WP3 work was to identify key political actors who have been involved in border making processes in political debates. By analyzing political documents and media sources, various actors have been identified: policy makers, media, supranational institutions (EU/NATO), expert communities, academia, intellectuals as well as ‘regular citizens’ who have participated debates i.e. by sending letters-to-editor. The historical layers of border making processes were analyzed through the investigation of concrete country-specific discursive situations or events (Lagen; peaks) that make the political and social meaning of border concepts derivable. The concept of border itself is studied within relevant conceptual clusters and measured against various counter-concepts (see exemplifying tables of Bulgarian and Finnish cases below).

Figure 1: Basic clusters of concepts and counter-concepts related to the concept of border (Bulgarian discourses, Sofia-team)

<table>
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<th>Discursive event</th>
<th>Conceptual cluster</th>
<th>Counter-concepts and spatial imaginaries</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Kosovo war (1999)</td>
<td>• nation</td>
<td>• Europe ↔ Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• territory</td>
<td>• Europeanization ↔ Balkanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• sovereignty</td>
<td>• integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ethnic identity</td>
<td>• enlargement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• self-determination</td>
<td>• migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• West ↔ East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• EU ↔ East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU enlargement (2007)</td>
<td>• government</td>
<td>• globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• sovereignty</td>
<td>• Post-Cold war international order</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• power</td>
<td>• imperialism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• rule of law</td>
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<td>Ukrainian crisis (2014)</td>
<td>• nation</td>
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In general, changes in conceptions of borders can in the first place be associated with shifts in international relations, changes in geopolitical power relations and related rhetorical strategies for legitimating political projects of sovereign rule, integration or establishing self-government. At the same time, conceptions of state borders are affected by ‘domestic’ framings of social and political arenas and how territoriality is attached to projects of legitimizing and challenging power in the name of the ‘people’. Culturally and symbolically, the significance of borders is constantly reconstituted as part of every-day institutional and discursive practices, strategies of survival and challenge as well as related identities and identity politics.

**Borders and shifting post- Cold War power relations**

In each case study, border making processes were analyzed through a conceptual history approach and the investigation of *discursive situation or events* that make the political and social meaning of border concepts derivable. The teams identified the most significant ‘peaks of discussion’ and three common discursive events were the dissolution of Soviet Union (1990-1991), the enlargements of the EU and NATO (2004-2005), and the Ukrainian Crisis (2013-2014). Teams also identified and analyzed case specific events, like the Kosovo War (1999) in Bulgaria or the Bronze Soldier -case as a Russian-Estonian dispute. While the case studies have been based on analyzing bordering processes and conceptual shifts during the times of crisis, geo-strategic tensions in international or regional level have been effected on conceptions of borders in each case study. Emerging problems or challenges have varied in

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<th>Discursive event</th>
<th>Conceptual cluster</th>
<th>Counter-concepts and spatial imaginaries</th>
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<td>Dissolution of Soviet Union and the Cold War order (1990-1991)</td>
<td>• sovereignty&lt;br&gt;• national identity&lt;br&gt;• self-determination&lt;br&gt;• nation&lt;br&gt;• stability</td>
<td>• Europeanization (EC/EU) ↔ national self-determination&lt;br&gt;• EC/EU ↔ neutral Finland&lt;br&gt;• Europeanization ↔ neutralism&lt;br&gt;• Europe ↔ Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>Enlargements of the European Union and NATO (2004-2005)</td>
<td>• security&lt;br&gt;• stability&lt;br&gt;• internal / external threats&lt;br&gt;• ‘soft’ security: terrorism, migration&lt;br&gt;• socio-economy, welfare</td>
<td>• EU-Europe ↔ Russia&lt;br&gt;• internal ↔ external&lt;br&gt;• Europe ↔ East / Oriental&lt;br&gt;• Old Europe ↔ New Europe&lt;br&gt;• EU/Nato/West ↔ Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ukrainian Crisis (2014)</td>
<td>• self-determination&lt;br&gt;• sovereignty&lt;br&gt;• territorial integrity&lt;br&gt;• sphere of interests&lt;br&gt;• geopolitics&lt;br&gt;• self-sufficiency (energy)</td>
<td>• West ↔ East / Russia&lt;br&gt;• more Europe ↔ less Europe&lt;br&gt;• post-Cold War order&lt;br&gt;• a new Cold War</td>
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each cases, and like in Ukraine the border issues have been more concrete and related more on the ‘hard’ border - an existing state border, whereas in Finnish or Bulgarian cases the debate has more on to re-conceptualize political boundaries and space on a shifting international context. For instance, in Bulgaria the 1999 crisis in Kosovo was a major instance which brought to the fore two important processes ultimately leading to reconceptualization of borders: Firstly, concepts characteristic of the language of the modern national state (inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, sovereignty, ethnic identity) co-existed comfortably with terms promoted by the EU (and the US) in defining the region (security, stability, multiculturalism, multi-ethnicity, reconciliation etc.)

The Bulgarian political discourse, as a rule, was in line with the international community’s language about the Yugoslav crisis, which indicated certain significant transformations concerning the role of territory and borders. At the initial stage of the conflict, the EU (and NATO) heavily emphasized the principle of inviolability of borders and preservation of the territorial status-quo in the Balkans. After Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, however, EU political discourse shifted to terms like “stability”, “security”, “peaceful disintegration of states”, “self-determination”, “sovereignty”, “non-interference”. With the introduction of CFSP and the escalation of the Bosnian war after 1993, EU policies towards the region became more assertive and political language changed once again towards terms like “reconciliation,” “poly-ethnicity,” “cross-ethnic,” “multi-ethnic states,” “multiculturalism” etc. The shift in EU language was a consequence of the growing need for both a common foreign and security policy and a coordinated approach towards the Balkan region. As noted above, in the Bulgarian case these new concepts were usually couched in the language of the modern nation-state emphasizing ethnic identity, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders.

Secondly, the Kosovo war prompted the political repositioning of Bulgaria from “Central and Eastern Europe” (CEE) to “Southeastern Europe” (SEE) as well as its (self-)delineation from the other states in the Balkans. This process was related to some interesting shifts in the international community's re-conceptualization of the Balkans in the wake of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.

Between 1996 (when the so-called Southeastern European Cooperation Process was launched) and 1999 EU documents positioned Bulgaria in both CEE and SEE. In documents on CFSP and the SEE region Bulgaria repeatedly appeared as a role model, as a key factor for preserving peace and security in the Balkans. This was mostly due to Bulgaria’s strict adherence to the EU and NATO policy during the crisis in Kosovo providing land and air corridors for the deployment of NATO’s forces against Serbia. This helped the country to be treated, at least in the political discourse, as more European than the rest of the SEE region. The fast relocation of Bulgaria from Eastern (post-Soviet) Europe to the Balkans to the Western political and socio-cultural orbit reveals the malleability of spatial concepts and represents, from the point of view of conceptual history, one of the most suggestive and far-reaching effects of the Kosovo crisis. It was in this context that the war in Kosovo highlighted the post-Cold War period as a genuine Sattelzeit in the (re)conceptualization of space in post-1989 Bulgaria.
In the Ukrainian case, changes in the conceptions of borders are dominated by severe political and socioeconomic problems, while cultural, educational, and other aspects remain in the background to a significant degree. The most common ones are concepts of borders in the context of international politics, economics, and especially problems related to the supply of energy carriers. Every so often questions are raised about solving the brain drain problem and attempt to reform the education system. The question of the return of Ukraine’s cultural heritage from abroad is raised frequently.

The changes in the conceptions of Ukrainian borders during 1991–2014 mostly concern such points as: ensuring the state’s national security, protecting the borders from illegal migration and contraband, border crossing, transiting through customs control (including visa questions), the features of this procedure, and, connected with this, questions pertaining to the establishment of the state’s effective customs and border system. In other words, the young Ukrainian state’s “self-description” included formal spheres and topics that were “externally” important for the legitimization of statehood more often than “internally” important topics. That means, that for a lengthy period of time the Ukrainian elite saw the Ukrainian state’s source of legitimacy in external recognition of the state and not in internal recognition on the part of its citizens. In addition, since more than a thousand articles are connected one way or another with customs questions (including visas, documents, etc.), one can assume the purposeful construction of the concept of the state border for the most part through the treatment of the border as a hard one, in fact, one that is an institutionalized, barrier one; treatment of the border as a place where economics and politics are refracted, and not as a place where cultures intersect and interactions take place.

Specific features of Post-Soviet borders as objects of EU policies

Finnish case: Geo-strategical and geopolitical tensions have been catalyzed border-related debate in Finland in the post-Cold period. Firstly, the dissolving of Soviet Union and the entire Socialist bloc resonated with Finland who had shared the border with Soviet Union for decades. Also neutrality policy and the Finno-Soviet Treaty, both related to the border, became under scrutiny during these years. Secondly, rapprochement of Cold War rivalries during the years has enabled Finland to open its Eastern border for cross-border traffic and trade which have had great national and regional impact on economy and business. Geopolitical tensions, like the Georgian War in 2008 and above all the Ukrainian Crisis have affected on cross-border activities but also conceptions of the border. Loss of Russian tourists have been evidently witnessed on the border regions, and in political language geopolitical conceptualizations have been broadly cited. After the annexation of Crimea, using of Cold War -like vocabulary and analogies have become more common. The crisis has been commonly contextualized, interpreted and explained through East-West/Russia-West nexuses which have both reconstructed and strengthened historical rivalries and dichotomies of the international relations. Hence, the Finnish-Russian border has been presented not only as a traditional, Westphalian state border but also as the East-West boundary. Geo-strategic problems, generally speaking, in Europe and its neighbourhood have catalyzed debate on security policy and the Finnish-Russian border has been one of the key themes in these debates.
In general, the Finnish-Russian border has closely related to identity politics and geopolitical interpretations during the examined period. The Finnish-Russian border has broadly been used to define Finnish nationhood and relation to Russia and Europe. During the first peak 1990-1991, Finland sought its place in transforming Europe, and the border was used to both to restrict and promote ‘Westernization’ and/or ‘Europeanization’ understood as participation on the integration processes. In context of the enlargement of the EU and NATO in 2004-2005 Finland’s place was presented quite stable among European democracies. The securitization of the borders was much debated and the border was reflected both in context of ‘soft’ (human trafficking, illegal trade, smuggling, organized crime) and ‘hard’ (military) security. As the external EU border, it was conceptualized as a barrier and control zone.

Third peak 2014-2015 shows that the using of Cold War concepts in every day political language has increased during the Ukrainian Crisis. The return of geopolitics to Europe was largely agreed, and the Finnish-Russian border was interpreted as the East-West borderline. Finland’s place among the Western democracies was presented stable, but the impact of sanctions to national economy raised questions if Finland should emphasize more on bilateral than EU-Russian relations. The border was also seen as geopolitical risk factor and parallels with other Russian border states, including Ukraine, was made both to promote non-alignment policy and NATO membership. Sovereignty and territorial integrity were presented as the key concepts of European borders in general.

Common for all peaks is that Russia plays an important role in Finnish political debate. The significance of the border is beyond territorial demarcation with impact on e.g. national identity, debate on foreign and security policy. Economic benefits and shared aims to create European, natural neighbourhood with Russia has broadly been noted. However, during the shifting periods, these functionalities appear mainly in subordinate clauses, whereas identity and geopolitical discourses tend to dominate in political debate.

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Moscow case: According to the results of the Moscow team, Russian discussion on new independent countries state-building is closely related with nationalism associated, on its turn, with anti-Russian foreign policy and bordering. In Russian political discourse, the general idea is that their elites try to create ethnocracies, applying the 19th century European model of nation-states and formally proclaiming the objective to build new political nations but in reality privileging the interests of only titular ethnic group(s) or even some parts of them. The mainstream Russian discourse is also based on the assumption that the ideal of political nation will make easier post-Soviet integration.

An analysis of post-Soviet changes in a set of monuments, symbols, toponyms, expositions of local museums, etc. confirms the hypothesis that symbolic policy is a tool for the dissemination of interpretations legitimizing the position of the elite at power, and is not related with a rational judgment of historical events. In border regions of Baltic countries and Ukraine the ideas of opposition, a civilizational border, historical offenses and injustice are being diffused. The process of a visual demarcation of the cultural divide did not concern yet much the Russian-Kazakhstani border but a contradiction between the materialization of the official narrative of national history and the memory about the past within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union can be observed. The use of contemporary European institutes of cross-border cooperation serves not only to increase openness and trust but also to disseminate old phobias and stereotypes via new legitimate channels. On the Russian side the symbolic policy is much less developed than in neighboring countries. The most important transformations of cultural landscapes are observed on the western borders, especially where “phantom borders” can excite public opinion (Kaliningrad and Pskov regions).

Drastic changes in the interpretation of common Russian-Ukrainian history marked the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010), like posthumous rewarding of radical nationalist Stepan Bandera known for his alliance with the Nazism and repressions against Jews and Poles. He was declared Hero of Ukraine as fighter against communism. A true battle of memory was unleashed by Yushchenko and his team around the theme of Holodomor – dramatic starvation in Ukraine artificially provoked by the Stalin regime in 1932-1933. From the perspective of Yushchenko, it was a purposeful action of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Russian historians and politicians tried to prove that starvation concerned also many agricultural regions of Russia and Kazakhstan. Viktor Yanukovich, Yushchenko’s successor, agreed with this position but new Ukrainian authorities, which overturned him, came back to intransigent and radical anti-Russian interpretations of everything related with Russia.

The most spectacular is the radical re-bordering at the Russian-Ukrainian boundary resulted from political change in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the civil war in Donbass. In autumn 2015 Russia and Ukraine closed their air space for direct flights connecting their cities and for transit. In March 2015 Ukraine abolished the simplified border regime with Russia. Nowadays, it is possible to cross the boundary between two countries only through few international crossing points. On the Ukrainian initiative, only international passports are accepted by border guards on both sides, unlike the recent past. To avoid infiltration of Russian military to the area of the hostilities in Donbass Ukrainian authorities forbidden to cross the country’s boundary to single Russian male citizens between 16 and 60. Exceptions can be made only to those who submit a paper about illness or the death of relatives in Ukraine certified by a notary, or an official invitation. By November 2015, it was possible to
cross the boundary between mainland Ukraine and Crimea only by foot and after a strict check on both sides. Both sides dislocated military units along the boundary. Cross-border cooperation is stopped.

**Bordering as part of identity politics, the role of mass media in the processes of border construction in today’s Russia (St. Petersburg case)** While we share the idea of multiplication of borders and boundaries and their mobile and situational character and find arguments in support of this thesis in our work, we also clearly see that this is the state that keeps serving as the major border creator and border operator. In the processes of bordering and re-bordering state remains a major actor launching targeted programmes on strengthening or blurring the borders in various spheres of political and social life. This may sound as common sense, however in contemporary Russia we see processes of boundary constructions everywhere, which is a striking difference with, say, political and social developments ten or fifteen years ago. In contemporary geopolitical context the question about borders, and predominantly in their primary geopolitical sense, is one of the most debated in Russia’s media space. There are almost no independent media in Russia. In the conditions of state monopoly on information there is no public debate allowing a plurality of options. Mass media is a mirror of state policy and politics, lately oriented towards seeking enemies and boundary construction with the outside world as well as within the country. In pro-state media the depictions of the Other is increasingly gaining the form of seeking and exposing enemies; media is shaping the space where Other is presented not as exotic (and interesting) cultural Other but as the one who is dangerous and carries the threat for national (and personal) security. This trend stems from international context which Russia is fully engaged with, such as the war in the Ukraine or in Syria, and also internal dynamics, namely the politics within the country oriented towards the “strengthening of Russia’s spiritual buckles”, support of patriotism and exposing of non-loyal dangerous “foreign agents” within the country.

On the level of everyday life and daily practices touching upon all population, the role of the state in bordering processes is no less significant. For example, the state limits the freedom of movement of its citizens. One of the bright examples of this is a limitation on international travels for the workers of state sphere, introduced by Russia in the course of the sanctions’ war. Additionally, playing out a patriotic card with the emphasis on Orthodoxy and patriarchy, the state does not support social and cultural multiplicity and creates prerequisites for attacking any minorities as not corresponding to the general canon. This leads to unification of the Russian society, to the extent that being ‘Other’ becomes dangerous. In the conditions of strengthening the borders between the dominant ‘good’ core and ‘deviant’ others, people try not to demonstrate their difference; boundaries within society becomes less visible, something what people try to hide.

**Hungarian case:** EU – Russia – Ukraine crisis is relevant also from the point of views of Hungary. Economic embargo against Russia is a permanent element of Hungarian political and civic discussions. The Hungarian-Ukraine connections (partly because of Hungarian-Russian political and economic co-operations) have been complicating. Geo-strategic question: how can an EU and NATO member country manage her connections with Russia without inner conflicts with her partners?
In the European and Hungarian development the state borders has been historical products. The first form of the Hungarian borders has been the zonal border (gyeptű) which was a zonal structure in fact. In the first Hungarian written history (Gesta of Anonymus) in the late 12th century a lineal border was appeared. In the modern history of Hungarian state borders the different types of zonal borders (military border zone, administrative border zone) has been appearing many times. The border of political integration (Austria-Hungary, inner, outer) had been functioning for centuries. In our research the state border first of all has been a historically changing line.

In the development of modern Hungarian border changing processes the international actors were dominated. (1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, 1947 Paris Peace Treaty.) Existing of international state borders has been dominated by the international community. Because of complicated historical development of Hungary, her territory, and state structures the state borders and border changes has been in the focus of Hungarian society, policy and geography. Especially between the period of two wars the borders questions were dominated the education (from the primary schools to the universities), the societal and political discussions, literature and newspapers. The new communication technology (radio) served the national aims.

During the period of state socialism the border questions were hidden. In practices there were very different border sections of the country. From the nearly military border (Austrian-Hungarian, early 50’s for Yugoslavia) to the nearly closed border (Hungarian-Soviet) for civil peoples. In 1988-1989 the two Iron Curtains were opened.

The Bulgarian case: The most notable shifts in the conceptualization of borders in Bulgaria are related to two major processes – the country’s spatial and civilizational “turn” from East to West after the end of the Cold War, and its search for a new regional and geopolitical identity against the backdrop of territorial changes and security challenges in the Balkans.
In the early 1990s, Bulgaria sought its new geopolitical identity through integration in the political and economic structures of the West – the European Union and NATO. The search for alternatives to Soviet power promoted new horizons of expectations and new ideas of sovereignty. For Bulgaria, the integration into the European and trans-Atlantic structures represented a matter of both geopolitical and, what came to be called, “civilizational choice.” Border making processes here involved not so much stricto sensu political borders, as social, cultural and symbolic borders, temporal borders (past-future) and grander-than-national spatial imaginaries (East-West).

In terms of regionalization, the early 1990’s EU (and NATO) policies and strategies treated Bulgaria exclusively as a part of the spatial category of East Central Europe understood as a common post-Soviet space, consisting of countries in transition (and less so as, for example, a part of the Balkans). Transition became the term that defined the borderline between the post-Soviet and the non-post-Soviet space in the Balkan region. Bulgaria embraced this left-over of the Cold War partition and its positioning into the Eastern European spatial orbit since it contained the promise of future merging with the West. Moreover, Bulgaria’s re-positioning into Central and Eastern Europe was a process of “ distancing” itself from the territorial and border disputes that were taking place in the Balkan region at that time. It was accompanied by discourses that emphasized the right to self-determination –with respect both to the
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the collapse of the USSR. Territorial changes in former Yugoslavia and former USSR thus did not trigger a notable debate on the role and meaning of political borders in post-Cold War Bulgaria. Rather, the new geopolitical identity of the country and the ongoing East-West turn proved to be a powerful tool against interpretations associating the Balkans almost exclusively with nationalism and nationalistic excesses. The absence of serious debates on the political meaning of borders in a context of territorial changes in the broader region constituted a steady tendency throughout the Yugoslav wars that would only change during the Kosovo crisis in 1999.

The crisis in Kosovo triggered the first in-depth discussions on the role of political borders and territory in post-Cold War Bulgarian political and media language. The threat of changing Balkan borders was measured against possible delay (or acceleration) of Bulgaria’s European and trans-Atlantic integration. Furthermore, the crisis led to a political relocation of Bulgaria from the “Central and Eastern European” to the “Southeastern European” orbit, together with its (self-)differentiating from the other states in the Balkans. The country was no longer to be seen as a part of post-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe, but as a stable island within the turbulent Balkan region, committed to the policies and the political culture of the “West”. The Kosovo war thus served as a consolidating factor for Bulgaria’s new geopolitical and regional identity as a country belonging to Europe and the West. This process culminated with Bulgaria’s EU accession, which brought along the opening up of certain intraregional borders (e.g. with Greece and Romania) and the securitization of other (especially with Turkey and Serbia).

**Finnish case:** As already reflected in previous points, the UEF team focused on analyzing crisis situations and conceptual shifts in these contexts. During the Ukrainian Crisis the Finnish-Russian border has been constructed through geopolitical imagination, and everyday geopolitics has been a dominant political discourse in analysed material. Concepts, like sphere of interest, sovereignty and territorial integrity have been referred and the Crisis has widely explained through East-West or West-Russia clash of policies and narratives. Finland, commonly defined as the Russian borderland, has then became more vulnerable because of geopolitical position. There has been analogies to history, especially Cold War period has been cited and used to explain and understand the contemporary crisis. Finland and Ukraine are also in some addresses paralleled as both are non-aligned Russian border states, which have been used for arguing for Finnish accession to NATO. Defining Russia as a threat, in sense of traditional security, has become more common and acceptable during the Ukrainian Crisis, while previously that kind of statements by political representatives have been rarely seen.

Common to all discursive events analysed is that Finland’s relation to Russia and Europe has been debated during the crisis situations, and often there has been competing visions of (military) alignment and non-alignment. In the early 1990s the European Community was presented as the right reference group for Finland, and as a protective alliance in case of security problems. After the EU-accession in 1995 it has been NATO that has promoted as the most important security community for Finland, and Finland has tightened a close cooperation with NATO through different initiatives but not applied the full membership. In times of crisis the non-alignment has been much discussed, and often the border has been used as an argument by both advocates and opponents of a membership.
The Finnish-Russian border has historically played a significant role in nation-building and identity politics. There has been much identity political using and formulation of the border also in the contemporary era, sometimes referred as “post-national”. The border has been used for constructing spatial imaginaries of Finnish neighbourhood and (re)-mapping Finland on changing Europe. There has been several mapping discourses in which Finland’s place on an imagined political map of Europe is defined through the Russian-border. An idea of Finland as a borderland nation-state locating between the East and West or Europe and Russia has broadly used for legitimizing political aims. Identity political connotations of the border have been used for both nation-building and strengthening of national identity, i.e. Finns as the truly Western nation (othering Russia) or Finns as borderland nation (between East and West, Europe and Russia).

Evidence of conceptual and theoretical development

Work package 3 has examined conceptual shifts in the process of re-bordering of the post-Soviet space by analysing political discourses and media representations in case studies of Russian, Finnish, Hungarian, Ukrainian and Bulgarian borders. Furthermore, the WP case studies have explored re-mapping of post-Soviet space and spatial imaginaries that are used to (de)construct territoriality and notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘self’ and ‘the other’, e.g. Novorossiya, Russkii mir, Transcarpathian Basin or Southeastern Europe.

The common approach of WP3 was based on conceptual history and regarding state borders as political concepts; fluid, contested and ambiguous. The approach is based on the premise that borders have a double meaning as state boundaries and frames of social and political arenas and as symbolic social and cultural lines of inclusion and difference. These meanings are based both on collective historical narratives and individual identity construction of the self, in which difference is related, but not reducible to, space. Underlying such an approach is the understanding of space and borders as being not so much related to their material morphology, but to the premises of their social production and the ideological underpinnings of this production, the various forms of interpretation and representation that it embodies. Hence, to define ‘border’ comprehensively is neither possible nor appropriate. As other key concepts of modern political language, i.e. state, nation or society, the significance of ‘border’ is constantly changing and its meanings vary depending on users, contexts, purposes and intentions.

State borders are historically formed as markers of spheres of power and, in this sense, they are products of competing projects of establishing power over territories and groups of people. From the perspective of political mobilization and collective action, borders have, at the same time, been constantly reconstructed as frames of social arenas and political landscapes, strategies of challenge and survival as well as related patterns of identification and identity politics. Within the study of international relations, the Post-Cold War period is seen as a time of fundamental changes in conceptualizing sovereignty and territoriality that are identified as symptoms of a new ‘post-Westphalian’ international order. Our analysis of the discussions concerning post-Soviet borders verifies that there are clear tendencies of new kind of Europeanization of borders in the context of political and economic integration. Especially, within the European Union the implementation of EU-regulation has transposed parts of traditional state’s sovereignty to the supranational level. As part of EU neighbourhood policies these new thinking modes have been introduced and gained ground.
even within post-Soviet space. In general, the Westphalian idea of territorial sovereignty has, however, prevailed as a hegemonic conceptualization throughout the examined period and ‘sovereignty’ as a concept has maintained its static-territorial links esp. in the context of discussions concerning the so-called frozen conflicts, Chechnian and Georgian wars and the Ukraine crises.

**Future paths**

General observations of conceptual shifts of borders and bordering in the post-Cold War space indicate how issues of geopolitics, geopolitical identity and state borders still are highly politicized and contestable. In some cases, the dynamics of the debate affect policy making processes when state borders and spatial imaginaries are used for arguing decision-making. Energy, security and foreign politics seem to be that kind of sectors of policy making in where borders have been constantly used for policy making arguments, and through their argumentative and rhetoric used, state borders have been re-conceptualized. Traditional geopolitical imaginaries have maintained through the post-Cold period, and re-shaped during the crisis situations. National self-perceptions produced in political and media discourses. The borders have affected on nation-building, ontological security, national narrative and identity. They seem to be very political concepts with many dimensions, meanings, uses and interpretations. More important than to construct a hegemonic border discourse is to identify these competing discourses, and to comprehend a nature of constant change of the border. Everybody involved in political debates from journalists and politicians to intellectuals and regular citizens make a border. Therefore, everybody shares a responsibility of creating border discourses and imaginaries around the border. In times of crisis, like in our contemporary world with news of all kind of crisis, there is need for critical evaluation of these discourses. Self-evident imaginaries of nation states, Europe, Russia, the EU, Orient, the West and so on need to be critically evaluated. Distinctive function of (state) borders is human-created social phenomena, it is not static and ahistorical “fact” which would be not able to redefine. On the contrary, critical studies are needed for re-constructing rivalry imaginaries and vocabularies, to re-conceptualize borders more as places of encountering than barriers of diverge.

After the final conference the joint work of the wp teams continues in form of a joint book project. Based on the in-depth analysis of key-debates, each team has prepared reports in article form of shifting sovereignty concepts and territorial imaginaries. The coordinating team has carried out an analysis of EU policy documents that will help to identify conceptual variation between conceptualizations of the EU and member country approaches to post-Soviet borders. The articles will be submitted for publication to Routledge series of Borderlands studies in September 2016. Cooperation of the Joensuu and Moscow team will continue in the frame of two new research project funded by the Academy of Finland and the Kone foundation.
WP 4 (Europeanization: European Integration and Conceptual Change)

General goals and philosophy

The WP has focused on the ways political and wider social debates contributed to shifts in border concepts within a framework of Europeanization. The notion of Europeanization signifies the ideational rapprochement of actors and institutions to the norms, values, rules, institutions and customs declared to be characteristic of the EU by EU policies. It is enacted in the process of European integration and enlargement, and it has multiple implications for bordering. However, since this is a normative idea borne out of political precepts, the analytical reformulation of the term “Europeanization” had to be differentiated. On the one hand it refers to the adaptation of “European” norms, rules, values and institutions by accessing and member states and regional or local stakeholders. On the other hand it refers to the original creation of border concepts and bordering practices which address a common element of Europe which however has not been (completely) foreseen or predefined by the European Union. The former variation of Europeanization we call Europeanization from above, the latter one Europeanization from below. These two basic modes of Europeanization interact and correspond to continual contestation, e.g. by nationalist and regionalist political thinking. Therefore, one element of conceptual evolution involves a partial reframing of state borders that reflects supranational (i.e. European) understandings of political, social and cultural space. However, another element of this diffusion is more contested; supranational perspectives compete with more nationally and locally oriented notions of citizenship, belonging and “common values”. Especially under the condition of the enduring Eurozone crisis Europeanization finds itself permanently challenged by growing trends of Euroscepticism.

This perspective entails a critical investigation of bordering processes in terms of how official policies, political debates as well as media representations and more informal local “place-making” practices contributed to variegated European interpretations of national borders. Work includes research tasks aiming at uncovering divergences and convergences of various modes of European border representations (political language, media, academic, cultural). What do these convergences and divergences tell about images of Europe in terms of openness and closedness? The theoretical focus developed throughout this WP has been built around the category of discourse. Relevant types of discourse that are subject to analysis are political and public discourse as well as media discourse at national and local levels. Another important theoretical notion is “imaginary”; it addresses the ideological, emotional, stereotypical and legitimizing quality of collective attributions made to particular borders, agents and territories during the evolution of discourses.

According to the primary distinction between Europeanization from above and below, the individual Research Tasks provide different accounts of “imagining” Europe when describing the contested nature of borders. RT 1 focuses on the European Union itself, as a generator and distributor of ideas of Europeanization. In particular, its institutions, major stakeholders and policies are screened for the particular normativism that they issued in relation to Europeanization, which in turn affected the political framing of borders and bordering. Also the insights of border research into the evolution of border concepts are subject to analysis.
In contrast, RT 2 assumes the perspective of Europeanization from below. It focuses on representations of borders and bordering in political and media discourse at national and subnational levels. These “local” understandings of borders, and the forms of social practice involved, often sit uneasy with EU-official or national imaginaries. They entrench the border as an item of practical liveability, identity, local history or economic profitability, with varying ways of addressing Europe (e.g. in terms of openness or closedness). These variations may diverge or converge, especially under conditions of the European economic crisis and the adventurous geopolitical interventions of the EU into its neighbourhood. The focus of analysis here is on a comparison of case studies of national and subnational media discourse occurring in different macro-regions displaying assumed political and social differences: Core Europe, Post-Socialist Europe, former Yugoslavia, Post-Soviet regions etc.

RT 3 takes up the view from below in a comparative and synthesizing manner. It puts a number of specific questions about emerging re-conceptualizations of European border that originate from local experience, including questions of periodicity, causation and context-dependency.

**Overall progress of the RTs from project start**

Analytical work in all RTs was handicapped by the fact that international politics in the European Neighbourhood, and its effects on European borders, recently gained such a momentum that a good deal of empirical findings were either rapidly outdated or had to be reasserted. Political shifts saw the EU increasingly involved in geostrategy, especially during and after the Arab Spring, during the Ukraine crisis, the quasi bloc confrontation between EU and Russia, and the escalation of the Syrian war. From early 2015 on, the EU experienced an unprecedented influx of large numbers of refugees and immigrants to West and North Europe. Policies of letting go refugee immigration in Sweden or Germany were answered by Central and Southeast Europe’s cataract-like closing of national borders to the southeast. The effect has been temporary, partial and chaotic suspensions of the Schengen and Dublin regulations. This dynamism caused a dilemma for the WP since the larger part of case studies in RT 2 could not be sufficiently updated to fully capture discourses up to this day. The majority of the sweeping events fell into the last 18 months of the project term, when most of the empirical work had already been done. The individual WP teams did as much as they could to capture the factual shifts and dramatically changed interpretations of borders. However this could only account for a small part of what actually happened, and should have been analysed, sufficient amounts of time and resources given. Therefore most empirical findings represent the status quo ante of recent political disruptions, with the exception of occasional updates that were made by individual teams on the basis of available local resources. This status quo often contains the seeds of changes that became manifest a couple of months later, hence there is some opportunity to trace recent developments back to basic presets, dispositions and discourses created in earlier stages of EU-neighbourhood relations, formal border regimes and evolving borderscapes.

After an initial period of exploring methodological approaches, discussing theoretical categories such as imaginaries, and delimiting the scope and procedures of document analysis (RT 1) and regional case studies (RT 2), the WP teams agreed to apply mutually compatible theoretical perspectives to varying situational contexts where possible. Geopolitical change at
the eastern fringe of the EU resulted in diversified response by southeast European regional and national media which was handled successfully by individual regional teams (e.g. CAS, RKK). They dedicated available resources to the analysis of recent discourses on rebordering, defense against immigration and the geopolitical realignment of the European neighbourhood.

The study of top-down Europeanization performed in RT 1 (Europeanization and Conceptual Shifts in Understanding Borders) was partly rearranged due to the need to react upon the quickly shifting scenery of regional bordering and the need to produce at least the most important updates for RT 2’s case studies. RT 1a (Europeanization of Borders: Policies and Political Language) had originally been subdivided into the analysis of EU policy documents and the analysis of positions taken by large interest groups and the civil society. The second part of this RT was dropped in favour of creating additional work capacities for RT 2.

The distribution of work in Research Task 1 was rearranged according to the following scheme:

RT 1a: Europeanization of Borders: Policies and Political Language
Review and desktop analysis of EU documents on sectoral polices was carried out by UEF (cohesion policy), CEPS/LISER (internal market, labour market policy) and IRS (higher education and knowledge production).

1b: Europeanization of Borders: Research Insights and Perspectives
Review and desktop analysis of EU RTD supported research on borders focused on the body of projects funded by EU Frameworks 6 and 7. Work based on screening of published project materials was shared by IRS, UEF, UH, QUB and CAS.

Research Task 2 moved from the rough idea of producing contrasting accounts of Europeanization from below, as related to bordering practice, towards a stronger orientation at reconstructing heterogeneous national and subnational discourses, including their idiosyncratic ways of positioning borders as points of reference within the growing trend of ‘going geopolitical’. It also aimed at grasping the issue of upcoming Euroscepticism which obviously relativized the former ‘Europeanising’ bias of national and regional debates.

Case studies on national and subnational policy and media discourses were made for the following pre-defined macro regions:
- Core Europe (RT 2a): IRS (Germany/Poland), CNRS-PACTE (France/Switzerland), QUB (Ireland/UK)
- Post-Socialist member states (RT 2b): CAS (Bulgaria/various), RKK (Hungary), UG (Poland/Germany, Poland/Russia)
- Former Yugoslavia (RT 2c): RKK (Serbia), CAS
- Post-Soviet Bordering (RT 2d): UEF (Finland/Russia)

According to national differences in type and extension of discourses the individual teams focused on those debates that delivered sufficient text materials for analysis. In some cases local policy and media debates on borders were nearly absent; discussions on borders and Europe could be recognized at national levels only (e.g. in Hungary or Bulgaria). For media analysis, in turn, print media were not always available or relevant, e.g. in Southeast European countries where online media and blogs served as the main forums of political opinion making. Therefore the empirical data basis has not been symmetric. It was left up to the individual teams to define the focus of analysis and produce consistent readings of the partial
discourses they analysed. Not in all cases policy analysis was done because available documents lacked substance concerning Europeanization and bordering. However all teams did media analysis, albeit mostly with a focus on either national or local media, depending on the availability of analysable materials.

An additional collaborative task was defined together with WP 8 in analysing perspectives on the German-Polish border that were generated in twin cities. This task was performed by the complementary analysis of stakeholder interviews by the IRS and UG teams. Additions were also made through a small number of up-to-date analyses of Core European media discourse on the Eastern Neighbourhood (Ukraine conflict) and the shifting interpretation of the EU’s external border in its overseas territories (New Caledonia), based on local activism towards decolonization.

**Synthesis of the overall results**

**RT 1a: Europeanization of Borders: Policies and Political Language**

The analysis of EU policy documents focused on the EU-internal labour market and the sector of higher education.

EU policy discourse on economic and labour market integration (CEPS/LISER) strongly referred to the neo-liberal concept of the Single Market. The EU devised a truly borderless vision for its politico-economic union while paradoxically discussing the significance of border or cross-border population mobility mostly within the framework of other sectoral policies (e.g. security policy or migration policy). This vision has been utterly normative, stressing the necessity of guaranteeing the “four freedoms”, i.e. the free mobility of people, goods, capital and services. Criticism within EU documents originally was sparse but increased towards 2015, arising from acknowledgements of the “incomplete” realization of these “freedoms”, and discussions about hindrances stemming from the Schengen and Eurozone regulations. Nevertheless borders, bordering or issues of exclusion/inclusion are seldom openly discussed; if at all, they are mentioned indirectly when addressing (mostly national) obstacles to the implementation of the Single Market.

The recent increase of refugees and labour-seeking (EU-internal) migrants, caused by new geopolitics in the Neighbourhood and the repercussions of the global economic crisis in the crisis-struck European South, found some official interpretation, mainly in neo-liberal categories. EU documents on the labour market envisaged free mobility as a tool of relieving the South from unemployment. In a similar economic fashion recent mass immigration was marked as having a temporarily destabilising potential which might dissolve due to the balancing power of the Single Market.

From 2000 on EU policy in higher education (IRS) likewise focused on economic concepts with a clear neo-liberal focus. Education and vocational training have been devised as a means of advancing a knowledge-driven economy and reinforcing innovation and competitiveness. Borders received attention only indirectly, namely as obstacles that hinder the creation of a joint European Higher Education area. They were understood to be indicators of the high degree of heterogeneity of European universities and research organizations,
according to their “national” type of organization, governance and operating conditions. Borders were also discussed as institutional barriers to mobility and exchange which had to be overcome. Governance of the educational sector became an increasingly important issue. New partnerships were discussed, bringing together governments, universities and the private economy (addressed as ‘triple helix’ or ‘third mission’).

From the 1990s on cohesion policy and cross-border cooperation (analysed by UEF) have been brought together by the EU to the end of achieving regional development goals. At the beginning the objectives of debordering and interstate integration were institutionalized under the model of the Euroregion. Euroregions were especially implemented between old and new member states to mediate between competing territorial logics at EU, national, regional and local levels. This project was accompanied by the express political will to create a supranational community based on a shared sense of political, social and identity. Processes of Europeanization were initiated, defined in terms of a gradual diffusion of transnational understandings of citizenship, identity and governance. Since 2000 this formal way of institutionalising cross-border connectivity has been gradually replaced by “place-based strategies” and “integrated territorial investments”. This includes the recent reformulation of cross-border cooperation within the more inclusive notion of Territorial Cooperation; it seeks to reduce the negative effects of borders as administrative, legal and physical barriers while allowing for flexible private sector network building. While implementing deeper the normative political language of Europeanization via integrating formerly divided border regions conflicting attitudes towards more open borders emerged, particularly in Central East and Southeast European regions. As cross-border cooperation is understood here in terms of European cohesion it nevertheless is heavily influenced by overlying political goals of nation-building and ethnicity. Consequently a notable East-West divide in the acceptance and adaptation of cross-border cooperation arose that can be attributed to variegated processes of Europeanization.

**1b: Europeanization of Borders: Research Insights and Perspectives**

EU RTD supported research has been analysed with regard to dominant themes, analytical perspectives and conceptual foundations. The material basis has been project reports and publications produced by EU Framework Programme 6 and 7 projects. While the majority of research projects were based on empirical analysis close to political interest, e.g. of creating evidence about good practice and problems of implementing EU policies, some projects also contributed to the answering of basic theoretical questions. Nevertheless a general development of theoretical concepts referring to Europeanization and bordering has only seldom been promoted by this kind of research. Most characteristic is a dominance of projects on topics related to Europeanization in a very broad sense: i.e. EU cohesion, EU integration by harmonizing policies and sectoral regulations, European identity building, regional economic development, etc.

A smaller number of projects concentrated on borders and bordering issues, most of them contributing to the focus on cross-border cooperation which was a thematic stronghold of the FP 6 funding period. They were conducted by economics and laws on the one hand, and by social and political sciences on the other hand. Economic projects often involved an EU-affirmative perspective focusing on good practice in cross-border economic integration.
Projects of the social and political sciences established a more distanced perspective, mainly in connection with themes such as border identities, bottom-up CBC, the role of the civil society and everyday practice for EU borders. Projects implemented later in the FP 7 funding period found it easier to develop a more independent perspective, some of them raising critical questions about EU integration and challenging the EU claim for conceptual hegemony.

All in all, the rhetorical preconceptions and political objectives of the EU are clearly present in almost all projects, either as part of the language of presentation or as a backdrop to implicitly normative arguing. The project descriptions and the concepts usually take up the normative idea that the nation state should be overcome in favour of a united, internally mobile, peaceful, economically strong and competitive EU. Obvious is a double orientation at EU supremacy: The EU is either portrayed as an enabling institution of de-bordering, or as the natural home of democracy, transnational citizenship and shared identity. Most projects take over the rhetoric of “removing obstacles” or establishing “good neighbourhood relations”, in spite of irritating findings related to the lacking compatibility of the southeastern periphery or the eastern neighbourhood, particularly when it comes to the varieties of east European capitalism, corruption, extreme nationalism and lacking support of civil society. The tension between the need for analytical independence and the urge towards political compliance produces a veritable paradox: the projects’ discourse offers a rich gamut of conceptualizations of citizenship, identities, inclusion, participation, etc. often contributing to the image of an EU evolving the bottom-up way; but at the same time the projects seek more to improve, rather than offer alternatives to, top-down EU policies.

RT 2: National Convergence and Divergence in Framing European Borders:

The analytical focus of this RT was on characterising the political language and the imaginaries implemented in national and subnational discourse on bordering and Europeanization. Particular attention was paid to discursive orientations that might indicate instances of (imagined or practical) Europeanization from below. From a comparative analysis of the degree of diversion or convergence of subnational positions and their respective shifts a number of general assumptions about intersecting or overlaying trends were supposed to emerge. The following paragraphs summarize the main findings from the individual case studies, before a comparative synthesis will be made.

(2a) Perspectives from “Core Europe”

PACTE-CNRS analysed the French-Swiss and French-Belgian borders with respect to territorial planning policy discourse at national and regional levels, focusing on the metropolitan regions of Lille and Geneva. In both regions Europeanization for the most part appears as an elite motto while large parts of the population remain untouched by political demands for pro-active EU support. Rather, the EU, as a backdrop to every day life, seems to have attained the status of taken-for-granted reality without receiving explicit cognitive attention. This orientation covers both metropolitan development and border-related issues.

Nevertheless the empirical findings point at different types of discourse evolving in both metropolizes (integration vs. heterogeneity of topics, arenas etc.); accordingly, dominant...
understandings of basic problems differ considerably. The case of Geneva reveals a small “clash of planning cultures”: Swiss pragmatism in terms of incremental functional consolidation vs. high-flying French idealism in terms of transnational regionalization. This contradiction is partially resolved by implementing planning projects “at ground level”, rather than imagining the metropolis as part of a larger European whole. “Europe” is made a label that is meant to attract external investors to a cross-border economic territory while leaving the national border as a separating item untouched. This situation is accompanied by mild disinterest from the local population and hardly any media referencing beyond the individual projects. The case of Lille, on the contrary, explicitly refers to Europe as a political and ideological embedding structure, as far as political planning is concerned. The suffix “Eura” is applied frequently by local elites for relevant projects. This practice factually remained part of a symbolic labelling approach.

Media response has been is vivid and problem-oriented. The media often take the role of opinion leaders in favour of Europeanization modernization while at the same time neglecting civil society. In face of serious social problems and rising anti-European opinions at the local basis this neglect reproduces the distance between political elites and the population that had already been created by political planning.

QUB addressed the history of the UK-Irish border in terms of national politics, economics and security policy. Drawing upon expert interviews and local/national media analysis, the case study stated that the relationship between UK and IRL within a Schengen context involves various forms of reconceptualising the border as an EU border. The European dimension paradoxically evolves upon the attempt by national and local media to downplay the EU’s role in bordering processes. A discursive framework has been created for the collective normalising of an open border by describing the border as an emergent “tissue of connectivity”. Consequently “local chatter” focuses on local achievements in promoting economic exchange and Irish unification. The media often describe imaginaries of the border that have been strongly framed by the UK-IRL peace process. These descriptions nevertheless conform to the top-down notions used by EU policies. “Re-nationalising” the European impact on the border thus indirectly promotes acceptance of the open border, while not necessarily popularising EU understandings of European borders. On the contrary: re-nationalization facilitated rising repudiation of the EU in terms of Euroscepticism. Being suspicious about the hidden EU character of the border obviously went hand in hand with general discontent with the EU in Northern Island. In public opinion the EU clearly changed from a problem solver to a problem maker. Euroscepticism and moral polarising pro and con the EU thus parallels the general debate on Brexit in the UK. Hence the gap between Euroscepticism and the factual implementation of a de-bordered (EU-conformous) border via re-nationalising tends to further widen – its inherent antagonism remaining unnoticed by a larger public.

IRS and UG worked on the discursive normalization of the German-Polish border, especially after Poland’s accession to the EU and its integration into the Schengen zone. Screenings of national policy documents and local media discourse at the border also laid the basis for a more detailed case study of two twin cities (see below, RT 2e), encompassing the local framings of discourse and the local variations of imaginary building on both sides of the border. In contrast regional media analysis done by IRS in the German part of the border
region revealed that all periods received much more journalistic attention. However the perspectives on the border region were highly ambiguous – oscillating between expectations for economic upswing, fears of “imported” crime, security problems and labour market decline. An undercurrent narrative of persistent loss and victimization, created in former days of post-communism, and preserved by the enduring economic crisis, was carried on. The EU was hardly ever openly addressed as a motor of change. The region itself (meaning the German part of the border region, in fact) was often portrayed in a historicizing manner, referring to the medieval age (e.g. in connection with the trade zone of the Hanse), and blinding out the communist past. This laid the foundation to an imaginary that ignored the recent having-become of the altered border by EU policy and its pending impact on the local everyday. It reads “Our region has been that way from medieval times on” and serves to wipe out the recent past and present in local discourse. After Poland’s integration into the Schengen zone (2007) the entire border region was depicted as being struck by sudden imbalance, the Polish side reportedly being better off in general. The social imaginary of “They get everything from the EU, we do not get anything” was repeated in several variations; it followed the analogous imaginary of being underprivileged due to unbalanced modernization that prevailed in the post-communist period of the 1990s. A “Europeanization” of the metaphor of “being the losers of modernization” came into effect.

The introduction of free labour mobility (2011) was accompanied by an increase of media reports on sceptical expectations in East Germany about adverse effects of labour competition, wage dumping and criminality. This trend conforms to the regional continuity of attributing negative traits to the border, combined with new complaints about alleged social and economic privileges gained by Poland, and hidden allusions to the unwanted top-down impact of EU norms and rules. A low, sometimes suppressed murmur of resistance to Europeanization and debordering became obvious, while descriptions of Europe as a clear-cut factor of integration or favourable change were avoided. Even cross-border political events and projects funded by the EU were described in a way that suggested the sole relevance of local impulse.

National media analysis done by IRS for three periods (before Poland’s EU accession, Poland’s integration into the Schengen zone 2007, implementation of free labour mobility in Poland 2011) revealed that there has been strong medial interest in the process of EU enlargement at a very general level but minimal interest in changes occurring in the German-Polish border region.

UG stated a similar separation of regional and national newspaper discourses in Poland, although situated in a context of much more open debates on EU accession and its effects. Although these two discourses do not interact the European Union is presented and described in many different dimensions at both levels. At the national level the EU membership is discussed mainly in ideational and geopolitical dimensions, i.e. in the context of national identity, democracy, freedom and independence. Most of the articles are of authoritative nature, especially when projecting the integration of Poland into the EU. However, at the local/regional level the membership is discussed under the aspect of practical benefits, available funds, legal and administrative regulations and the advantages or disadvantages they might have to socio-economic life.
The Polish border regions to Germany and to Russia were strongly neglected by the national media whereas regional media took up major issues of changing everyday life and of the emigration of local residents to Germany or the UK. Europeanization or rapprochement towards Europe was a topic established mainly at the Polish-German border, especially after 2007 when facilitated population mobility contributed to imaginaries of the border as an opportunity to economic and social well-being, rather than a barrier. In contrast to East German regional media, however, the Polish media did not mirror the ‘German Angst’ of overcharging the border region. Instead the Schengen integration of Poland was rated as being implemented too late since everyone willing to emigrate to the UK or West Europe had already done so before.

**RUN** explored general accounts of the history of the EU’s external border, the concept of Europe as part of Europeanization, and on the visual communication of European characteristics in a geopolitical context (cartography, flags etc.). Major findings stress the growing significance of “nationophobia” and national policies reoriented towards symbolic incidents, such as the “Charlie Hebdo” assault in Paris, January 2015, which could easily be labelled as an attack on European values and freedom of cultural/political expression.

**(2b) Perspectives from “Post-Socialist” Member States**

**CAS** focused on the shift of imaginaries from Euro-optimism to Euroscepticism as represented in national political discourse and national media discourse on Bulgaria’s external borders to non-EU countries (Turkey, Serbia). This focus was inevitable since regional media discourse about borders and/or Europeanization was virtually absent. Discourse analysis of national newspapers was complemented by a number of interviews with political and institutional stakeholders and study visits to the Bulgarian-Turkish-Greek border triangle. Until the outbreak of the refugee crisis of 2015 a number of controversial concepts had contributed to the paradoxical establishing of Europe as an object of collective desire, and at the same time as a threat to national projects. Rising EU-scepticism and claims by national political elites not to understand the EU’s Schengen rationale now contributed to border practices which favoured the national protection of external borders to the southeast (e.g. to Turkey) at the expense of EU-centred visions. In contrast, borders to designated accession candidates (Serbia) and EU member states had been accompanied by national and subnational rhetorics of integration while existing barriers and associated institutions (e.g. customs) were treated as symbols of bad practice, including corruption.

This predisposition has recently been overridden by a large trend towards Euroscepticism and a rapid diversification of discourses. Former consensus that Europe might be a solution to national problems (corruption, underdevelopment, instable geopolitical alliances) was increasingly replaced by convictions that the EU posed the major problem of national development, mainly by not effectively dealing with the economic crisis and the influx of refugees. This shift was paralleled by a turn of EU-scepticist opinion-making from specialized (extremist) speakers to diversified speakers that were attributable to the political mainstream. Euroscepticism had obviously arrived at the centre of the Bulgarian society.

Border-related imaginaries changed from visions of a borderless Europe, including visa-free population mobility, economic exchange and access to EU funds, to imaginaries of a re-
bordered Europe including the construction of walls and intensified othering. The collective call for walls, echoed by the media, ironically neglected the collective negative experience of the Cold War wall in the country’s recent history. In its new appearance “the wall” suggested stability and cultural self-assurance, in face of a plethora of destabilizing political and social factors. The imaginary of a country endangered by an EU of insecurity has been verbalized using narratives of fear, risk and crisis. A second connotation has been the repulsion of liberalism and multiculturalism which had been ambiguous notions during the post-communist period of transition. During that period liberalism had been conceived as a synonym of Europe, symbolizing democracy and human rights; today liberalism/multiculturalism is mainly portrayed by the media as a major failure. To cap it all media debates create artificial dilemmas, opposing images of the ‘Europe of security’ with those of the ‘Europe of freedom’.

**RKK** analysed national Hungarian policy documents on border issues and Europeanization, as well as regional/local media discourse on border-related issues including Hungarian, Croatian and Serbian borders. Discourse analysis based on national policy documents aimed at reconstructing the shifting rhetorical practices on ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanization’ from the pro-EU leftist era (between 2002–2010) to the more EU-sceptical rightist governments reigning since 2010. Two distinct sets of documents (before and after 2010) were analysed covering a wide spectrum of policies. The recent impact of increasing numbers of migrants from the Middle East arriving at Hungary’s borders has created some need for re-examining national policy documents. At the time of reporting this was still work in progress.

Media analysis focused on regional and local newspapers so as to reconstruct the differences in reporting on Hungarian, Croatian and Serbian border zones. Border-related issues were taken up by a small number of reports only. They were mainly portrayed in a positive manner, especially if they arose from projects of cross-border cooperation, political agreements, civil initiatives, economic collaboration and joint development perspectives. The role of the EU as a provider of funds was mentioned in most cases; the perspective of top-down Europeanization was clearly identifiable. Nevertheless bottom-up perspectives were offered in connection with reports on local initiative in political and economic cross-border networking. Since the period of analysis ended before the refugee crisis began the recent closing down of national borders and security interventions did not appear.

Hungarian border politics has also been a research subject of the **UEF** team. Hungary’s strategic use of its borders has changed from early post-communist agreement to institutionalized cross-border cooperation, coined after the EU’s normative precepts for political collaboration and inter-state rapprochement, to increasingly contested and confrontational practices. The recent discursive exploitation of the refugee crisis, new border fortifications (fences) and the partial militarization of border areas indicate a fortified focus on national development policies. The strategic use of borders, both discursively and practically, reveals their function as 1) cultural resources in strengthening national identity within Europe, 2) resources for consolidating the exercise of political power and 3) a means to challenge core European dominance. Central to the local appropriation of Europeanization and the reinterpretation of cross-border cooperation in terms of nation-building is the concept of transovereignty. It claims for improving the connections between Motherland and Hungarian communities around the country as well as abroad. De-bordering is thus used to create new
(trans)national spaces that might implicitly extend Hungarian extraterritorial sovereignty claims. At the same time, while rejecting top-down European institutions as inhibiting region-building through local initiative, the present Hungarian government stylizes itself as a guardian of Europe’s historical legacy and Christian culture by defending Europe against foreign cultural (e.g. Islamic) influence and everything that threatens Europe’s welfare, security and identity. By doing so it adds an arbitrary variegation to Europeanization: it reinterprets Europeanization as a national project that has beneficial effects for a wider European framework.

(2c) Perspectives from former Yugoslavia

RKK organized a complementary analysis of national Serbian media discourses on Hungarian/Serbian, Serbian/Croatian and Serbian/Romanian borders. There is evidence that media discourses were divided into two stages: i) up to the beginning of negotiations for Serbia’s EU accession, revealing predominantly negative attitudes on EU rapprochement; ii) after the opening of the first chapters of the Acquis Communautaire in 2014. At that time the whole media landscape changed to unanimous pro-EU reporting, clearly following the example given by the official Serbian government policy.

(2d) Perspectives from Post-Soviet Borders

UEF prepared an exploration of Finnish political discourse on the Finnish-Russian border between 1990-2014, identifying the shifts in national political relations between the two countries. A second strand of analysis focused on Finnish media discourse on the Finnish-Russian border between 2013 and 2015. It served the purpose of documenting recent turns in Finnish public opinion towards Russia, which by tradition had been much more politicized than those of other EU countries.

The shifts in political concepts of the Finnish-Russian border can be described as the return of cold-war rhetoric to border discourse. After a long post-fall-of-the-wall period of competing discourses that sought to define Finland’s position towards Russia as a communicative opening, including a continued search for national and regional identity, the enlargement of EU and NATO of 2004/2005 posed a discursive event that raised national awareness of geopolitical risks (Russia as a challenge to security) and the heightened significance of the Finnish-Russian border as the external border of the EU and the Schengen zone. At the same time claims were made that Finland commanded particular political and everyday expertise in dealing with Russia. This put the pervading key concept of security (the state border protects national citizens) into an altered context: while conceding that Finland belonged to the cooperative, multipolar order of “the West” national sovereignty was expressly declared to be “not for sale”.

Recent media discourse on the Finnish-Russian border focused on emerging debates about Finland’s international position in face of the Ukraine crisis. The annexation of Crimea was seen as an evidence that the post-Cold War order based on multipolar cooperation was terminated by Russia and crude geopolitics had returned. This shift caused problems and uncertainty for countries in the Russian neighbourhood particularly, and a return of politics of power raised Finnish questions about state security. “The West” was portrayed as the ‘easy’
key concept, whereas Russia was reported to have diverged from the multipolar world order. The West allegedly symbolized ‘traditional’ values, human rights, equality and democracy that were easily acceptable among European states. As a universal concept, it was put in opposition to the counter-concept of Russia. As a result, the Finnish-Russian border was presented to the readers not only as an external border of the nation state and the EU but also as a civilizational boundary between “the West” and Russia. The dominant narrative aimed at naturalising this proposition: it described the unwillingness of Russia to get westernized during the post-communist era, hence the cultural clash would be inevitable. Finland’s dilemma finding an apt identity and a substitute for the former consolidating role of the Finnish-Russian border has been widely laid out in media discourse.

Both political and media discourses signify a clear trend towards intensified othering of the Eastern non-EU after Finland’s NATO integration and the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict. Increasing geopolitical involvement contributes to the construction of a sphere of “us”, “the West”, “the EU”, “Russia” and “Putin’s Empire”. Cold war rhetoric, including the polarization of attitudes and moral obligations, informs a spatial imaginary of the Finnish-Polish border as a zone of defense against the East: an effect of massive rebordering, and a representation of Europeanization that demonstrates the dark side of the EU. It tells more about its geopolitical and militarist ambitions than about integrating power.

(2e) Targeted case studies on Europeanization, local bordering and place-making

IRS and UG conveyed two symmetrical case studies on the German-Polish twin cities of Frankfurt/Oder-Słubice and Görlitz-Zgorzelec. Based on the analysis of local political documents and interviews with local key stakeholders, empirical evidence was raised about the different modes of local awareness of the border, of shifting socio-spatial imaginaries, visions of developmental pathways (between localism and Europeanism/Europeanization) and attempts of rendering the twin city attractive (place-making). Recent findings indicate pronounced differences between the two cases: in the case of Frankfurt, a shift from the EU-led creation of „Europeansing” symbols and top-down policy intervention to local cross-border pragmatism and self-organized emancipation from EU presets, in the case of Görlitz a regression from former trust in EU guidance to frustration about economic decline and implementation of relatively one-sided, exclusive political priorities for the development of the German part of the city.

In Frankfurt local place-making was based on the reshaping of responsibility and initiative, from an EU-led context to a re-localized framework. Localism had already been a trait of local politics before 2004 but it mainly served as an ideological backdrop to attempts of driving back the impact of the EU and especially its „local department”, the Euroregion. During the 2000s the opening up towards Europe was still felt as an undue challenge linked to the cultural imperialism that in the opinion of many locals governed national post-socialism and Europeanization alike. Meanwhile a change of generations in the local administration brought in a new elite self-assured pragmatist young professionals who redefined cross-border integration a civil task that should be met in a balanced way. These actors have been strongly supported by like-minded Polish professionals at Słubice. Their networks have not only been successful in establishing private bi-lingual kindergartens and schools but also in creating joint city marketing, a twin city brand and attempts at converging local institutions. They
issued the motto of „emancipation from the EU” while paradoxically taking over much of its rationale concerning cross-border cooperation. Such Europeanization from below seemed to achieve much of what Europeanization from above had prevented from being realized, mainly by its authoritative gesture. Nevertheless claims for true emancipation and the existence of grassroots origins of „non-EUism” are being held up. The related spatial imaginary reads “This is a self-contained city that abandoned the irritating guidance by external institutions (i.e. the EU) and is now heading for a self-determined future”.

In sharp contrast, place-making in Görlitz has been a one-sided mono-cultural enterprise, focusing on the built heritage of the German part of the twin city and exploiting relevant resources in favour of city tourism. The German part of the twin city was addressed by institutional stakeholders as the single bearer of development potentials, hence endeavours of town planning, economic policy and education were claimed to rightfully focus on Görlitz. Reference was made to the neo-liberal turn in German regional policy, suggesting that investment should only be made in places that promised to yield visible returns. Zgorzelec was imagined as not being compatible or potentially conducive to the development of a joint social, economic and territorial construct. Especially the adherence of Zgorzelec to the ‘backwardish’ mining and the ecologically damaging coal energy sector was cited as an impediment to possible joint strategies that could hardly be overcome. Joint labels created under the impact of EU-wide intermunicipal competition only formally integrated Zgorzelec. In fact the label of “Euro City”, created for the application of Görlitz for the award of the European Capital of Culture in 2010 was used exclusively for the German side. Major stakeholders described the city as being isolated, abandoned by the German government and the Saxonian ministries. They neither expected nor wanted any help from Brussels since this would create new dependencies and inapt external perspectives on the city. The alleged thrust towards Europeanization was a paper tiger.

Additional research

Additional empirical research that had not been explicitly programmed by the DOW yielded surprising insights into shifts in reference-making to Europe occurring during particular periods of rebordering at the EU’s external borders. Such shifts were observed in the course of geopolitical shake-ups in the European Neighbourhood (i.e. the Ukraine crisis) and the post-colonial contestation of the EU’s external border in its overseas territories (i.e. New Caledonia). The case of the Ukraine crisis of 2014/15 was investigated by IRS and UEF. Discourse analysis was applied to representations of geopolitical agents, geostrategic constellations and implicit references to borders in major German national newspapers. Empirical evidence validates the assumption that consensus between the governments of western member countries, and among protagonists of EU foreign policy, to engage in aggravating East-West escalation of the Crimea and Donetsck crises was massively supported by leading newspapers. Differentiated reporting at the beginning of the crisis narrowed down to the focused blaming of Russia as a single aggressor and of describing the Russian president Putin as a wayward warrior against “the West”. The latter stance involved a decidedly pro-EU perspective, affirming the EU’s right to intervene into its neighbourhood. However this is not simply an instance of EU-optimism created by geopolitics: The derogatory language and narratives of abasement, applied to an alleged enemy of the EU, not only represent classical procedures of conflict escalation and war preparation but also seek to legitimize imaginaries...
of territorial revisionism: They implicitly put existing EU borders and borders in the neighbourhood ready for renegotiation (e.g. via the spontaneously initiated association treaty with West Ukraine). Such revision would inevitably end in the accelerated enlargement of the EU.

The case of New Caledonia, constituting a part of the overseas territory of the European Union, reveals a peculiar dynamism of post-colonial struggles for local emancipation. It is motivated by increasingly blurred constructs of citizenship. The ethnic group of the Kanak, organized in trans-Pacific networks of indigenous peoples, demanded for decolonization and full independence from the former colonial motherland of France. Focused discourse analysis of activist internet websites and local media representations of the process was done in 2015 in collaboration with a prominent external scholar who specialized in New Caledonia (M. Kowasch of the University of Bremen). It demonstrated that an important element of Kanak activism that affected the EU’s external border concept was situated in their intensified struggle against French rsp. European citizenship. Alternatively they claimed for the acknowledgement of a natural indigenous, transnational and floating citizenship. On that basis they declared French or EU territorial constructs and also the political borders drawn by colonial and post-colonial Europeans illegitimate. The contested “fuzzy” outer border of the EU unexpectedly stood in antagonistic opposition to the EU’s claim for a closed external border as represented by the Schengen treaty. This added another bit of paradox to the inconsistent political construct of the EU’s external borders. It is an example of failed Europeanization effected by disregard of post-colonial actorness.

Evidence of conceptual and theoretical development

The analytical focus on imaginaries and their role in evolving media and stakeholder discourses proved to be both relevant and applicable. Especially the shifts in the way Europe and its borders were perceived and conceptualized at the level of the everyday became clearly visible. Major trends of imagining Europe and Europeanization after the beginning of the Eurozone crisis point in the direction of lasting disappointment and frustration about the promises of European integration. At first sight the specificity of such frustration seems to differ between East and West Europe.

In East European member states the promise of wealth and social security had initially been greeted with enthusiasm by local elites and also by large parts of the population. “Going for Europe” had often been equalled with getting access to European funds and support. The global financial crisis shook local protagonists’ confidence in the benefit-generating capacity of Europeanization. Political radicalism and Euroscepticism swiftly took the place of former optimism, not only at the fringes of the political spectrum but more so within the centre of the societies involved. This shift came unprecedented but it could clearly be traced back to the failed economic recovery after the breakdown of the former communist systems. Disappointment about lacking consolidation met the recent suspicion that the EU might not support national and local interest enough if it was able to neglect security issues and expose national territories to chaotic immigration. Hence Euroscepticism reached back to earlier stages of post-communism in that it took up and reverberated older existential threats. Recent fears of being exposed to imponderable risk through post-2007 economic decline, geopolitical adventure and further political disillusionment about the EU’s future were especially nurtured.
in border regions that were confronted with the symptoms of arbitrary debordering and rebordering.

West European core regions, in contrast, had been better prepared to meet the economic crisis and pending migration dilemmas, mainly on the basis of long-term integration and political governance. The case of French-Swiss and French-Belgian conurbations demonstrates an unagitated way of carefully mitigating cross-border disparities and developing local visions according to long-established pathways of development. Public discourse and the media indicated neo-liberal “business as usual”, with a strong focus on cross-border achievements in creating a favourable standing in global metropolitan competition.

Nevertheless such cases only partially support the idea of a discursive East-West divide. Although the French case seems to represent a number of West European “normal cases” that developed under the “slow but steady” evolution of factual debordering and the local adoption of the Single Market narrative, it cannot be overlooked that many EU-internal frictions and basic political controversies have been propelled by the recent economic crisis to an extent that local discourse on Europe and borders have been substantially reframed. The case of Ireland reveals an intricate mechanic of putting an old national border conflict to an extent that local discourse on Europe and borders have been substantially reframed. The case of Ireland reveals an intricate mechanic of putting an old national border conflict to an extent that local discourse on Europe and borders have been substantially reframed. The case of Ireland reveals an intricate mechanic of putting an old national border conflict to an extent that local discourse on Europe and borders have been substantially reframed.

The case of the Polish-German border region, situated within the contact zone of culturally antagonistic societies and territories that underwent substantially different procedures of societal transition, saw a break in public and media discourses between pre- and post-accession periods. Pre-accession times were characterized by ostentative neglect of factual tensions between Germany and Poland, whereas post-accession periods revealed rising divergence of public and media discourses between the two countries. Fears of being at a loss by Poland’s integration into the Schengen area on the German side, and increasingly relaxed attitudes towards Europe on the Polish side were portrayed by local stakeholders and the media as being part of differentiating local practice. These divergences, heterogeneous as they are, nevertheless indicate that rising Euroscepticism has some important roots in the history of post-communism. Before 2004 the EU had been partly welcomed on the German side by local elites while having been rejected by large parts of the local population. Former imaginaries of beneficial cooperation with the other side were attributed then to the political pressure and idealistic symbol-building exerted by the EU and the national government. These were followed after 2010 by imaginaries of self-governed bi-national togetherness created by (equally idealistic) civil pragmatists. Their declared attempt to emancipate from EU domination ensured some support by a sceptical local population while nevertheless tacitly leveraging an older EU logic of gradual cross-border coalescence.

Subnational political and media discourses thus entrench border regions as topics that are mainly shaped according to locally situated, if not path-dependent, interests. The EU and the vaguely circumscribed imperative of Europeanization serve as contrasting items that allow for
well pronounced articulations of localist or nationalist claims. The local “us” serves as a point of departure for identity claims, the launching of arguments legitimising local political power and the public “playing on the keyboard” of fears that had obviously been generated by the EU. The imaginaries created under this condition portray the region or the local border as a self-contained entity that implicitly refers back to the national “us”. Othering based on cultural difference or other antagonisms is thus carried further, periodically inflated by issues such as geopolitical conflict, immigration and economic disruption. Such othering is presently being supported much by the media, be it motivated by national opposition towards the core EU or by the attempt to position pro-EU solidarity against proclaimed non-EU impact. The local point of departure in this game, however, often belies the speakers. While claiming to emancipate from the EU in one way or another, they implicitly reproduce or implement an EU-typical top-down agenda that they internalized before. Discursive attempts at re-nationalising the border (the case of Ireland), returning to quasi cold-war understandings of national borders (the case of Finland) or claiming local authorship of cross-border initiative (the case of East Germany) still have the EU in their packs, often without being fully aware of it. Presently the geopolitical involvement by the EU serves to cement this tacit EU guidance: it binds local and national stakeholders by suggesting the imaginary of “the West” as an undisputable block of homogeneous political interest and common cultural heritage.

**Future paths**

Subnational discourse implicitly or explicitly refers back to a collective past. Such reference is not easy to detect since ongoing discourse has it that present incidents demand immediate plausibility and self-evidence to become communicable to a larger public. This “trap of timeliness” might delude discourse analysis to focus on topical representations of problems that usually span longer periods. Although the case studies of this WP tried to capture the temporal aspect of discourse by describing its evolution or comparing characteristic periods of time, a number of problems obviously elapsed the analytical focus. Especially those issues that did not find their way into medial representations virtually did not exist for the researcher unless they were raised by contextualizing discourse (i.e. by reconstructing the dispositif in a Foucauldian sense) or by contrasting different discourses. One of the problems that repeatedly came up but could not be traced sufficiently is the issue of context-specific precursors of present conflict, antagonism or struggle. For example the discursive seeds of Euroscepticism had obviously been disseminated in preceding historical periods. East European discourses on Europeanization and bordering uniformly point at unresolved conflicts inherited from post-communism. At that time fears of economic or political failure, pauperization, perpetuated insecurity or external domination had often been veiled under medial representations of EU-optimism. Once these fears became overwhelming, however, the EU as a problem-solver became an unreliable associate, hence the collective shift to massive EU-scepticism was accomplished in an incredibly effortless way.

Here is one vital point of analytical interest that still waits to be established: i.e. the preparation of such radical discursive change by discursive events, and also unnoticed social context, of the past. Post-communism had a large number of national and regional polarisation, disruption, subdued struggles and non-debates (in the sense that important controversies were not addressed in public discourse) that might have contributed to the discursive breakouts of our time. These older contexts have to be analysed and evaluated...
according to their framing capacity of recent discursive changes. The image of the EU as a loser and false prophet might be the flip side of a picture puzzle that once before showed the EU as a winner and generator of great expectations. Digging into past and present context by in-depth analysis might contribute to defining the tipping point of the picture puzzle.

Another analytical track that will have to be followed carefully has been generated by the EU’s increasing involvement in geopolitics via the European Neighbourhood Policy/Initiative, its foreign policy in the Ukraine conflict, its clandestine intervention into the Syria conflict, and continued eastern enlargement projects. Recent national and subnational discourses not only addressed the practical implications of political bloc building (“The West against Russia”) for European external borders, or the relevance of achievements in core European integration for future tasks of debordering that would become necessary after successful acquisition of new territories; they were also nourished by the constant destabilization and renewed stabilization of borders at the European fringes and in the EU neighbourhood. The repetitive nature of these events had a normalizing effect on national and subnational discourse. Speakers got accustomed to the fact that “their” country or region was (and still is being) attributed an important geopolitical task by the EU or “The West”, whereas the critical assessment of such attribution might have been an important alternative approach as well. Increased discrimination of the non-European other (mainly situated in the East European neighbourhood) might further on produce more discursive paradoxes, especially when combined with claims for intensified EU-internal solidarity and unity. The existing paradox of borders which have to be imagined as almost non-existing in the EU’s interior and as hermatically closed as possible on its verge might be driven to a new extreme by continued geostrategy. Political and media discourses at national and subnational levels have the lion’s share in normalising such paradoxes. Normalization of this kind draws on purposeful neglect and routines of making co-present adversary elements of discourse invisible. The homogenizing of German newspaper reporting on the Ukraine conflict delivered but one example out of many. This tendency, in turn, might create even bigger future disruptions and abrupt changes in the orientation of discourses than those we have been witnessing.

**WP 5 (Post-Colonial Bordering and Euro-African Borderscapes)**

**General goals and philosophy**

The main goal of WP5 has been to dislocate the *idea of Europe* from the ‘necessary’ or ‘self-evident’ boundaries to which the hegemonic discourse on Europe has pinned it down—in political language, media, academia and an overall practice in which the EU project has played a critical role. With this in mind, WP5 has explored the conceptual evolution of the European borderscape by tracing routes suggested by Europe’s post-colonial strands, paying particular attention to the *relationality* they evoke between European and African cultural and social geographies. Although often buried under the hegemonic discourse on Europe, such human geographical connections insinuate a wealth of unspoken Euro-African borderscapes and thus their conceal represents an enormous loss for the social, cultural and political imagination of what Europe is and what it can be. The existence of obscured Euro-African borderscapes suggests that Europe and Africa are so intimately bound together than to speak of different or separate human geographies, cultures or civilizations is not only historically, economically and socially atypical but also politically problematic and geopolitically shortsighted. Euro-African borderscapes unavoidably force us to reimagine the meaning of
Europe in all its dimensions and to rethink the soundness of the assumptions and geographical scope upon which core EU policies are based.

In order to excavate the Euro-African geographies that have been obscured by the vicissitudes of power struggles, WP5 has been guided by a methodology of “dislocation”: a recognition that the physiographical boundaries of the European and African continents do not coincide with the borders of either European and African culture, followed by an attempt to chart alternative human geographies. The very ontology of a distinct European or African civilization can be refuted by a critical historiography that, unbound by the restrictions of methodological nationalism, transcends national and physiographically conventional borders to question the fundamental premises that support the paradigm of what is Europe (and thus where is Europe, who are the Europeans and which are the cultural productions that characterize them).

**Research tasks**

In accordance with the goals and philosophy of WP5, its research tasks have aimed at dislocating Europe from its paradigmatic location, both cartographic and ideological:

**RT1: Reconceptualising Post-Colonial Borders: Dislocating and remapping the external borders of Europe**

Since WP5 departs from the assumption that Europe is not where we have been taught it is, one of its main objectives has been to dismantle the theoretical and conceptual scaffolding that supports the discursive structure upon which the paradigmatic idea of Europe rests. In order to do this, the members of WP5 have applied a multiplicity of approaches spanning historiography, cartography, literature and geopolitics. On the basis of what are considered to be some quintessential aspects of Europe, this WP has tried to find geographical counterarguments to show that rather than natural they have been created by power. The remapping of Europe’s and the EU’s external borders has taken place not only narratively but also symbolically but also visually in cartography and film.

**RT (1a) Post-Colonial Perspectives on Europe and its borders WP6 led by METU**

This conceptual task has attempted to re-situate EU bordering practices and cross-border interactions within a more globally-oriented geopolitical narrative, by framing them in ways that emphasize material as well as symbolic dimensions of borders and bordering practices. The initial “post-colonial” approach evolved into a “trans-colonial” one to better capture the borders as “in-between” spaces where hybrid and tightly intertwined cultures and practices take place.

**RT (1b) Euro-Med Dialogue, Migration and Border Discourses**

The Mediterranean has stood out as an understudied borderscape with a vastly underestimated potential to re-imagine Europe in refreshing ways. This has implications for the political language of official documents, the informal language of cultural and social initiatives involved in “EuroMediterranean” dialogue, and the geopolitical context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and EU enlargement. Looking at Europe from a borderscape
that encompasses the geographies surrounding the Mediterranean basin as a historical geography provides radical insights into crucial geopolitical issues regarding the political significance of EU identity and symbolism, security, (irregular) migration, asylum seekers and ethnic tensions within EU member states.

**RT2: Representations of Euro-African Borderscapes and European Identity**

WP5 has studied the representations that civil society, political discourse and media promote about Italian and Spanish urban settings to understand the relationality between the complementary North African and EU social, cultural, political and economic urban contexts. This RT has paid particular attention to whether current representations of European borders either cast light or obscure these transnational contexts and their transformations. The aim has been to understand the role that complex relations of visibility/invisibility play in promoting inclusionary/exclusionary representations across the Euro-African frontier.

**RT3: Tetuan – Externalized European Borders**

Based on the study of Tetuan, a border regions located very close to terrestrial and maritime borders of the EU, WP5 has studied how the impact of EU border design can be directly perceived in its immediate exteriority—creating a new form of urban borderland and transitional ethnic space fed largely by migrants from other parts of Africa. The main objective has been to dig into the representations of Moroccan and Spanish political discourse (including the government, media, cultural and other local organizations) to unearth these transnational ethnic spaces.

**RT4: Video documentation**

Two videos have been produced. The aim has been to document the historical development of dominant conceptualizations of Euro-African borders through the visual exploration of two emblematic Euro-African borderscapes: the Italian-North African and the Spanish-Moroccan. Such visualizations will aim at showing processes of “dislocation” and “relocation” by showing the interactions from “outside” to “inside” Europe as well by exposing the new North African borderscapes created by the recent configuration of the EU’s external borders.

**Overall progress**

**RT (1). Reconceptualising Post-Colonial Borders: Dislocating and remapping the external borders of Europe**

RUN has conceptualized Europe as one of the most meaningful geopolitical ideas and, following the most recent critical cartographic, dated its emergence to the Renaissance and the age of European world travelling and colonization. The links between power and empire associated to the idea of Europe have survived until today through a successive series of imperial designs of which the latest proponent is the EU. Empires have constructed Europe together with a vast arrange of forces working on their behalf but also in opposition to an equally vast assemble of forces challenging their hegemony—all including an arrange of political, philosophical, academic, intellectual and artistic practices and productions. The result of this complex power struggle has been a historically contextual idea of Europe. This
imperial strategy to create Europe has been an imperial territorial strategy: an attempt by a power elite to legitimize its ambitions over a vast collection of lands, their inhabitants and their material and ideological resources within the bounds of what they have designated as “Europe”. We have defined this imperial strategy as Europeanization, i.e., an attempt to bound a certain territory under the auspices of a political project within the European continent.

**RT (1a) Post-Colonial Perspectives on Europe and its borders**

As part of challenging dominant representations of Europe, RUN has traced the genealogy of Europe through the texts of its changing cartography—one of power’s most telling artifacts. RUN has defined this *Europeanization* as a historical geopolitical strategy that different empires have relied upon to create a political affiliation with a territory they have ambitioned to control and which they have called Europe. Thus, notions of Europe as a space associated with a certain people, a certain culture and, overall, a certain civilization, cannot be detached from the historically troubling notions of imperialism, colonialism, violence and oppression. Simultaneously, however, cultural commonalities and affinity have also arisen from this imperial/colonial experience. This convergence has rendered the idea of Europe and Europeanization into highly complex matters. This complexity is however under-theorized and its consequences for the EU in particular remain under-explored. The symbolism, narratives, practices and overall discourse that such notions enable about Europe exert a commanding influence upon the borders and geopolitics of the EU project. The idea of Europe in the EU frames and thus limits the geopolitical narratives and possibilities of the very EU project.

**RT (1b) Euro-Med Dialogue, Migration and Border Discourses (shared task with WP6 led by METU)**

RUN has explored the links between the violence along the Mediterranean border and the Euroskeptic calls for the reestablishment of national borders that put restrictions on intra-communitarian mobility. RUN has argued that there might be a link between the treatment the EU gives to migrants trying to bridge the Mediterranean and the legitimization for the mistreatment of minorities taking place across EU Member States—not only of migrants but also of intra-communitarian migrants. This is supported by a historical understanding of the Mediterranean. A genealogy the Mediterranean has proven that the Mediterranean to be a system. The EU is also a system. The idea of system is to highlight the reciprocity between the external borders of the EU and its internal national borders. Thus, what happens along the EU’s external borders reverberates across Schengen space. This is unavoidable and understanding it is crucial, for the EU can only forget it at its peril: by legitimizing certain border representations and border practices that affect a group of non-EU migrants and asylum seekers the EU is also, inadvertently, legitimizing the dehumanization of intra-communitarian migrants and thus setting what could become the precedents for the increasing closing of borders and the eventual collapsed of Schengen and the pillars of openness and liberal democracy upon which the EU rests.

In its aim to explore the Euro-Mediterranean borderscape RUN—in collaboration with METU—conducted field research in Cyprus during March of 2015. Following the suspicion that the Cypriot conflict encapsulates crucial contradicting logics of larger EU geopolitics,
RUN carried out unstructured interviews in Nicosia during the spring of 2015. Together with these interviews, RUN traced a Foucauldian genealogy of the ethno-nationalist categories upon which the Cypriot conflict has been built (i.e., Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot) to suggest that the Cypriot conflict epitomizes some of the key contradictions in the EU and can also be regarded as a scale model of the EU’s most pressing dilemmas.

UNIBG studied the changes across the two Mediterranean shores of the Italian/Tunisian borderland—from colonial times until its present postcolonial configuration. UNIBG carried out intermittent fieldwork in Mazara del Vallo, Sicily during August 2013 and February 2014, May 2014, and April-May 2015; and in Mahdia and Tunis, Tunisia during August 2014. This fieldwork included the following activities: direct engagement in the field setting where the ethnography took place and use of primary sources of ethnographic data: non-participant observation, field notes, visual instruments (photographs and short videos), cultural cartography and counter-cartographies; participatory methods with (migrant) children (auto-photography, drawings, photo-elicitation, maps); narrative and semi-structured interviews (20 interviews were conducted for the joint work with WP6 based on the list of research questions prepared by METU; targeted data collection based on METU indications about selection criteria for the interviewees - shared task with WP 6 - RT 2d).

UNIBG carried out fieldwork in close connection with the production activities for the video on the Italian/Tunisian borderscape (collaboration with video-makers BC Today, Turin and Lab80, Bergamo - RT 4). UNIBG organized educational workshops on the topic “Landscape as an intercultural mediator” with a group of students attending the first grade (I C) in the junior high school “Paolo Borsellino” in Mazara del Vallo (TP) & with a group of children attending the fourth/fifth grade (IV-V B) in the junior school “Daniele Ajello” in Mazara del Vallo (TP). Another educational workshop on the topic “Italian/Tunisian border: imaginations, imaginaries and images” with a group of young people (16-19 years old) attending post-school at the San Vito Foundation’s place in Mazara del Vallo & with a group of children attending the fourth/fifth grade (IV-V B) in the junior school “Daniele Ajello” in Mazara del Vallo (TP). This research used a variety of participatory techniques: job shadowing, group walking expeditions to discuss and auto-photograph places that children like in the area; focus groups which included an informal group discussion, the drawing of places young migrants like in Mazara del Vallo and in Tunisia as well as drawings of a dreamy place as well as photo-elicitation; and the drawing of a participatory map by the children. Young people’s viewpoints have been incorporated into a broader ethnographic work on both sides of the borderland and mainly focusing on urban borderscapes of Mazara del Vallo, in Italy, and Mahdia, in Tunisia, which included observations in the urban areas, as well as talking with pupils and some parents. These ethnographic observations have been useful for the interpretation of the children’s self-representations and I also refer to them in the discussion of the results. Research activities with young people in both Italy and Tunisia were shot by professional film-makers with whom we are collaborating to produce a videodocumentary on the Italian/Tunisian borderscape within the scope of WP5-RT4.

A collaboration between UAB and RUN has examined the logics of fracture and cohesion governing current geopolitical dynamics in the Mediterranean. In the face of these contradictory tendencies, it has proposed the notion of archipelago-frontier as a concept for deepening our understanding of an ever more dispersed and ubiquitous geography defining
the southern border of the EU. Drawing on the contemporary resonances of the destabilizing cartographic imagination of Al-Idrisi (1100-1165), UAB and RUN have penned a paper that argues that a contemporary reading of Al-Idrisi helps us rethink the current symbolic, terminological (and hence geopolitical) abduction of the Mediterranean by the European Union—which the very term “Euromediterranean” encapsulates. Finally, the paper underlines the necessity of forging new outlooks on the Mediterranean, engendering perspectives that are more dialogical, plurivocal and sensitive to permanent transformation, as evoked by a long-term spatial as well as political horizon of struggle. The deadly consequences of the EU border control has amongst others been explored in this contribution: Ferrer-Gallardo, Xavier & Van Houtum, Henk (2014) “The Deadly EU border control”, ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 13(2), pp. 295-304.

RT (2) Representations of Euro-African Borderscapes and European Identity

A crucial conceptual issue for WP5 is the issue of geographical imaginations, particularly those elicited by cultural representations that impinge upon political identity. This is crucial to understand how immigrant communities from former European colonies—particularly African—develop a sense of local belonging and identity within the EU while unavoidably being confronted with the legacies of Europe’s colonial past. In order to study these geographical imaginations, one of the objectives of this research was to design a methodological approach that cast light upon the plasticity of geopolitical constructs like Europe by undermining the aura of necessity that surrounds them. To do this, this research decided to draw on the conceptual force of “dislocation”, whose meaning detaches the sense of belonging from material geographical continuity and thus allows for the understanding and configuration of “detached geographies”. The analytical lens of adjustable geographical scale for the study of critical geopolitics. Such analytical lens allowed us to discern the mechanisms through which local geographies are constituted by geographical notions that are neither material nor immaterial but the product of their interaction. Geographical identity is an intricate perception shaped by the time- and space-compressing abilities of technology and the geographical imagination.

The ultimate goal of dislocation was to bring about the dislocation of idea of Europe which, sponsored by the EU and other relevant actors, promote the notion that there can be only one Europe and thus that there is a “European essence”. In order to discover these many Europes WP5 developed a method of “dislocated geopolitics”. With the use of this lens, this research departed from examining what kind of European geography and history can be inferred from the symbolism promoted by the EU. Then this research explored how the EU’s symbolism about Europe interacts with other systems of signs that make Europe meaningful—eg, Eurosceptic political movements and African post-colonial discourses. Throughout all the research WP5 resorted to radical cartography to show the variety of Europes that could be narrated or depicted using the palette of the different and often invisibilized historiographical, geographic and cultural notions on Europe. Ultimately, the idea of this analysis is to go beyond a critique and assemble a critique that may constitute the basis to create new syntheses of Europe that can serve as the foundation to reimagine Europe and the EU as an open-ended possibility rather than a closed necessity.

Rather than studying the Euro-African borderscape along the geographical borders between Europe and African continents, members of WP5 have tried to find these borders, still very
present and crucial, scattered within the EU, in the practices, narratives, representations and symbolism where difference between insiders and outsiders is constructed. In this regard, UIT has carried out a literary field research among the literary narratives of African migrants in Sweden to explore how the Euro-African borderscape is shaped along the EU’s Scandinavian borders—to which the Mediterranean-African borderscape extends by virtue of the links created by migrant populations and the weight of their experiences. In the same realm, UEL produced a video to document the everyday discourses (practices, images and narratives) that make the migrant experiences in Britain a particular lens to look at Britain from an Euro-African borderscape.

As a consequence of using the concept of dislocation as the main methodological guide for this research, RUN has been able to conceptualize unsuspected Euro-African borderscapes that have been historically configured as consequence of a “geography of carom billiards”. The influence of Europe on immigrant African communities has been explored in extra-European geographies, particularly in the detached European borderscape of Argentina. In order to take dislocation seriously, it has been found that European culture not only goes beyond the physiographical borders of Europe and interacts in extra-European geographies but it transforms in them. Roughly put, European culture has travelled beyond the physiographical borders of Europe as a consequence of colonialism and imperialism, there it has been transformed through interaction with the local geographies, this transformation has then made its comeback to Europe, where it has again been transformed and again travelled back to extra-European geographies to interact and be transformed again.

RUN has found a fascinating example of such dislocated carom-billiard Afro-Mediterranean geographies in the coffee houses of Buenos Aires. These places are cultural frontiers whose aesthetic poetry evokes a geopolitically destabilizing trans-Atlantic familiarity. Their spatial rebellion reveals a colonial genetics evoking the one that runs through the whole American continent as heritage of the ceaseless bodily-intellectual intercourse that it has sustained with Europe since their mutual discovery. The confusion of elements that furnish these coffeehouses with their particular bohemian atmosphere find their roots in the immigration that sketched their character and suggests alternative cartographies of Europe joining what maps divide across the Atlantic. The emotional mutiny stirred up by porteño coffeehouses suggests that sensory experience might be more important than territorial contiguity for the conceptualization of frontiers. Such emotional frontiers discredit geopolitical labels that dress us up with intangible clothes to justify our division through domestic and international policies. By exposing the cultural baggage of these coffeehouses, as well as the iconography of socializations taking place in them, we attempt to undermine that cultural heritages are afraid of water and stop at the edge of continents. If the mapmaker and the historian aim at mapping the boundaries of Europe and America or the geographers defy the harmful vainglory of nationalisms and imperialisms, they would help themselves by listening to the swinging of oceans in cup of porteño coffee.

UNIBG carried out fieldwork in Zingonia—Province of Bergamo. Fieldwork activities were carried out in different periods between February 2014, May 2015 and were concluded in November 2015. There was a direct engagement in the field setting where the ethnography took place and the following sources of primary sources of ethnographic data were used: non-participant observation, field notes, visual instruments (photographs and short videos),
cultural cartography and counter-cartographies; participatory methods with migrant children (auto-photography, drawings, photo-elicitation, maps); narrative interviews (“targeted data collection” based on a study of the suburban area of Zingonia and the Senegalese migrant community inhabiting it); action-research and organization of workshops with local actors (stakeholders, value-holders, experience-holders).

Ce.R.Co. (Centro di Ricerca sulla Complessità at the University of Bergamo) has organized a Seminar Series on THINKING | ACTING | INHABITING ZINGONIA. Policies, Practices, Experiences and Representations of a Borderscape between the Local and the Global within the EUBORDERSCAPES project, WP 5 – RT 2. A first seminar was held at the University of Bergamo on November 28, 2014. It was planned as a half-day event including two parts: in the first part, brief talks by ‘key actors’ who are thinking, acting or inhabiting Zingonia; in the second part, focus-group activities were organized with actors invited to the seminar as privileged and experienced witnesses. A second seminar was held on April 10, 2015 at a civic centre in Boltiere (BG), one of the five urban municipalities between which the territory of Zingonia is divided. A third seminar was held at the end of September and beginning of October 2015.

RT (3) Tetuan – Externalized European Borders
The output of this research task has been crystallized in academic contributions such as:


These contributions explore how, when Spain joined the Schengen Agreement in 1991, the north African region of Tetouan/Ceuta started to gradually turn into a key hub of irregular sub-Saharan migration to the European Union (EU). Since then, both the increasing securitization of the Ceuta border and the fluctuant - though persistent - arrival of migrants have transformed the socio-spatial nature of this territory. These transformations have subsequently influenced migrant’s perceptions vis-à-vis the destinations and trajectories they take into considerations during their decision making process. They have had an impact on spatial behaviour in key migration routes towards the European Union.

These two contributions have explored how the two different borders of Ceuta, the land border with Morocco and the sea border with the Iberian Peninsula influence the opportunities of migrants en route toward the EU. In so doing, it has built on previous contributions within the field of transit migration to the EU, which have focused on the north of Africa. In concrete terms, they have put the lens on the situation of those sub-Saharan migrants who having managed to irregularly cross the land border between the Moroccan province of Tetouan and the EU, find themselves stranded in the north-African city of Ceuta. We argue have argued
that, under these circumstances, the city of Ceuta becomes what we define as a limbo-like landscape (a limboscape): a transitional zone, a threshold or midway territory between two different borders, between the hell of repatriation/expulsion and the heaven of regularization, where the migrants’ trajectories towards “European-EU” are spatially and temporally suspended.

The research question underlying this work package addresses how to evaluate the EU’s regionalization process in the Mediterranean neighbourhood. Since the answer should evaluate the appropriateness of the existing regional framework, we first undertake a critical analysis of the current debate on regionalization itself—both in the European context and beyond—in order to detect the range of possible understandings framing the notion of region. Our fundamental assumption is that the Mediterranean—from a physiographical, cultural and geopolitical perspective—is a region with a great deal of civilizational and cultural weight, not only for the EU (in which different notions of Mediterraneity coexist) but also for the international actors around the Mediterranean basin—including the near East and northern Africa—and beyond. Thus, the importance of the Mediterranean, a geopolitically contested idea, looms large for EU geopolitics and its regional policy towards this region. Since the dimension of power is fundamental for the definitions of both the Mediterranean and Europe (itself a contested idea within and beyond the EU), we take a critical historical perspective that emphasizes the role of power over space. Through a genealogy of its changing geopolitical meanings, we aim at locating the historical perceptions of Mediterraneity through the rise and collapse of the political projects that have formulated them to subsequently assess how those understandings keep playing a political role today between the EU and other Mediterranean actors beyond its borders. How can such diversity of historical perceptions and their contemporary reminiscences be understood within a contemporary European Mediterranean policy framework? The diversity characterizing the Mediterranean neighbours, particularly the weight of the cultural connections—both those which persist and those which lie hidden—and inform their debates on foreign policy—particularly in regard to migration, terrorism, enlargement, neighbourhood and cooperation—will be stressed and valorized as a resource rather than a constraint for the EU’s regionalization framework (this specific issue will be developed further in WP2). Thus, a fundamental assumption of this work package is that the Mediterranean is an area of opportunity whose borders, both spatial and political, are dependent on the cultural notions of geopolitical relevance that inform the policies shaping the interactions across the region. Through WP1 the research will therefore try to advance an original understanding of the regional perspective emerging from the richness of the area. To do this it will be necessary to overcome the prevalent idea of that existing regions are based on presumed common features. Fundamental questions of this WP are: where is the Mediterranean? How many understandings of the Mediterranean stand in geopolitical competition today? How are they related and what is the political import of their relations for the EU’s understanding of the Mediterranean region and its formulation of policies towards it? The research team will follow a broad methodological approach that takes into account not just political or territorial analyses but also cultural images, social representations, and artistic imagination deriving from a situated experience and understanding of the region. Inspired on the assumption that the Mediterranean is defined rather than given, the objective of this methodology is to find out the geopolitical imaginations that are created through the interaction between official and popular geopolitics. The understanding is that such geographical imaginations bear a great deal of influence in the democratic spaces of EU
Member States and thus in EU voters’ support or rejection of national and EU-wide policies towards the Mediterranean. The main goal of this work package is to trace the different understandings of the Mediterranean which frame the understanding of the phenomena shaping this region, particularly the dramas related to the geographical, cultural and thus political boundaries of Europe and the EU. The accomplishment of this WP requires the definition of different tasks, which rather than being temporarily subsequent are intended to overlap and interact with each other.

The Mediterranean has played a crucial role in the configuration of European civilization. Cross-Mediterranean contact laid the foundations for the Renaissance and Enlightenment in Europe. The Ottoman capture of its eastern coast catalysed the Age of Discovery and launched the rise of Europe not only as an hegemonic geopolitical player but also as a cultural idea. Trans-oceanic travel and breeding transported Europe to continents where Mediterranean empires not only left their indelible cultural imprint but also took back elements that inexorably changed European civilization—not least in the development of international legal doctrines of human and universal rights on which the EU today draws its moral inspiration and in which it finds its most meaningful historical legacy.

Today, the Mediterranean has become a fracture line where the clash of immense discrepancies engenders some of the most pressing dramas for the EU. In spite of the many efforts the EU has carried out to address this imbalance—e.g., the Barcelona process, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean, the European Neighbourhood Policy as well as the action plans and association agreements that accompany them—, the EU’s neighbourhood keeps engendering more challenges of an ever increasing urgency. The relative peace and wealth along the EU’s Mediterranean shores is confronted with North African and Middle Eastern coasts ridden with weak statehood, widespread violence and lacerating poverty. The absence of strong and stable states is creating the fear that the EU’s neighbouring Mediterranean shores are becoming breeding grounds for terrorists. This weak statehood coupled with an alarming discrepancy in prosperity across the Mediterranean basin keeps pushing asylum seekers and attracting undocumented migrants into the EU. Although the migrants pleas and plights are not only understandable but justified—who can blame anyone for crossing a border to escape misery and violence?—, their inflows have exacerbated populist xenophobic and anti-EU political movements that threaten the pillars on which the EU is based. Although these problems are due to larger geopolitical dramas the EU can do little to steer, they are aggravated by the EU’s mismanagement, inaction and short-sighted geopolitics.

**RT (4) Video documentation**

Following the conviction that representations have an unparalleled power to create geographical imaginations and thus perceptual borders (borders as people imagine them), WP5 has paid particular attention to how borders are displayed in images and what these depictions contribute to their promotion and maintenance. Three members of WP5, UNIBG, UAB and UEL, have acarried out video documentation on this issue.

WP5 has produced three documentary films. One carried out by UAB (“Tout le monde aime le bord de la mer”, under the direction by Keina Espiñeira) and the other by UNIBG
EUBORDERSCAPES (290775) is Funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7-SSH-2011-1), Area 4.2.1 The evolving concept of borders

("Houdoud al bahr | The Mediterranean Frontiers: Mazara-Mahdia", under the direction of Chiara Brambilla).

- UAB - “Tout le monde aime le bord de la mer”

Regarding the documentary film on the Spanish-Moroccan border, during the Autumn 2014, UAB organized a cineforum at the border enclave of Ceuta. The participants were sub-Saharan migrants that had irregularly crossed the external EU border between Ceuta and Morocco. In the course of this activity we screened some documentary films produced along/about the Euro-African borderscape such as: Distances (Pilar Monsell, Spain 2008); Border Diaries (Irene Gutiérrez, Spain 2013); or Sahara Chronicle (Ursula Biemann, Switzerland 2007). We discussed our perceptions of the films as aesthetic works and their performative functions when dealing with the representation of borders. Gradually the cineforum became a film laboratory/workshop: we took the cameras and shot various improvised fictional situations in the city of Ceuta.

After this experience of two months, in December 2014, UAB carried out its own documentary film at the border. This film entitled “The Colour of the Sea - A border filmic experience in Ceuta-” is an observational and participatory work. The main characters: Aliou, Diakité and Boubacar - coming from Guinea Conakry-, knew they would participate in the creation of the story. They knew that our proposal challenged the porous boundaries between reality and representation. They knew that we were not looking for a representation of the experience of the border registering their migratory biographical travel, but rather we were seeking to produce and activate a border experience through the performance of a film about being trapped in Ceuta, waiting between the forest and the sea. The result has been an ethnographic documentary performed with a poetic and symbolic language in which we examine the waiting time in this border city through oniric situations in which one of the characters narrates a short story based on a legend about the arrival of the white colonial men in Africa. Moreover, the film includes a reflection on the film itself, a meta-reflection about the process of creation and about the conflict that performing in a film about the border entails. It explores the experience of being in the border and of being settled in the CETI - Centre of Temporary Stay for Immigrants-, as was the case of all persons participating in the film. The final outcome is the film Tout le monde aime le bord de la mer, which has been presented at the International Film Festival in Rotterdam (IFFR) in 2016. This is a film that, through a blend of documentary and fiction, tries to captures African migrants’ transitional period while they wait in a forest in their way to the EU. Through images that aim to elicit the importance of geography and landscape for understanding the emotions during such migrant experience, the film tries to capture the feelings of migrants during the transitional period in which they are neither in their country of origin nor yet in the country of destination. Ceaseless uncertainty accompanies a sense of looming disaster. Both the transitional experience as well as the emotions elicited by it correspond to what UAB has conceptualized as a limboscape. This film is an exercise to put the concept of limboscape into practice through visual art—in this case film making. This film plays with the idea of the coast and the sea as well as with the different perceptions they evoke in people with different passports and socio-economic possibilities: while they might constitute a beautiful sight for tourists, for migrants in a dangerous journey towards Europe they represents the all-too real possibility of death and a reckless gamble to exchange a life of deprivation for a life of less deprivation. It is
a film that explores how the landscape and emotions merge with the experience of undocumented African migrants while alluding to the meaning of the sea and the changes that its crossing involves and whose everyday signification is of unavoidable importance—e.g., race—for the understanding of “the self” and “the other”.

- **UNIBG** – “Houdoud al bahr | The Mediterranean Frontiers: Mazara-Mahdia”

UNIBG has produced a film documentation on shifting Italy/Tunisia borderscapes across the Mediterranean. The level of observation has been national and transnational, meaning that part of the film documentation entailed multi-sited work in Italy (mainly the urban context of Mazara del Vallo in Sicily and in Tunisia (Tunisi/La Goulette and Mahdia). As explained above, the documentary (provisional title “Houdoud al bahr / The Mediterranean Frontiers. Mazara - Mahdia”) has been made in close connection with fieldwork research activities under RT1b and RT2 within WP5. Gazing into the Euro/African border and migration nexus through the borderscapes lens, the documentary provides empirical examples from multi-sited research in and across the Italian/Tunisian borderscape. By adopting such a multi-sited approach, the video is aimed at revealing the complexity of the Italian/Tunisian borderscape that is perceived as mobile and relational, resembling a fluid terrain of a multitude of political negotiations, claims and counterclaims that are actualized at the level of everyday practice. The video intends to describe how ‘pluritopical’ and ‘pluriversal’ experiences of borders often clash with the assumptions of geopolitical theory and mass-media dominant representations, and to investigate how the rhetoric and policies of borders impact, conflict and are in a dynamic relationship with everyday life; how these rhetoric and policies are experienced, lived and interpreted by those who inhabit the Italian/Tunisian borderscape. At the same time, the documentary is aimed at responding to the need to search for new ways to give voice to these experiences and make them visible. We have worked with young people living in Mazara del Vallo (Sicily), whose families are originally from nearby Tunisia, to capture their kaleidoscopic perceptions, experiences, representations, and imaginaries of the Italian/Tunisian borderscape.

- **UEL** – “Everyday Borders”

This film was made by the University of East London’s Centre for Research on Migration, Refugees and Belonging, in conjunction with Southall Black Sisters, Migrants’ Rights Network and the Refugee and Migrant Forum of Essex and London. The documentary film examines the various ways in which “the border” is manifesting itself in British society’s everyday life after the introduction of the 2014 Immigration Act. Film description: *Everyday Borders* provides an insight into aspects of such legislation, particularly on the requirements for employers, landlords, health workers and educators to act as border-guards when performing their jobs. The film argues that peaceful co-existence in multi-cultural Britain is under threat, as more members of the public are being asked to perform the role of UK border guards. The documentary argues that these new bordering processes impact not only immigrants, but all of us, as Professor Nira Yuval-Davis, co-director at the Centre for Research on Migration, Refugees and Belonging (University of East London) explains: “This evolution of bordering from the margin to the centre, from the extraordinary into everyday lives, is now threatening to destroy the conviviality of pluralist metropolitan London, and multi-cultural Britain in general”.

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Synthesis of the overall results

Perhaps the most important result of this research is the significance of the concept of dislocation and particularly the cultural and ultimately geopolitical bearing it exerts upon the future of the EU project. First, WP5 has established the importance of understanding the symbols upon which the EU draws inspiration as well as of tracing their history, heritage and power behind them. After this critical exercise it is important to take a step into destructive creativity and detach European borders from their taken-for-granted location (both physical and ideological). Only then does it become feasible to see and analyse those European borders hidden in plain sight by the veils of power in a more holistic way and to better grasp the extent of their implications. In today’s world one cannot claim to understand what is happening within the EU, around it or beyond it without taking into account a glocal perspective for each scale. Europe’s borders need to be emancipated from its “self-evident” boundaries in order to be better understood, analysed and, perhaps most important of all, shaped in ways that allow the EU preserve the path of peace and prosperity that it has been following over the past half a century.

Europe cannot be taken for granted as a category of study. This is perhaps one of the biggest methodological shortcomings of many studies falling within the broad category of “European studies”. We cannot assume the pre-existence of something called Europe—much less of European culture, European society or European civilization. Much more perilous is still to talk about the EU as synonymous of Europe. There is a geographical carelessness and a grossly misleading methodological regionalism that falls into the territorial trap of assuming that a physiographical convention can be used as a category to study a civilization that has had much interaction with most of the rest of the world and none of whose particularities can be explained without reference to such global geographies. European cross-border integration, European spatial planning, European identity building, European state building. Any study of this breadth must necessarily include a reflection upon the meaning of Europe. Europe needs to be taken seriously rather than taken-for-granted. We cannot understand the full political implications and historical meaning of FRONTEX, for example, without understanding the historical importance that the Mediterranean has had for Europe. We cannot understand how massive of a change it is for the EU to be closing the Mediterranean when the Mediterranean has constituted one of the moist culturally prosperous geo-cultural unities throughout the history of Europe. We cannot understand both the appeal and aversion Europe inspires without taking into account Europe’s post-colonial meanings across different geographies. This is particularly important to understand the complex relations that are shaped not only between migrants and the EU polity but among the EU polity, EU citizens with a migratory background and other external actors struggling to snatch away their loyalty.

The importance of taking Europe seriously has never been as important as it is today. Unlike their deceitful appearance, the increasing geopolitical challenges the EU faces today are not mainly foreign problems but problems whose roots are to be found in the EU’s inability to solve them. This conceptualization entails a crucial implication: It is not the EU’s lack of power to solve them or to influence them what allow these problems to threaten the EU but rather a lack of political will and a dire lack of political vision and leadership within the EU. It is the suspicion of this WP5 that a great deal of these shortcomings stem from an inability to
imagine a Europe that is more global, a Europe that can escape the straitjackets of its parochialism and its ever deeper introspection. This is what we consider the crucial geopolitical import of understanding and studying the detached geographies and carom-billiard geographies of Europe. We need to engage the complexities of a geography and borders understood not as mere material demarcations or outer features but as the product that arises from the conjugation between material conditions and purely ideological/immaterial perceptions.

The reach of the conceptual and methodological tool of dislocation is shown by WP5’s film documentations on Tetouan/Ceuta and Mazara del Valo/Mahdia as well as by the studies on the glocal configuration of Cyprus’ Green Line and on Latino-Mediterranean borders found in the Buenos Aires coffee houses. What each of these cases shows is that the analysis of certain local borders can be extrapolated to understand the configuration, evocations and logics of much wider borders and geographies such as the EU.

A very important aspect of WP5 research has been to show that both the external and internal borders of the EU as well as the imaginary geographies (ie, perceptions of space, culture and history) on which they are erected form part of the same border system, ie, of the same borderscape. Thus, the distinction between internal and external borders is redundant, unnecessary and deceptive. This is key to understand phenomena such as migration: recognizing that its internal and external borders form part of the same border system should make the EU think twice before putting into practice certain border controls along its external borders, for both the discourses and the policies that are used to bring these about will be later used to legitimize and implement the same kind of border controls along the EU’s Schengen space.

Another aspect highlighted by WP5’s research is the loss of vision in the EU. The films produced for WP5 show with striking clarity how the people experiencing the borderlands not merely understand their complexity but have proposals on their own on how to solve them. The bare clarity with which these borderlanders are able to see not only the manifold implications posed by the EU’s external borders but also the potential solutions makes one wonder: if local fishermen can grasp such border complexity, why is it proving impossible for the EU to come up with a better border regime—especially at a time when xenophobes and Euroskeptics are using the failure of the current border regime to tear the EU apart? Films like these have the ability to show an aspect of crucial importance for geography and which has been lost: aesthetics. The visuality of geography is not only intellectually fascinating but it commands a critical importance in the understanding of geopolitics—and, in the case of WP5, for the understanding of EU geopolitics in particular. Tha

Why art is important to do critical geography? Artistic geopolitics are crucial. The nexus between art and critical geography is not only crucial to understand geopolitical problems but also as a counterweight to the most callous propaganda. The imagination plays a crucial role in the shaping of European geography: There is an inextricable relationship between our ideas and feelings and the physical world. Geographical descriptions lie to themselves and do a disfavour to their field when they try to pursue the alchemical goal of objectivity. Probably the most obvious and well known artefacts pointing to the inextricable visuality of geography is its unavoidable association of maps. When we study Europe’s geography we use the senses
and the senses are relentlessly subjective. Since the senses are inextricably concerned with concepts of beauty and ugliness or what is pleasant and unpleasant, there is an unavoidable link between beauty and geopolitics—or, better stated, between what we consider to be beautiful and the political actions we undertake to preserve it.

We should not sacrifice the study of these links through scholarship in spite of how difficult it may appear to study deeply subjective and abstract concepts such as beauty. A careful exploration of the feelings evoked by viewing should accompany scholarly research. Dry modernistic epistemologies create dispassionate utilitarian insights that pave the way to inhuman public policy. If we resign ourselves to believe that we can only know hard facts but not emotions or perceptions. The issue here is the handling of subjectivity, which in any case is unavoidable. Hard facts should be combined with subjective emotional descriptions because it’s more honest the assumptions and biases of the researcher, which are ontologically unavoidable. By ignoring the emotions and subjective perceptions we are ditching crucial variables that account for causality. The very object of study of geography calls for an epistemological bridge between art and science.

Aesthetics are an inseparable part of geography, which is an inherently visual field, therefore geographers do themselves and their fields a disservice when they exclude visualizations from their work. We cannot just write about geography, we have to make it visual, either through maps or literary descriptions. It is not enough to talk about the immigrant’s skills, place of birth, education degree, we need to be able to visualize him and make it visible to the audience we are addressing. It is the same with borders. Geography is an inherently artistic field because in order to make its object of study visible it needs to resort to the means of poetry, literary writing, painting and other visual arts. It is not enough to talk about borders, border controls, give numbers of how many people cross the borders, how many of them come from which countries. We need to make the borders visual to have an impact on the imagination and on the reshaping of the geographies we are trying to change. Serious books of geography need some paintings and some poetry, some maps and some metaphors, some cartoons and some literary imagery.

Since geography’s traditional role has been to provide advice to statecraft, which has been used for war. To redress this imbalance geography needs to give its advice to someone that can use it for peace and be a bulwark against the abuses of the state. The goal of artistic geography would be to provide advice to the citizens to be aware of the manipulation of their states, to devalue the power that they theoretically have yielded to their states and allow them to emancipate from their abuse. The usual vehicles of traditional geopolitics are the means of state propaganda. They use images, slogans, political spots through media and maybe even some other channels like public education that convey a ready-to-use discourse (a toolkit of thoughts to interpret the world). Critical geopolitics are the David and traditional geopolitics the Goliath. If critical geographers want to hurl the stone into the center of Goliath’s forehead, they need to temper it with the same materials as propaganda’s evocatively visual and instantly appealing and memorable language. This does not mean that scholarly articles and specialized language of critical theory is useless but that if its true objective is to emancipate the masses and not just make emancipation the zealously guarded privilege of a few lucky in an ivory tower, then it needs to find a way to appeal to the masses.
Art is a meaningful way to counter the most pernicious aspect of geopolitics. Art can be used to balance out the effects of propaganda. Maps drawn in the service of a given ideology usually create unquestioned worlds, histories and relations between nations, which are insidious not because they are truth but because they are taken as such. The only weapon against propagandistic geopolitics is geopolitical education. It is important to dispel the illusion that any sort of geopolitical analysis can supply us with objective truths. Objective geographical truths are often used as an excuse to hide their indefensible immorality. Critical geopolitical approaches should be aimed at freeing human beings from the shackles of prejudice. We need an emotional cure to offset the emotional damage made by traditional geopolitics. We need to get out of the mathematized paradigm that limits social sciences to try to explain everything in mathematical terms. For this we might rely more on art than on science, because “the advantage of the emotions is that they lead us astray, and the advantage of Science is that it is not emotional”. We need both science and art: the first to give strength to our arguments and the second to breathe life into them and give them a soul. When addressing immigration, we need to get rid of this modernistic thinking that so much harm has done to humanity. We need to make people admire the human being independently of his origins, background and go back to the enlightened that all men are entitled to some basic inalienable rights just because of their condition as men.

Evidence of conceptual and theoretical development

These are some of the most promising theories and concepts developed within the research of WP5:

Dislocation
The cross-cutting theory that has informed the diverse projects undertaken under the umbrella of WP5 is that of geographical dislocation. As explained before, this theory entails the awareness that geographical analyses should not be constrained by geographical contiguity. This is a point that assumes that some of the most important geographies are not material but perceptional and that rather the latter are the hardest foundation upon which the former are built.

Europeanization and cartopolitics
Europeanization has been defined as an imperial strategy that has pursued the geopolitical ambition of legitimizing power over a bounded geography that has been labelled as Europe. This strategy however is more than a mere cartographic designation: it has been a formidable apparatus that has created whole traditions in art, historiography, political thought, etc. Europeanization is the political will to create Europe. European people, European culture and European civilization are thus dependent on this first fundamental definition. Cartopolitics has been defined as the geopolitical strategy to inscribe space with meaning through highly visual artefacts (which might be maps of any kind or descriptive, politically meaningful narratives that evoke the existence of such cartographies). This has been amongst others explored in the following publication:

Borderscapes
An epistemological, ontological and methodological re-conceptualization of borders that is able to grasp the complex border landscapes of an era of globalization and transnationalism. Its aim is to promote the liberation of geopolitical imaginations from the straitjacket imposed by the pervasive methodological nationalism of the territorial trap. This has amongst others been explored in the following publication:

Border acrobatics
A methodological tool to explore the core of a territory by scrutinizing its periphery. This has amongst others been explored in the following publication:

Invisibilization practices
These are the practices that, by creating borders that include, automatically obscure other borders and other inclusions. It refers to the deceitfully void space of exclusion created by borders and which is, in reality, a world rich in other borders which, however, are not favoured by the emphasis of art, academia, media or power. Invisibilization practices have been most conspicuously highlighted in the following video documentations:
- UAB - “Tout le monde aime le bord de la mer”
- UNIBG - “Houdoud al bahr | The Mediterranean Frontiers: Mazara-Mahdia”
- UEL – Everyday Borders

EU’s self-threatening border regime
This refers to the unacknowledged system formed by both the Eu’s internal and external borders. The importance of this concept lies in its insight on the repercussions of promoting an external border regime around the EU or an internal border regime within the EU without suspecting that either of these decisions will resonate on the other. The external and internal borders of the EU are intimately and unavoidably connected and what happens in one part of the system reverberates across the other. This concept has been further explored in the following publications:

Limboscapes
It refers to the expanding archipelago of migrant confinement spaces scattered within and beyond EU space. This concept has amongst others been explored in the following article:

**Border complex**

It refers to the increasing divergence between the implementation of the EU external border securitization needs and its management of free trade. This has been addressed in the following article:


**Future paths**

The task of dislocating Europe becomes ever more pressing as the European project grows increasingly challenged by forces that, one geopolitical crisis at a time, steadily chew at its foundations. It is the general opinion of this WP5 that the EU is being haunted by a self-defeating sense of besiegement that is leading to an entrenchment that is being exploited by Euroskeptics at working at the EU’s cannibalization. Europe—the most meaningful idea the EU project rests upon—needs to be opened, not only materially but first and foremost ideologically. Instead of a promoting feelings of helplessness and unavoidable catastrophe, the EU needs to recognize itself as one of the most influential global players, militarily, economically, politically and culturally. In order for Europe to open, Europe first has to change its imagination about itself and thus about its possibilities. There is no single way to go about this. However, as long as the geographical imagination of a Europe that is besieged and that has reached its limits of influence, appeal and power, that open Europe won’t be able to be imagined, neither in historiography nor in symbolism nor in politics nor in geopolitics.

Promising future paths that WP5 identifies to conduct research that could help to promote this opening of Europe are the following:

- **Unimagining Europe in cartography**: New depictions of European space need to be crafted, particularly those that are able to envision a more open and inclusive Europe. It is worth keeping in mind that throughout history political projects have first been drawn in maps and later built on the ground.

- **Rediscovering more Euro-African (ie, Mediterranean) borderscapes**: Like Mazara del Vallo or Tetouan/Ceuta, which speak of the historically ceaseless and crucial interactions between Europe and Africa. Many of these Euro-African, Euro-Latin American, Euro-Asian borderscapes are still alive (e.g., Mazara del Vallo); others have been disappeared but they a key historical importance for the understanding of today’s European polity (e.g., Al-Andalus and the import of Muslim-Arab culture on Europe’s development during the Middle Ages).

- **Visual analysis of Europe’s representations**: never in the history of mankind has the world been so interconnected and never has people’s geographical imaginations derived so much inspiration from an ubiquitous and relentless bombardment of images as we do today. Representations play a crucial role in the development of geographical imaginations and thus on what many of us uncritically consider to be reality. These
mediates realities on Europe, particularly those that are used to promote certain policies that could fundamentally alter the EU, should be researched.

- **The Mediterranean borderscape**: The Mediterranean is one of Europe’s most significant geographies both historically and presently. The interactions among the peoples inhabiting the surroundings of its basin as well as the importance of this basin itself as a crucial nexus in world history should be studied in relation to its implications for today’s EU policies across and along the Mediterranean.

**WP6 (Borders and Critical Geopolitics of Neighbourhood)**

**General goals and philosophy of the WP and definition of the Research Tasks**

Work Package 6 focused on the changes that have taken place in the conceptualization and political language of borders among EU and its neighbours following the geopolitical shifts of 1990s. Of particular concern are the dissolution of the Soviet Union and larger impact of the end of Cold War on Europe and its neighbours. In the Work Package we adopt critical geopolitics perspective which looks at borders beyond the role of the state and addresses the socio-spatial categories that operate at the more everyday level. Thus, we complement state-centered perspective with a bottom up approach and explore the perceptions of borders by a broad range of actors. In this Work package, particular attention is paid to the perspectives of EU’s neighbours on the relations with the EU in the context of their changing geopolitical roles and border-related concerns. Specific objectives of the Work package were:

1) to uncover categories through which commonalities and differences between the EU and neighbouring states are framed: e.g. showing how these borders are conceptualized in geographic, political, and socio-cultural terms, as well as the shifts in these concepts of borders. This will be achieved, among other ways, through investigating and interpreting, using a variety of sources, contemporary discursive linkages between cultural representations, identity, Europe and borders;

2) to uncover the specific lines upon which borders between EU-Europe and its neighbours are defined: e.g. with regard to referencing historical experiences in both contemporary and past political debates;

3) to characterize how and detect why EU bordering categories produce differentiations between different neighbours (Turkey, Ukraine, Tunisia and Morocco);

4) uncover and document inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies as elements of border representation (who is “in”, who is “out”?): are forms of civilizational differentiation discernible in discourses?: detect whether and in what way the politics and policies of the EU are referenced with regard to the above.

To address these objectives, four different research tasks were undertaken in this work package.
Research Task 1 (RT1): The Geopolitics of Neighbourhood involves a review of official and critical interpretations of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in order to fine-tune the questions developed in Tasks 2-4. This Research task is to be completed by all the participants of the Work Package.

Research Task 2 (RT2): Neighbourhood Relations and Evolving Border Concepts is the core Research task and it aims to pursue the research objectives outlined above for different neighbourhood context. The focus is on the rhetoric and policies of regional cooperation promoted by the EU Neighbourhood and their impact on both the internal political discussion of neighbouring countries and their external relations with the EU and each other. Of particular interest are the processes of cross-border and regional co-operation and domestic civil society activities. Under this Research task, we analyse local perceptions of the EU’s social and political agendas that emerge from academic debate, political discourses and media representations. The Research task includes several sub-tasks, according to the specific neighbourhood context.

2a: Turkey, the Black Sea Region and Shifting Borders of Neighbourhood
The research objectives outlined are pursued for the specific case of Turkey as EU candidate country, focusing on its relations with two Eastern Neighbourhood countries: Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Research Team: METU/UEF/CAS

2b: Post-Soviet States and Shifting Borders of Neighbourhood (SHARED TASK with WP 3-Post Soviet)
The research objectives outlined are pursued for the specific case of post-Soviet states that are included in the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. Countries in focus include Moldova and Ukraine, as Armenia and Azerbaijan are researched in the RT 2a. This RT will be undertaken in conjunction with WP 3 (Post-Soviet) RT 2.
Research Team: UEF/KKNU/IGRAS/METU

2c: Russian – EU Partnership
Under this research task, the special relationship between Russia and the European Union will be subject to investigation, taking into consideration Russia’s ongoing geopolitical interests in the Eastern Neighbourhood region.

2d: EuroMed Dialogue, Migration and Border Discourses (SHARED TASK with WP 5 – Post Colonial)
This subproject explores how Mediterranean borders are referenced in the political language of official documents and cultural and social initiatives that are involved in “Euro-Mediterranean” dialogue. Political issues regarding security, migration as well as cultural and ethnic issues that impact on ways these borders are represented at the national level were included in analysis. The research objectives outlined were originally planned to be pursued for the specific cases of Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. However, due to political instability in Egypt which rendered fieldwork impossible we replaced the latter case with Israeli-Palestinian border. This RT is undertaken in conjunction with WP 5 RT 1b.
Research Team: UAB/RUN/UNIBG/BGU
Research Task 3 (RT3): Synthesis and Policy Aspects involves formulating the main insights and practical consequences of results of the work package regarding political language of “Neighbourhood” and bordering processes between the EU and its neighbours. Major policy insights of this WP lie in relating perceptions of EU policies and politics (e.g. as “inclusive” or “exclusive”) to the development of Neighbourhood co-operation agendas. Results of the research task will contribute to the Final Report.

Research team: All WP participants

Methodology

The work package utilizes qualitative methodology. However, the specific methodological tools varied according to the research tasks. The main methodological tools included:

1) the analysis of political language and its development. Among other sources, official political statements, speeches as well as policy documents will be taken into consideration. Political discourse transmits and unconsciously reinforces the ideological foundations and the ways of knowing of political elites.

2) qualitative media analysis. Systematic media analysis was undertaken for the cases of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine (tasks 2a-2c). In Italy-Tunisia, Spain-Morocco and Israel-Palestine cases selective media analysis was carried out as per previous agreement with the partners. For each case under investigation, specific discursive events bearing on the issues of bordering were identified and examined in at least two newspapers with different political orientations (pro-government and oppositional, and, where available, also independent/mainstream).

3) desk research involving available academic sources was undertaken for all research tasks

4) Fieldwork involved interviews with experts in order to corroborate the analysis of political language as well as visits to archives. In total, 54 interviews were conducted for RT 2a; 23 interviews for RT 2b; and 97 interviews, in a shared research task with WP5, for RT 2d. In addition to interviews, for research task 2d we also made use of ethnographic fieldwork that was conducted in connection with Work Package 5.

Overall progress of the RTs from project start

Research Task 1 (RT1): The Geopolitics of Neighbourhood

According to the official EU website, with its European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) “the EU works with its southern and eastern neighbours to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration” (European Neighbourhood Policy). The ENP includes a bilateral ENP action plans signed between the EU and individual neighbouring countries. Currently, 12 of the 16 neighbouring countries have signed ENP action plans with the EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Ukraine. Algeria is currently negotiating a plan, while Belarus, Libya and Syria remain outside of the neighbourhood initiatives. The bilateral agreements are complemented by regional multilateral partnerships: Eastern Partnership and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Eastern Partnership initiative was launched in 2009, and includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The cooperation in the framework of the partnership is developed according to the mutual interests of the EU and the neighbour states, and thus can move at a different pace. In 2014, Association agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
agreements (DCFTA) were signed with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative first began in 1995 as Barcelona process, and was relaunched in 2008 as Union for the Mediterranean. Currently, the initiative includes 43 states: 28 EU members and 15 Southern European, African and Middle Eastern states. 8 of the North African and Middle Eastern participants of the initiatives are also part of the European Neighbourhood: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia.

The aim of the ENP policy is to overcome the exclusionary character that is usually attributed to borders, and to balance the hardening of EU’s external border that accompanied its internal de-bordering. With this aim, EU seeks to foster multilateral and multidimensional relationships with its neighbours, often described as ‘privileged partnerships’. The ENP is envisioned as an instrument of Europeanization in promoting EU values, i.e. human rights, open markets, and democratic participation, without the prospect of membership (Scott 2011). In this, EU aims to engage wide range of actors both in Europe and among the neighbours: to go beyond intergovernmental cooperation and engage also various civil society actors. Broad understanding of security, involving human, environmental, energy security is a central issue in the ENP. Consequently, various initiatives focused on the borders of the EU with the neighbourhood countries are of central importance in the ENP.

While ENP is rooted in a cohesive policy framework, the actual level of integration and forms of partnership are negotiated with each participant and for each specific regional context. The different pace of progress in bilateral relations can sometimes be at odds with EU’s attempts at establishing regional partnerships, and thus strengthen some borders in the neighbourhood regions. Another issue that impedes regional integration in the neighbourhood is territorial conflicts in a number of states, including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, Israel and Palestine, Moldova, Spain and Morocco, and most recently, Ukraine.

The different regions in the neighbourhood also present different challenges and opportunities for the EU. Thus, in the Mediterranean, the main issues of concern have to do with migration and human mobility. There is also some migration to the EU from the Eastern Neighbourhood, particularly from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, which includes both labour migration (from Moldova and Ukraine, mostly to Romania and Poland) and transit migration of third-country nationals. Yet, in the East, the main issue in the relationship with the neighbourhood is the influence exerted on the region by Russia. Russia, despite sharing a border with the EU, is not part of the ENP initiative, but it remains an important regional partner. In recent years, the relations with Russia have become increasingly tense, and the Eastern partnership plays central role in these contradictions. Russia considers Eastern neighbourhood to lie in its sphere of interests. Two of Europe’s neighbours in the East - Armenia and Belarus are also part of Russia-sponsored security bloc, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia further initiated a regional Eurasian Economic Union, arguably modelled upon the EU, and aiming to reintegrate former Soviet republics. Currently, Armenia and Belarus are both members of this organization. The membership precludes deeper integration with the EU as envisioned the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA). Many actors in the region perceive the relationship between EU and Russia as a zero-sum game, which has complicated the implementation of ENP in the Eastern neighbourhood. The rivalry between EU and Russia has led to new fragmentation in the
region: thus, in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan tries to pursue equidistant policy towards both EU and Russia, which means no integration with either; Armenia abandoned DCFTA with the EU and is reintegrating with Russia, and Georgia is persistent in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

These tensions culminated in the Ukrainian crisis in March 2014, following annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and involvement of Russian military in the conflicts in Donbass and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. In response to Russia’s actions, which EU strongly condemned, a range of sanctions including diplomatic measures, sanctions targeting certain individuals and entities, restrictions for Crimea and Sevastopol and suspension of some cooperation programs were implemented. Programs targeting civil society and cross-border cooperation are left intact. Russia reciprocated EU sanctions with the ban of agricultural imports from the EU (EU sanctions factsheet). Thus, EU’s progress in Eastern Partnership, with its ‘soft’ security approach, appears to be clashing with Russia’s view of its own strategic interests in the region, which is based on hard security problematic. EU’s soft security approach is also problematic for tackling conflicts in the region.

A special place in EU’s bordering practices with the neighbours belongs to Turkey. As a candidate country, Turkey enjoys a special relationship with the EU and is far more advanced in terms of Europeanization than the ENP participants. It is a key country both in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions, and it lies on the Eastern Mediterranean migration route, through which hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees entered Europe in 2015. Turkey also has a land border with three of the Eastern Neighbourhood states in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), and thus can serve as bridge between EU and this region. However, its role is also limited by conflicts with Armenia.

In research task 2 we explored each of these specific regional contexts in greater depth.

Research Task 2 (RT2): Neighbourhood Relations and Evolving Border Concepts

2a: Turkey, the Black Sea Region and Shifting Borders of Neighbourhood (15 PMs)
For the purposes of the Work package, we focus on the multi-lateral relations between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The peculiarity of this case is that borders of Armenia with both Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed, due to frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenian forces of Nagorno-Karabakh currently occupy the NK region as well as surrounding territories. Consequently, Azerbaijan does not control large part of its border with Armenia, The de-facto border therefore lies at the frontline separating Azerbaijani and Armenian military forces.

Turkey’s border with Azerbaijan is only 11 km, and that is with Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is disconnected from the Azerbaijan proper by the territory of Armenia. Georgia is a key country in the region providing connection between Azerbaijan and Turkey on the one side and Armenia and Russia on the other. Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran are guarded jointly by Armenian and Russian troops.

The Karabakh conflict has all but eradicated respective minorities in Azerbaijan and Armenia. In Turkey, there is an Armenian Diaspora, mostly centred in Istanbul, as well as people of Azerbaijani origin that migrated to Turkey after the Bolshevik Revolution. These people remained largely «distant and critical» to the Aliyev regime whom they considered «anti-
The collapse of the Soviet Union was the main transformative event that changed the borders and relations in the region. Turkey, which had previously been the one of the only two NATO members with shared border with Soviet Union, found itself with not one, but three new neighbours, and with each it had to develop a separate relationship. For Azerbaijan and Armenia, in addition to the Karabakh conflict, the collapse of Soviet Union meant the erection of new borders, which previously did not exist within Soviet Union, which put restrictions on people’s movement.

The relations between Turkey and Armenia remain complicated due to the history of the events of 1915-1917. For Armenia, the recognition of these events as a genocide remains a priority in foreign policy. But within Turkey, the topic remains controversial. The official position of Turkish state is that both Turkish and Armenian communities suffered terribly in the last years of the Ottoman Empire (Republic of Turkey MFA). This position is also shared in Azerbaijan. In Turkish civil society, some intellectuals and activists support recognition of those events as genocide. However, for others, this is a period of ‘mass killings’ and ‘forced migration’ (METU case study report), but not genocide. The proximity to the border with Armenia also has an impact on the interpretation of these events, and in the border regions where “Armenian aggression” (METU case study report) is felt much stronger, recognition of genocide is strongly opposed. In 2008-2009 an attempt at normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey took place. Started with visit of Turkish President A. Gül to a football match in Yerevan, the process led to signing of Turkish-Armenian protocols in October 2009.

The detailed media analysis of this process in three countries revealed significant differences in interpretations. In Turkish and Armenian media, the process of normalization was largely viewed positively, as an opportunity for establishing neighbourly relations. In Armenia however normalization ‘without preconditions,’ (CAS media analysis report) such as withdrawal of troops from Karabakh or giving up of genocide demands, was stressed. In Azerbaijan, both opposition and government newspapers united in their rejection of the normalization, which they perceived as betrayal by Turkey.

Turkish interviewees presented a more diverse view than Turkish media. Some of our respondents mentioned that the normalization process damaged relations with Azerbaijan and pushed it towards Russia; others saw this as an expression of Turkey’s good will, which Armenia did not appreciate. One other opinion is that the borders should not be opened before Armenia gives up its territorial claims against Turkey and stops the occupation of Karabakh and surrounding territories. In Armenia, our respondents generally supported opening of the borders. In contrast with Turkey, the opening of the borders is viewed more positively in the border areas than in Yerevan.

Azerbaijan and Turkey have a special exceptionally close relationship, based on ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural ties. In Azerbaijan Turkey is considered “the closest friendly and brotherly nation”. (METU case study report). “One nation - two states” motto is often invoked in both official and everyday discourse. Economically, the two countries are connected by stragic oil and gas pipelines which deliver Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon resources.
to the West. In the post-independence period, Turkey has been viewed by Azerbaijan’s elites as a model for secular modernization and the gate to the West.

In Azerbaijan and Armenia, the concept of borders is strongly associated with conflict, division, separation, and the role of the state, mainly due to the Karabakh conflict, and also to relations with Turkey (in Armenia). In Azerbaijan the associations with separation, alienation, and division can also be traced back to the separation of historical Azerbaijan into North and South by Russia and Iran in 1828. The years of separation resulted in new cultural borders, when North Azerbaijaniis see the Southerners as highly conservative and “backward” (METU case study reports). In Armenia, there is a even a more acute understanding of the territory across the Turkish border a lost homeland. However, the major difference lies in the fact that Iran-Azerbaijan border remains stable and peaceful despite the cultural tensions, while Turkish-Armenian border is closed.

The collapse of Soviet Union led to construction and reinterpretation of cultural borders as well as political ones, and the two do not coincide. In Azerbaijan, the lines along which cultural borders are drawn include: Sovietness, Russian versus Turkish/Turkic civilization, Turkish/Azerbaijanian language, Religious identity, Common history, Common enemy (METU case study report). None of these borders is absolute. Regional identity as South Caucasus people also remains relevant, despite the history of conflict with Armenia. Between Azerbaijan and Turkey a significant de-bordering took place, Azerbaijaniis describe feeling “almost home” in Turkey (METU case study report). However, Azerbaijaniis are significantly more informed about the events in Turkey than Turks about the events in Azerbaijan. This de-bordering does not necessarily mean the denial and/or rejection of the Soviet/Russian legacy, but rather denotes a choice of the part of the world where Azerbaijaniis want to belong.

In Armenia, the major cultural dimensions of bordering include religion and history. In terms of religion, Armenians see themselves as the foremost Eastern point of Christianity in the East. As such, Armenians feel closer to Europe in cultural terms than to their immediate neighbours Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran, as EU is perceived as an association of Christian nations. In terms of history, Armenians consider their current political boundary to be just a small part of historical Armenia: “we lost 90% of our territory” (CAS case study report).

Our respondents in both Azerbaijan and Turkey have positive view of the EU, because of the values that it represents namely, democracy, human rights, development, and modernization. However, in Azerbaijan it is also considered an “inefficient and ineffective” (METU case study report) actor, particularly in the field of conflict resolution which is of high importance there. Our Turkish respondents were pessimistic about the chances of Turkey to enter EU both due to the lack of interest on the part of current government and its anti-democratic policies as well as resistance within EU itself, which some respondents dubbed as “Christian club” (METU case study report). In Azerbaijan, our respondents would like to see Turkey as an EU member, yet this offers little to Azerbaijan itself, as its own government has distanced itself from the EU and other European structures.

For Armenia, EU has ‘failed’ (CAS case study report) in its policy toward the region. The democracy agenda that EU offers is not sufficient for Armenia, who foremost seeks
guarantees of security, and only Russia can provide them. According to respondents, “the main pillars of the Armenian security system” (CAS case study report)

2b: Post-Soviet States and Shifting Borders of Neighbourhood

For this research task two specific case studies were conducted: in Kharkiv region in Ukraine (bordering Russia) and in Moldova, focusing particularly on the unrecognized state of Transnistria. In Ukraine, the issue of borders has become very important following the conflict with Russia that unfolded in 2014. Following the exile of President Yanukovich in February 2014, Eastern part of Ukraine became an arena of political confrontation. Initially peaceful protests challenging the European choice of the political elite, began to be held in various cities. In two regions (Donetsk and Luhansk) the protests eventually grew into violent conflicts, with Russian military involvement. In Crimea, pro-Russian authorities refused to recognize the new Ukrainian authorities, and after a referendum, which was not recognized by any international organizations, announced unification with Russia. It is important to note that the territory of the present day Ukraine had historically been divided between different empires: West of Ukraine used to be part of Austro-Hungarian Empire, while East of Ukraine part of Russian Empire; Crimea also was a part of Ottoman Empire. The different regions have retained cultural, ethnic and linguistic differences. Thus, Western Ukraine is predominantly Ukrainian and Ukrainian speaking; Ukraine’s Russian minority is concentrated in the East and in Crimea; Eastern Ukraine is also predominantly Russo-phone, although not all of Russian speakers are of Russian origin. Western and Eastern Ukraine also differ in their political orientations: the West is more pro-European while the East is pro-Russian. Crimean Tatar population in Crimea mostly opposed annexation of the region by Russia, unlike the majority of the population of the region.

Prior to this conflict, the Russian Ukrainian border was relatively transparent: “one could pass, going through the fields, bypassing customs points” (KKNU case study report). Since the conflict unfolded, the part of border in Kharkiv region has been hardened and reinforced from the Ukrainian side. The border between Ukraine proper and the breakaway Crimea region has also hardened considerably; while it is not impossible to get into Crime from Ukraine, this is now a long and tedious process. Ukraine currently does not control the border in the conflict regions of Luhansk and Donetsk.

For our respondents in Kharkiv region, the notion of border was mostly associated with the state, division and separation; however, cooperation and partnership were also mentioned. The Russian-Ukrainian border was mostly associated with “conflict” and ‘enemy’ (KKNU case study report). For many respondents, as well as general population, the current conflict has been very disruptive, as they have friends, relatives, or economic interests on the other side of the border. Many respondents, especially those of the older generation, contrasted the current state of affairs with the Soviet past, where borders were formal and did not limit movement within the Soviet Union. In Kharkiv, the border with EU is not part of the everyday experience, and the population does not feel that they are “European neighbourhood”. Respondents also noted that in Western Ukraine the EU was much more visible: “In Western Ukraine, there European projects work ... which help to equip the border and which show that the border can be as it is in European countries, but not the same as it is in the eastern part of Ukraine” (KKNU case study report). Several respondents mentioned approvingly the EU initiative of Euroregions. In the framework of this initiative, a Euroregion
of ‘Slobozhanschina’, comprised of Kharkiv region in Ukraine and Belgorod region in Russia, was organized. However, the project had since lost its relevance for the EU, and currently is not active. EU is also evaluated positively as a model of free movement not restricted by national borders.

Turning to the evaluation of the neighbours, in Kharkiv currently the perceptions of the EU and Russia are polarized: those who see EU positively, view Russia negatively and vice versa. The positive aspects associated with EU include democracy, freedom, order; for Russia, positive associations have to do with economic prosperity (compared to Ukraine), cultural proximity. The negative notions associated with EU are the potential economic exploitation of Ukraine and the moral decay, particularly sexual freedom, which is interpreted as perversion (KKNU case study report).

Similar polarization between pro-European and pro-Russian orientations is also observed in Moldova, despite the fact that Moldova has no common border with Russia. Throughout the history, territory of the present day Moldova had belonged to Ottoman Empire, and later was divided between the Kingdom of Romania and Russian Empire. Re-unification with Romania has been an important part of the political agenda since before the dissolution of Soviet Union. Currently, the right wing political parties are strong supporters of European integration, while left wing emphasizes the economic and cultural ties with Russia. European integration has been identified as a goal of Moldovan foreign policy; in 2014 Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between EU and Moldova was signed, and it entered in full force from January 2016. The association presupposes privileged conditions for trade with the EU, assistance in reforming public administration, border control, modernization of economy and particularly agricultural production, as well as simplification of human mobility. In Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict EU also demonstrates the biggest presence, compared other frozen conflicts: EU has a status of observer in Moldova-Transnistria talks.

European integration and especially re-unification with Romania are strongly opposed in Transnistria - an unrecognized state populated predominantly by Russian minority. Similar to unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic, Transnistria declared its secession from Moldova in 1991 and has existed since with political, military and economic support from Russia. However, despite the ongoing political conflict, the border between Moldova and Transnistria is an open one, and everyday communication and travel are carried over across the border. Yet, the hostility between Russia and Ukraine, through which the communication of both Moldova and Transnistria with Russia takes place, is likely to further complicate the conflict around Transnistria. Currently, the relations between Moldova and Transnistria are facing a new challenge: as Deepened and Comprehensive Zone of free trade (DCZFT) becomes effective, Transnistria must make a choice between severing its trade with the EU or with Russia. In Transnistria it is believed that DCZFT is going to be used by Moldovan government to exert pressure over them.

Regarding the Georgian case, a policy seminar held in Tbilisi on the European Neighbourhood and Eastern Partnership policies. As the major neighbourhood instruments towards the post-Soviet region, particularly Georgia, the certain elements were highlighted in order to achieve a more encompassing neighbourhood policy towards the region. The
participants underlined the importance of the EU in terms of obtaining common values such as rule of law, human rights, freedom of expression as well as building closer ties with Europe through developing long-term trade and innovation policies. Europeanization is perceived as the main motivational engine for improving rule of law, social and political justice, and a major path towards democratization in Georgia.

The policy seminar also offered a chance for analysing to what extent the conditionality is perceived as an instrument for enhancing and motivating the Eastern partnership countries as well as examining the impact of association agreements. In addition to the analysis of the how EU reaches to the region and how effective the EU policies in order to create a European neighbouring zone in a wider perspective, the Ukrainian crises started during the Vilnius Summit in 2013 constituted another important turning point between Eastern Partnership countries and the EU. Depending on the Russia’s aggressive engagement with the region, especially with the countries aligned themselves with the Western political path, there is a demand addressed to the EU to develop more assertive policies and closer attachment, which emphasize a geopolitical and security-based attribution to the EU’s engagement in the region.

2c: Russian – EU Partnership
The special relationship between EU and Russia evolved considerably over the years. In 1990s, Russia’s then liberal elite held hopes of integrating into European institutions. In 1994, the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (ratified in December 1997) was signed between EU and Russia. Liberals in Russia warmly welcomed the Agreement, hoping for deepening interaction with the EU. This however did not happen; observers complained that the EU kept Russia at a distance; the conditions that EU put forward for deeper integration were seen in Russia as interference in internal affairs.

The relations between EU and Russia were complicated by a number of factors. First, it was the close connection between EU and NATO, which implied that integration with European institutions, also involved integration with NATO. As this was not possible for Russia, it became obvious that Russia’s integration into the EU will not take place. The second issue was the military conflict in Chechnya, which revived the fears of Russia’s imperial expansionism. Third was NATO’s involvement in Kosovo, without the UN consent, which Russia strongly opposed.

The next period in the EU-Russia relations began in 2001 after President Putin came to power. It was in this period that the theme of Eurasian integration began to figure more prominently in Russia. Nevertheless, Putin initially established good relations with the EU, and the EU were considered as a model for future Eurasian integration. However, the plans for EU enlargement, and particularly the problem of Russia’s communication with Kaliningrad region, which was to be cut off from Russia but new members, became a serious trial for the Russia-EU relations. Russia accused EU of ignoring its legitimate interests and refusing to cooperate.

The definitive turning point in the EU-Russia relations was signalled in 2007 with Putin’s speech in Munich. In this speech, Putin openly expressed his opposition to a unipolar, US-led world. He stressed that any cooperation with the West will take place on equal footing, and that re-organization of post-Soviet space without Russia is not possible.
Following this reformulation in Russia’s policies, in the next years the EU-Russia relations were dominated by the Eastern partnership initiative. The Eastern Partnership was perceived as a challenge to Russia’s interests in the region, aiming at taking post-Soviet space from its sphere of influence. Russia’s response was intensifying its own efforts at Eurasian integration. It also pushed Russia to re-evaluate its border regimes with the participants of the initiatives. Thus, with those countries that were deeper involved in the EP project, the borders hardened (Georgia); with those who remained less involved or not involved at all the border regimes were relaxed (Belarus). The debates about the geopolitical choice of Moldova and Ukraine also came to the fore (see research task 2b).

Belarus remains Russia’s main ally, and is part of both the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). EU-Belarus Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has been frozen due to violations of electoral code and crackdown on civil society. EU has also applied some restrictive measures to Belarus officials. However, EU continues some cooperation with Belarus in support of civil society, environment, and negotiations of visa facilitation agreements. Belarus also participates in the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership initiative.

The 5-days war with Georgia that took place in 2008 also needs to be understood in the context of EU-Russian relations. Russian troops crossed into territory of South Ossetia, a separatist region in Georgia. Over the course of 5 days many military targets in Georgia were attacked. Following the war, Russia recognized independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia responded by leaving the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and suspended diplomatic relations, and Georgia’s commitment to integration with the EU was reinforced. EU also played important role in negotiations between Tbilisi and Moscow and reaching a ceasefire; after the conflict, EU established an unarmed civilian EU Monitoring Mission in the region in order to prevent resumption of hostilities. Georgia also signed Association and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreements with the EU in 2014.

In the West, Russia was blamed for the war; however, no significant sanctions followed. In Russia, public opinion remained certain that it was Georgia who began the attacks; it was also generally considered an adequate response to the EU and NATO’s treatment of Kosovo. Only a few liberal voices, represented in media for example in ‘Novaia gazeta’, blamed Russia for the invasion.

In Moldova, Russia continues to support the separatist Transnistria region. It also protested against Moldova’s signing of Association agreement by banning some Moldovan products, particularly wine, which used to be an important item in Moldova’s exports to Russia.

The final big crisis in the EU-Russia relations, which is still ongoing, began in 2014 with Ukraine’s movement towards association agreement with the EU. In Russia, Ukraine was presented as a battlefield between itself and the West. In the official discourses the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovich was interpreted as a coup instigated by the West.

Thus, the relations between the EU and Russia have changed considerably over the last 2 decades. In 1990s Russia itself was interested and hopeful of integrating into European institutions; yet beginning from 2001 the relations with EU have become increasingly tense and antagonistic. The areas included in Eastern Partnership program are the main apple of discord, as Russia sees EU’s deepening relations with these former Soviet republics as a threat
to its interests. The tensions between EU and Russia have led to deepening of divisions within the Eastern Partnership region

2d: EuroMed Dialogue, Migration and Border Discourses (SHARED TASK with WP 5 – Post Colonial) (15 PMs)

In this research task, we explore in depth three cases: Spanish-Moroccan, Italian-Tunisian, and Israeli-Palestinian borders. All of these countries are part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which started in 1995 as Barcelona process and was re-launched in 2008 as Union for the Mediterranean. Morocco and Tunisia both have privileged ‘advanced status’ in the process, received respectively in 2008 and 2011.

The increasing security concern for the EU with regard to the Mediterranean region is its role in migration, especially irregular migration. European border agency FRONTEX identifies 3 migration routes in the Mediterranean region: Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean. The Western and Central Mediterranean routes are predominantly maritime (with the exception of the cases of Ceuta and Melilla, described below). Western route is mostly used by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. After the political unrest in Tunisia and especially Libya, the flow of people from the Central route increased greatly. The Eastern Mediterranean route passes through Turkey and reaches Greece or Bulgaria; both sea and land are used for the crossing. This route is used by migrants from Middle East (Syria and Iraq), Afghanistan, and also some Africans. In 2015, the Eastern Mediterranean route became the largest route of migration to Europe, particularly due to the flow refugees from war in Syria. Spanish-Moroccan border is unique in the EU because it includes two Spanish enclave cities Ceuta and Melilla on the African continent (UAB case study report). The Spanish sovereignty of both cities however is disputed by Morocco since 1956. The cities became an iconic representation of ‘Fortress Europe’ due to the fences erected around them in order to prevent illegal immigration. Despite transborder communication as well as some limited hybridization in the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves, where the “notions of Europeanness, Africanness, Islam, and Christianity” merge to “rework the meaning of Europeanness” (UAB case study report), the symbolic and cultural borders between Spain and Morocco remain strong. Spanish nationalism was built on the legacy of reconquista and opposition with the Moors, leading to policies of ethnic, religious and cultural homogenization (Driessen 1992, p.17). Historically, Muslim Moroccans, even those who were working for Spanish army, were denied access to Spanish citizenship; this only changed in 1985. The cross-border ties are being strengthened by the ongoing process of family re-unifications, as well as some formal and informal cooperation in key areas, such as public health. Despite these changes, in everyday talk ‘Muslim’ and ‘Moroccan’ remain interchangeable categories. The granting of citizenship to some Muslim Moroccans also created new boundaries, between Muslims holding Spanish and therefore EU citizenship and those who do not.

Morocco plays an important role in securitization of EU’s external borders with regards to migration from sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, Morocco signed Mobility Agreement with EU, facilitating issuing of visas for certain categories of Moroccan citizens. However, so far Morocco has refused to sign a re-admission agreement, which would force it to admit illegal migrants who crossed the EU border from its territory. Nevertheless, Morocco in fact does re-admit third country nationals who passed its territory on their way to EU. Ceuta is one of the
key points in this process. The paradox of the situation is that Morocco cooperates with Spain in protecting EU’s external border, which it does not officially recognize.

The border between Italy and Tunisia is a maritime one, and passes through the Channel of Sicily. Historically, Sicily and Tunisia have had intensive interaction and migration. The common heritage includes Roman Empire, Arab conquest, Italian settlements in Tunisia in 18-19th centuries, and most recently migration of Tunisians to Sicily. Particularly after Tunisian independence in 1956 many Tunisian men found employment in Sicilian fishing industry and agriculture. Importantly, Sicilian fishing fleet operated not only in the waters between Sicily and Tunisia but also near the shores of Libya, thus leading to “Mediterraneanization” of Sicily’s fishing industry and town of Mazara, where its fleet was based. What began as temporary and seasonal and largely undocumented economic migration eventually led to the emergence of Tunisian community in Mazara del Vallo. For years, Tunisians remained segregated and their social mobility in Sicily was blocked, but this is now changing with the second and third generation of Tunisians in Sicily. Many of them, especially those who were educated in Italian schools develop multiple identities. Another important element is the new waves of migration from sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe (Roma), who have taken the jobs of lowest status and pay. Local respondents in Mazara del Vallo also distinguish between the old migration, of Tunisian workers, which is viewed more positively, and the more recent migration from sub-Saharan Africa. The latter is perceived more as a strain on local resources.

The turning point in the regulation of migration between Sicily and Tunisia was the adoption of Martelli Law in 1991 (UNIBG case study report). Previously unregulated and fluid migration process, which was often temporary, was put into strict legal framework. Paradoxically, this law also led to the establishment of Tunisian communities in Mazara del Vallo and other Sicilian cities: as seasonal work became difficult and full time residence presupposed family unification. The respondents also noted that hardening of Italian legislation has led to the rise of illegal migration and the terrible tragedies with drowning boats full of illegal migrants (UNIBG case study report). EU policies of securitization and militarization of the border also play the role in turning the previously fluid border between with Tunisia into a hard boundary. At the same time, EU’s initiatives aimed at fostering cross-border cooperation and interaction remain distant from the local context and often not known to local actors, including both public administration and civil society.

For Israel, the question of borders has been central since the moment of the creation of the Israeli state in 1948. Here, they are not a matter of security only, but also of national identity and the self-perception between East and West. In this context, Mediterranean option opens new opportunities for Israel to find its place in the region, and overcome the role of ‘Crusader’ from the West that does not belong to the Middle East (BGU case study report). It has been argued that Israel is a “Mediterranean society in the making” (BGU case study report). Three processes have been important in this Mediterraneanization: first, in the context of ongoing confrontation with Palestine, Israelis gained access to Turkey and Maghreb (in 1990s), which helped to place Israel in Mediterranean, rather than Middle Eastern context. Second is the decline of mobilization around Zionist ideology and a shift towards more secular and civil society. Third is the Oslo Accords (1993) and the beginning of Barcelona process.
In terms of identity, Mediterranean option is especially favoured by Mizrachim and Sephardic Jews, i.e. those who arrived to Israel either from Muslim countries of North Africa and Middle East or the descendants of Iberian Jews who were scattered in Europe after the Reconquista. Mizrachim Jews now constitute 60% of Israeli Jewish population; however, in the early period of Israeli state they were marginalized both politically and culturally by the Ashkenazi elite which saw Israel as a piece of Western civilization in the Middle East. The Mediterranean option thus also can help Israel in its internal tension between Ashkenazi and Mizrachim Jews, by offering an alternative umbrella identity. However, Ashkenazi, and especially more recent migrants of Ashkenazi origin from former Soviet Union, still oppose this option.

Mediterranean option is valuable for Israel because it shifts the perspective from borders as divisive lines, which is especially salient in Israel’s relations with Palestine and other Middle Eastern Arab states, to borders as zones, where multiple relationships beyond confrontation can be established and developed.

**Synthesis of the overall results**

In all of the neighbourhood countries under examination, the perceptions of borders are significantly influenced by the historical legacy as well as the national and international context. By that we mean not only the more or less recent history, such as Soviet Union, French colonization of North Africa, or establishment of the state of Israel, but also more distant historical events. Arab conquest of Sicily and Spain, the Reconquista, the Crusades, the inclusion of parts of the territories of modern Ukraine and Moldova into Habsburg Empire, the history of Ottoman, Persian, and Russian rivalry in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region are all perceived as important historical events with lasting impacts. Thus, the history of Reconquista has an impact on cultural boundaries between Moroccans and Spaniards; in Azerbaijan the perception of border is coloured by the division of historical Azerbaijan between Russian and Persian Empires; in Ukraine, considerable difference in perception of the EU in the Western and Eastern part of the country is linked to the history of inclusion of the Western areas into the Duchy of Lithuania and later Habsburg Empire, while the East of the country is politically and culturally closer to Russia.

Another common feature of the regions under examination is that they have historically been areas of contact of different states and empires, religions and cultural groups. As a result of this history, in all of our case studies the political and cultural borders do not coincide. In many cases, cultural borders are relatively permeable and allow considerable interaction and mutual exchange. Thus, in Azerbaijan, pro-Turkish orientation usually does not mean rejection of Soviet legacy, and in Israel the Mediterranean option actually presents an opportunity for Ashkenazi and Mizrachim-Sephardic Jews to forge a common cultural identity. In some cases, the political borders are stronger and harder than social and cultural, and are experienced as an obstacle to interaction of ordinary people. This, for example, is the case in Italian-Tunisian border, where regulation of migration has changed traditionally fluid and flexible cross-border relations. Arguably, this is also the case between Turkey and Armenia, where closed political border is at odds with attempts of business and civil society activists from both sides to establish closer relations. In other cases, cultural borders can be as strong as political ones, for example between Spain and Morocco and between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Yet in other cases, for example in Ukraine, the cultural borders within the country, namely between pro-European and pro-Russian groups, can lead to deep societal division, which in turn reflects on the international relations at the political level.

Another important, and related, issue is the territorial disputes of various degree of intensity which are present in most of the cases we studied. These include disputed Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Morocco, Crimea and Eastern regions of Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Transnistrian region in Moldova, Armenian claims to parts of Eastern Turkey, and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. These conflicts impede cross-border interaction between members of the Neighbourhood partnerships and, especially in the Eastern neighbourhood, prevent the construction of multi-dimensional regional interaction that is envisioned by the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, there is also evidence that Neighbourhood initiatives, although they do not contain specific conflict resolution component, can help in forging a ground for communication of the conflicting sides, if not resolution of the conflict. The examples from our research include the cases of Israel and Palestine, where Mediterranean discoursed is used to de-emphasize the binary opposition, and Spanish-Moroccan cooperation in border control in Ceuta, which takes place despite the lack of official recognition of the border by Rabat.

Beyond these commonalities, it is important to note that Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods are two very different regions and present different opportunities and challenges for the EU. In the Southern neighbourhood, despite tensions, controversies, and uneven pace of progress of the integration dynamics, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership initiative has been successful in providing a common platform for communication of different states and actors. The three case studies show that Mediterranean is a meaningful discourse that plays a role in the conceptualization of borders as zones of contact (BGU case study report) and spaces of syncretism and socio-cultural exchange (UNIBG case study report). Importantly, the multi-lateral platform has also opened opportunities for cooperation for states that are in conflict with each other, i.e. Israel and Palestine and Spain and Morocco, as mentioned above.

One major area of cooperation in the Mediterranean neighbourhood has been regulation of migration and human mobility. It is well known that the internal de-bordering in the EU was accompanied by the simultaneous hardening of external EU borders, as the Union has been securitizing and fortifying the borders. The impact of these practices for the Mediterranean has been controversial. On the one hand, fortification practices have led to hardening of the borders between EU and the neighbours, as is demonstrated by the Italy-Tunisia and Spain Morocco case studies. The fences around Ceuta and Melilla have become the iconic representations this process, commonly known as ‘Fortress Europe’. On the other hand, the Mediterranean neighbourhood countries are invited to partake in the process of securitization of EU’s borders, in exchange for some relaxing of their own borders with the EU. Southern neighbourhood is being turned into a kind of cordon sanitaire, ensuring security of EU’s external border, while remaining at the margins of EU’s free movement policies (UAB case study report). Thus, as some borders are being taken down, other borders are being erected.
The EU’s attractiveness for the neighbourhood and beyond has dual character: economic and political. For migrants, EU is on the one hand a land of economic opportunities which are not available in the home countries; on the other hand, migrants seek to escape from authoritarian regimes in their home countries and are attracted by the promise of democracy and human rights protection. But also EU serves as a model and potentially a force for reform in the home societies of the Neighbourhood: thus, in Eastern Neighbourhood, association with EU is perceived as a mechanism for modernization of Soviet-type economies and overcoming problems of political corruption. On the other hand, as the events in Tunisia and Libya in 2010-2011 and especially the current Syrian crisis demonstrate political unrest, civil war and the ensuing destruction of local economies result in multifold increases in the refugee and migrant flows. Thus, creating a belt of security and prosperity in the neighbourhood as declared in Neighbourhood policy goals is indeed in the mutual interests of both EU and the neighbourhood countries. However, existing ENP mechanisms may be insufficient to achieve these goals. Further engagement with both neighbourhood countries and influential actors beyond the neighbourhood, particularly in the area of security, may be necessary.

In particular, in the Eastern neighbourhood context, the major issue that is not addressed by the ENP policy has been the complex and tense relationship with Russia. Russia itself is not part of either European neighbourhood Policy or Eastern Partnership initiatives, despite the fact that it has common border with the EU and participates in various cross-border initiatives. Russia opted out of the ENP from the very beginning, as it perceives itself not as just “any neighbour” of the EU, but rather as an equal partner (IGRAS media analysis report). Consequently, Russia has been also suspicious of EU’s Eastern neighbourhood initiatives and considers them, at best, as competition for influence in the region. Russia’s suspicions about the EU’s motives were also amplified by the simultaneous Eastern expansion of EU and NATO during the 2004-2007 wave of accession (IGRAS media analysis report). As a result, Russia has perceived relationship with the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood, which is also sometimes referred to as ‘common neighbourhood’ as a “zero-sum game” (IGRAS media analysis report).

This zero-sum mentality has had many implications for the Eastern neighbourhood countries and their relations with the EU. Deepening of integration with the EU often meant hardening of borders with Russia; most notably, this has been the case in Georgia and in Ukraine (IGRAS media analysis report). Russia further initiated its own project for regional integration, called Eurasian Union, which was arguably modelled upon EU. Currently, two participants of Eastern partnership have become members of the Eurasian Union: Armenia and Belarus. While this membership formally does not disqualify from participation in European neighbourhood initiatives, it precludes deeper integration with the EU, such as Association and Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreements.

The most problematic area for the Eastern Neighbourhood however is the issue of security, and especially the many territorial conflicts that are present in the region. In Azerbaijan and Armenia many of our respondents have expressed their disappointment with insufficient EU’s involvement in the conflict resolution. EU is perceived as a trusted partner which could have a positive role on the resolution process. However, given Russia’s sensitivity to the issues of security in the Neighbourhood, EU’s greater involvement in conflict resolution is bound to raise objections from Russia. Thus, such involvement can further complicate already rather
tense relations in the region. In the Eastern Neighbourhood therefore the ENP faces an impasse: EU’s attempts at regional integration are dependent on Russia, which is not part of either Eastern Neighbourhood or Eastern Partnership.

Evidence of conceptual and theoretical development

Three main conceptual issues emerge from the research we have conducted. First is the “dual spatial logic of cohesion and fracture” (UAB case study report), or of inclusion and exclusion, in the EU’s relations with its neighbourhood. This duality has been an important feature of EU’s bordering practices, and is known, for example, from the hardening of the external borders that accompanied the softening of borders within the EU. In the neighbourhood regions, this duality has played itself out in variety of ways. On the one hand, EU successfully blurs the boundaries between itself and its neighbours through the neighbourhood policies and enhance cooperation. But at the same time it effectively draws symbolic and institutional divide between those who are included in the EU and its regime of human mobility and those who are excluded from it. Furthermore, by inviting neighbourhood countries to participate in protecting EU’s external borders, EU is pushing the boundary further from itself, but enables the hardening of boundaries between its neighbourhood countries and their own neighbours who have no borders with the EU. This effect is especially palpable in the Eastern Neighbourhood where deeper integration with the EU has often resulted in hardening of the borders with Russia.

The second important issue to consider both in policy and research is the variations in the perceptions of borders in the two neighbourhood contexts. Although both in the Mediterranean and in the post-Soviet regions the borders both divide and provide contact, in the Mediterranean the view of the border as a frontier, a contact zone, or a borderscape is more pronounced. In the Eastern neighbourhood, the borders are more strongly associated with division and separation. At a first glance, it seems that this difference may be explained by the more recent and urgent projects of nation-building in the post-Soviet space. However, further research would be needed to improve our understanding of how these different perceptions are constructed. The differences in perception of borders may also have important implications for the interpretation and ultimately the success of neighbourhood policies.

Third issue is the essential contradiction with Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Russia’s perception of the ENP as a zero-sum game presents serious challenges for the policy. In the current situation, ENP participants are facing a choice between Russia and the EU, and this choice, regardless of the side which they choose, serves to establish and strengthen borders, which in this region are understood mostly as division lines. It thus contributes to the fracture aspect of the dual spatial logic discussed above.

Future paths

Latest developments with the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean suggest that dual spatial logic of cohesion and fracture which was identified in the previous section will remain the major feature of EU’s bordering relations with the neighbourhood. The major indication of this is the recent agreement between EU and Turkey, where Turkey will receive 3 bln Euro and relaxation of its border regime with the EU in return for handling refugee flow. Thus, Turkey is invited to play the same role in the Middle East that we previously described with
regard to Morocco in Africa. Both countries become part of ‘cordon sanitaire’ around EU’s external borders. It is important that EU remains sensitive to the implications of such policies in terms of reproduction of borders and the inclusion/exclusion dynamics that it entails.

If EU is to make a lasting impact in the neighbourhood, it should be sensitive to the specific regional contexts in which it is active. The multiplicity of interests that exist in border regions should be recognized, and the range of actors involved should be broadened. Bottom-up approaches, such as those that were employed in the Italy-Tunisian case study fieldwork, would be especially useful, as they can help tailor the policies to the needs of the local communities. One possible method for developing such policies could be conducting focus groups prior to formulating policy proposals. Employing bottom-up approaches does not mean focusing on micro-level processes only: on the contrary, people’s experiences with the neighbourhood policies in all realms should be connected back to the broader regional perspective (UNIBG case study report).

It should also be noted that territorial/border conflicts, which are abound in both Mediterranean and especially in Eastern neighbourhood, pose a significant challenge to the implementation of partnership initiatives and threaten regional integration. The existence of such unresolved conflicts hampers cooperation at the official level, and prevents development of legal frameworks. Thus, border cooperation with Morocco is hampered by the dispute over Ceuta and Melilla enclaves. In Israel and Palestine, the progress of Mediterranean partnership is intertwined with the peace process; and since there progress in the peace process has stalled after 2009 there are concerns that there are concerns that Mediterranean partnership is only making progress in the cultural sphere but not political (BGU case study report). In areas where conflicts are especially deep or pronounced, such as between Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan and Armenia, they also block cooperation of civil society as well as everyday interaction between people from different sides of the border. Many of our respondents in various countries have expressed disappointment with the lack of EU’s engagement with the issues of conflict resolution, and stressed that the EU as a trusted partner can make valuable contribution to confidence building and establishing dialogue between civil societies in the conflicting entities.

Finally, the EU’s relationship with Russia requires re-evaluation. Russia continues to exert considerable influence on much, if not all, of the Eastern neighbourhood and has persistent geopolitical interests in the region. In this context, progress in the regional integration of the neighbourhood without Russia’s engagement will inevitably face resistance. The possibilities of engaging Russia in common initiatives, perhaps at the civil society level, should be investigated.

WP 7 (Cross-Border Co-operation as Conflict Amelioration)

General Goals and Philosophy

Work-package 7 aims to investigate conceptual change in our understanding of bordering and borders as resources in cross-border co-operation or as means of conflict-resolution. The research focuses specifically on the relevance and limitations of EU cross-border cooperation as an instrument for conflict amelioration within cross-cutting contexts of
power relations, governance, funding regimes, political will, culture, and ethnicity. Drawing on empirical evidence from case studies within the EU and its neighbourhood, the research emphasizes the regional/local dimensions of the border in the challenge of transition from conflict (or its aftermath) to more normal relations in a (potential) post-conflict period. More precisely, WP7 explores the multilevel complexity of border conflicts, their reverberations beyond the line of the border, and the intersections with questions such as ideology, power, security, culture and emotions.

Objectives
The WP research relies on two large foundational questions:

1. What opportunities can be identified for the positive transformation of contested border narratives in terms of cross-border co-operation, conflict resolution and intercultural dialogue?

2. How can security-oriented policies (‘securitization’) be reconciled with a need for greater cross-border and transnational co-operation?

The aim of responding to these research questions entails the following objectives:
1. To chart the development of local cross-border relations from the perspective of power relations, governance (including voluntary and community sector and transnational organizations) and recent geopolitical shifts in Europe and beyond;
2. To discern how cross-border co-operation has contributed, or might contribute, to conflict amelioration in specific contested cases, particularly where it is integral to reconceptualising issues of culture in terms of openness/exposure to ‘significant others’;
3. To discern obstacles to cross-border conflict amelioration, and anticipate factors contributing to possible conflict recidivism where détente or reconciliation has commenced;
4. To query whether cross-border interaction exacerbates confrontational difference and fears of insecurity, loss of identity and decreasing social wellbeing;
5. To identify the conditions under which shared ethnicity across a border facilitates or inhibits cross-border cooperation;
6. To examine the circumstances under which contested borderscapes have the potential to serve as a model and/or provide lessons for the establishment of conflict amelioration initiatives.

Research Tasks
Two key research tasks were identified in order to set the investigation in the larger context of the academic literature and policy developments (RT1) and identify critical challenges and issues to be investigated through empirical research (RT2).

Research Task 1: Co-operation, Conflict and Shifting Understandings of Borders
This initial research task involved a review of international academic and policy research literature in order to identify major ways in which state borders are framed and referenced with regard to interstate disputes, on the one hand, and conflict amelioration, on the other. The review identifies the workings of local, national and supranational perspectives regarding ethnopoliical/territorial disputes and is targeted at demonstrating the mechanisms through which different border securitization policies and (geo)political logics operate and impact on
local attempts at conflict-transcending co-operation. More specifically, this review provides an analytical framework for the second phase of the research that captures local and civilian forms of cross-border cooperation in contested border areas.

**Research Task 2: Governance, Power Relations and the Socio-political Negotiation of Borders**

Ideally, the amelioration of conflicts at borders entails both a reduction of ethnic violence and wider security risks and an increase in local cross-border interaction. Often, however, policies formulated by national authorities or international organizations, are based on *a priori* constructed definitions and interests of security and co-operation that might clash with wider understandings of the social, cultural and economic factors shaping border conflict and conflict transformation. This is evident, for example, in situations where management policies of borders clash with local initiatives of economic, social and environmental cross-border interaction that might in fact contribute to regional stability and security. This research task delves into context-specific regional/local dimensions of the border in the challenge of transition from conflict and its aftermath to more normal relations in a (potential) post-conflict period.

**Overall Progress of the RTs from Project Start**

**Task 1: Co-operation, Conflict and Shifting Understanding of Borders**

This review of international academic and policy research literature identifies major ways in which state borders are framed with regard to interstate disputes, on the one hand, and conflict amelioration, on the other. Three key dimensions that matter for our understanding of borders and bordering practices in the context of conflict and conflict amelioration were identified:

Firstly, the alignment of the ‘conflict trinity’ – an ability to mobilize the necessary resources to challenge the ‘significant other’, a justifying ideology, and legitimating myths and symbols that supply the necessary material for violent conflict over borders and territory; Secondly, the shifting understanding of borders in relation to globalization, European integration and the post-9/11 ‘security turn’; Thirdly, the potential and limitations of cross-border co-operation and inter-cultural dialogue in Europe’s borderscapes to contribute to conflict amelioration (McCall, 2014).

- **State borders and interstate dispute: Territory, emotion and significant ‘others’**

Geographers have conceptualized borders as lines of separation that divide economic, political and social spaces and are driven by a bordering process entailing both demarcation and management functions. Political scientists have concentrated on the power relations involved in that demarcation and management (including border reconfiguration). Sociologists and social anthropologists have tended to focus on binary distinctions when studying borders, that is, distinctions between ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and ‘include’ and ‘exclude’ (Newman, 2006a, p. 176; Newman, 2006b, pp. 143-7).

Across these disciplines and beyond one thing is clear: **borders and conflict involve disputes over territory**, something that is physical, tangible, durable and valuable and implies acquisition, ownership, exclusion, and protection. These are meanings that can evoke emotions of fear, resentment, grievance and hate, the end product of which is often deadly
violence (Berezin, 2003, p. 4). As such, territory and conflict share an intimate relationship that is historically deep and emotionally momentous.

Modern nationalism as a territorially driven ideology has prioritized the acquisition and/or defense of territory, state-building and the creation of state borders as separation and defense barriers for the nation, usually ethnically defined (Kolossov, 2005, p. 614; Paasi, 2011, p. 14). Emotion is the constitutive dimension of territory. It is through cultural institutions, like museums, universities and national art galleries, as well as cultural practices, such as the composition of songs, the naming of streets and the erection of monuments to commemorate national heroes, national victories, national defeats and 'old freedoms', that territory is steeped in national, communal (and thus emotional) memory. Borders reinforce the relationship between national territory and communal emotion and identity (Berezin, 2003, pp. 9-10). In doing so, emotions are also central to the construction of ‘significant others’: in the context of conflict, fear is often cited as the prime mover for a national group to commit acts of violence against the ‘significant other’ in the quest to gain or defend territory. Other emotions may prove to be equally effective in inspiring people to commit acts of national violence against the ‘significant other’.

- **Globalization and a shift in understanding of borders: Re-bordering and ‘the security turn’**

By engendering deterritorialization underscored by the ease with which certain types of socioeconomic organization, activity, and identity traverse state borders, contemporary globalization is perceived to be a countervailing force to bordering. However, rather than producing a borderless world globalization is best understood as involving a twin process of re-territorialization, i.e. a re-bordering that differs from modern state bordering in form, function and scale. An example of reconfiguration of ‘hard borders’ into ‘soft borders’ in order to enable the free flow of goods and services, is provided by the process of European integration (re-territorialization), having re-bordered Europe, particularly through the Single European Act.

The border security regimes and the resulting discourses of threat and insecurity emerging in the aftermath of 9/11 as responses to so called features of ‘dark globalization’ have turned a page in political, media and academic understandings of state borders. Implication for dominant understanding of border conflicts and cross-border cooperation are two-fold: firstly, in this contemporary global context, the idea of cross-border co-operation and the reconfiguration of borders from hard security barriers to spaces for contact, communication and co-operation appears to belong to a naïve pre-2001 era when the notion of a ‘borderless world’ was en vogue; secondly, the security turn has marginalized the relevance of border conflicts, now regarded either as inconsequential or passé with notions of contemporary global threat and insecurity (Newman, 2012, p. 249). Territorial borders, however, continue to hold this allure. In terms of the security-identity nexus, imagined borders of the state continue to offer notions of security even when many of the practical bordering functions of borders have been removed. These borders of the imagination continue to be informed by the historical experience of violent national conflict.

- **State borders and conflict amelioration: Cross-border co-operation, ‘peace-building from below’, and inter-cultural dialogue in EU borderscapes**
The concept of the *borderscape* identifies landscapes displaying cultural and political complexity, contested discourses and meanings, struggles over inclusion and exclusion, and involves multiple actors (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2008, pp. ix-xl). Yet, it also resonates with the idea of borders being reconfigured as networks that increasingly enable flows of communication and mobility, as well as the notion of the EU as the ‘paradigm of the network state’ (Rumford, 2006, p. 55). Therefore, EU borderscapes may be interpreted as potentially important sites for intercultural contact, communication and co-operation that advance conflict amelioration. As such, borderscapes offer potential zones of cultural production in which meaning is constructed and deconstructed (Donnan and Wilson, 1999, p. 64).

Established across different regions, cities and borderlands and involving actors as diverse as civil society, municipalities, local businesses and cultural institutions, cross-border co-operation has become a trademark of Europeanization as well as a strategic partnership tool deployed outside its ever-shifting external borders to extend the EU’s geopolitical influence into neighbouring countries and strengthen its image as a global actor (Bialasiewicz, 2009; Scott, 2012;). By (even momentarily) lifting the territorial cage of the state that is pivotal to border conflict and (re)constructing borders as resources for economic and cultural exchanges, as well as for political regional co-operation, cross-border co-operation has a conflict amelioration potential in that it can offer opportunities for intercultural dialogue and intercommunal relationships across conflictual and contested borders and borderlands (McCall, 2014).

However, the whole or partial success of this strategy in some European contexts, for instance, as in the case of the Irish border (Hayward et al, 2011), is also met with examples of its failure in other scenarios where EU-sponsored cross-border co-operation is perceived negatively and may exacerbate conflict, e.g. Cyprus. This is especially likely in the aftermath of protracted conflict and cross-border tensions where the eventuality of cross-border encounters might serve to further entrench feelings of difference and cultural superiority (Newman, 2011). Clearly, overcoming the psychological hold of borders as dividing lines between ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, and ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, which have been fortified by conflict memories and myths, as well as separate political, economic and cultural development under the roofs of different states, is no easy task. In this context a ‘peacebuilding from below’ (Lederach, 2005) approach is appropriate given that borderscapes usually lie beyond the concerns of central governments and yet borders are often central to national conflict, providing as they do sites for conflict over contested meanings, cultural and political antagonisms, and struggles over inclusion and exclusion. In a conflict amelioration turn they can provide valuable opportunities for local and regional intercultural dialogue and cross-border communication on similarities and differences.

### 2.2 Task 2: Governance, Power Relations and the Socio-Political Negotiations of Borders

Drawing on the framing of cross-border co-operation as conflict amelioration developed in Task 1, Research Task 2 focused on context-specific regional/local dimensions of the border in the challenge of transition from conflict and its aftermath to more normal relations in a (potential) post-conflict period. The approach of this research task is broadly comparative and interdisciplinary. It includes cases were ethno-linguistic issues are primary drivers of interstate tensions (e.g. Ukraine/Hungary) unresolved post-conflict situations (Cyprus,
Balkans) and contexts of renewed conflict and securitization (Ukraine/Russia, Israel/Jordan). In seeking to discern ways in which cross-border co-operation has contributed, or might contribute, to conflict transformation, particularly where this is integral to reconceptualising issues of culture in terms of openness/exposure to ‘significant others’, this research task focuses on the following questions:

- In what circumstances do opportunities for co-operation across contested and contentious borders advance a conflict transformation endeavour?
- Under what conditions do they exacerbate confrontational difference, insecurities, fears, historical resentments, grievances, hatreds and threats to received notions of identity?
- Can an EU borderscape, where conflict transformation is relatively well advanced, offer a site for learning?
- Can cross-border co-operation aimed at conflict transformation resist countervailing pressures from the rise of border security regimes that seek to deliver hard, impenetrable borders between states and between the EU and neighbouring states?

The overall objective under this task has been to carry out empirical work on WP7 selected case studies, develop and finalize the analysis of the data, and disseminate the conceptual and empirical findings emerging from the research. More specifically, this research task offers an analysis of cross-border co-operation as an instrument of conflict amelioration that examines the local configurations of bordering processes in specific geopolitical and social contexts (Brambilla, Lane and Scott, 2015). Evidence from the following case studies is presented:

- The border between Poland and Ukraine
- Cross-border relations between the twin cities of Szeged (Hungary) and Subotica (Serbia)
- Non-recognized republics in the Post-Soviet space – Abkhazia and Transdniestria
- The Ukrainian-Russian border zone
- The case of Cyprus
- Conflict amelioration between Turkey and Armenia
- Conflict amelioration in the former Yugoslavia
- The context of Israel/Jordan
- The Israel/Palestine conflict

As a part of WP7 work dissemination, a series of publications are currently under review, or have already been published. Research findings were presented in a panel entitled ‘European Union Cross-Border Peacebuilding in Crisis?’ at the Policy conference at the University of East London (9-12 November 2015). Additional plans for the dissemination of results include a Special Issue of Geopolitics, entitled ‘European Union Cross-Border Cooperation as Conflict Transformation’ and a panel at the forthcoming Euboredrscapes 3rd Scientific Conference at the University of Barcelona (28-29 January 2016).

Synthesis of the Overall Results

Partner: University of Gdansk (UG)
Case Study. Cultural co-operation between Polish and Ukrainian partner cities as a factor in conflict amelioration
Research highlights:
A plethora of co-operation initiatives aimed at rehabilitating Ukrainian – Polish relations (as referred to in Progress Report 1) was examined. These focused primarily on Lviv (Ukraine) and its Polish partner cities (Wroclaw, Lublin, Rzeszów, Łódź, Przemyśl and Kraków).

Dimensions of co-operation can be divided into two groups: the first – referred to here as ‘external’ - comprises events aimed at popularising cultural initiatives and engagement among ordinary people; the second – called ‘internal’ dimension – comprises events organized for people involved in cultural projects. However, evidence, suggests that these are often intertwined and that co-operation with Lviv is multidimensional and multi-layered. In all cities there were some concerts, festivals and exhibitions organized as a part of the partnership.

The case of the European Days of Good Neighbourhood taking place at Malhowice – Niżankowice border–crossing point is a good example of cultural co-operation may have a strong physical spatial effect (fig. 1). Two thousand people took part in the event in 2014, demonstrating, by its sheer scope, the prevalence of good will on both sides of the border for both cultural co-operation and the reopening of the cross-border point. Despite pessimism in this regard, conveyed in interviews with border guards, a representative of the city of Przemyśl has claimed that such a project has already secured a budgetary commitment by local government.

Fig. 1. Malhowice – Niżankowice border–crossing point during and after the European Days of Good Neighbourhood in 2014
Source: authors’ own collection
• Similar small-scale events, integrating local people, are organized across the Polish-Ukrainian border involving other cities and regions (e.g. Kryłów, Zbereże). Such events give bottom-up visibility and legitimacy to building new, friendly relations between Poland and Ukraine through cultural co-operation.

• Some barriers and obstacles to cross-border co-operation have also been detected, particularly such concerning the funding of forms of cultural co-operation and the unwieldiness of visa regimes.

• In 2013 a special report was published on the relations between Poland and Ukraine – the report covered many different issues, including the historical guilt perception, as demonstrated in Figure 3. Half a century after the Second World War 50% of the interviewed Poles and 33% of the Ukrainians claim that ‘both nations are guilty’. What is more, a relatively small percentage of the interviewees blame only one side of the conflict – 18% of Poles blame Ukrainians and 14% of Ukrainians blame Poles.

![Figure 3. Historical guilt perception](source: Polska – Ukraina, Polacy – Ukraińcy, Spojrzenie przez granicę, 2013, 71)

• In intra-EU space, as observed in the case of the Polish-Ukrainian border, the unification of nations in the one supranational organization may tighten the social closeness, despite dividing history and/or language. Here borders are seen as provoking a flurry of cultural activities, while socially they continue to serve as sources of separate communal and national identities and establish lines between ‘us’ and the ‘other’.

Partner: Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (RKK), Hungary

Case study: Szeged and Subotica: cross-border connections of the twin cities

Research highlights:

• The Szeged-Subotica axis is a major determinant of cross-border relationships between Hungary and Serbia. The two cities are connected beyond historical past, geographical proximity and infrastructural networks by familiar, friendly relations and
a common culture, notwithstanding their diverse ethnic composition. Furthermore, present-day EU development programmes are opening new dimensions for intensifying co-operation in the region. A case in point is the formation of EGTCs, focusing not only on culture and sport but also on common public institutions (hospitals, ambulance service, schools etc). Such initiatives give substance to efforts at cross-border co-operation and improve the functionality of this border region.

• Cross-border co-operation between Szeged and Subotica is strongly shaped by the availability of EU funds: Our focus was the detailed analysis of CBCs in the second period of the EUBORDERSCAPES project. The main factors (and financial background) of these CBCs are the EU funds, so we examined these sources and their results. After Hungarian EU Accession (2004), the Hungarian–Serbian border became the external border of EU, and Serbia (then Serbia and Montenegro) was given a chance to join the INTERREG IIIA Programme. Szeged and Subotica had success with five applications and realized projects in fields of tourism, industrial parks, education and economic cooperation. The next possibility was the Hungary–Serbia IPA Programme between 2007 and 2013. This programme had three calls and Szeged and Subotica won 23 joint projects.

• In the context of developing a positive relationship between local governments, in 2003 the two cities re-affirmed their twin-city status (first agreed in 1966) and formulated new goals of co-operation in the fields of economic partnership and joint cultural events. Examples of such initiatives include:
  o Enhancing integrated agricultural supply of goods and agro-trade potentials of the region in the interest of increasing its economic competitiveness.
  o Assistance by the Municipality of Szeged in the making of a feasibility study of Subotica Industrial Park in 2011.
  o Joint cultural projects and events (see below)

• With regards to the economic sector, different economic systems and entrepreneurship exist in the two sides of border, requiring steps towards better mutual alignment. The main generators of these steps are the regional development agencies, the chambers of commerce and industry and the local governments who have organized some events and informational days for entrepreneurs. In 2009, the Chambers of Commerce of Hungary and Serbia established the Hungarian–Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry with the aim of assisting the development of cross-border economic co-operation (joint business, or project generation), and partner search.

• Figure 4 below demonstrates the achieved level of co-operation between Szeged and Subotica in the fields of tourism, culture, transportation, environment, and health services. It is suggested that some of these projects have had a very high impact on cross-border cooperation. For example:
  ▪ The INNOCOPESS project had a significant impact in the development of the enterprise sector. The project partners prepared information materials, and organized some events for entrepreneurs, in order to improve familiarity with legal regulations on the either side of the border.
The **Animal Health** program was implemented with the co-operation between the Szeged Zoo and Palić Zoo (Subotica). The main objective of this project was knowledge transfer and education on environmental ad nature-preservation issues.

- The most important cultural project was **DIAMOND**. This cross-border project concentrated on the highly significant Art Nouveau architectural heritage of the three cities (Szeged, Subotica and Senta) and took measures to preserve and promote these architectural jewels far and wide.

- The **SuSze pubtrans** project introduced an integrated public transport system in the Subotica–Szeged region, making travel between the cities easier, faster and more comfortable.

**Figure 4. Project list of Hungary–Serbia IPA Programme 2007–2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st call of Hungary–Serbia IPA Programme</th>
<th>Construction of a road to connect Ásotthalom and Backi Vinogradi, planning of necessary infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation of Nature conservation rescue centre and animal health monitoring system with cross-border cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing economic cooperation in the field of integrated agricultural supply of goods along the Serbian-Hungarian order</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partnership Centre for Clusters and Enterprises</td>
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<td></td>
<td>South Pannon Food Chain Network</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Examination of innovation and cooperation abilities and development possibilities of small and medium sized</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The borderline as an axis of innovation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Harmonized development of logistics centres in CB region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border network for innovative development of economies and knowledge transfer</td>
<td>Gynaecological endoscopy for the assessment of infertility: joint capacity building to foster future cooperation in research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme in Faculty of Economics and Engineering Management</td>
<td>Preparation and accreditation of new Master EU Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two European ZOOs enhancing education and environmental protection-second part</td>
<td>CUL-TOUR: Promotion of Cultural Tourism in the Cross-Border Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sporting development of the Serbian-Hungarian cross-border cooperation</td>
<td>Development of an integrated public transport system in the Subotica-Szeged region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open University Subotica Cross Border Business Advisor Network</td>
<td>SMEs' Internationalization in the Cross-border Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing Quality of Services and Production in Cross-border region</td>
<td>Common Heritage Based Initiatives in Joint Tourism Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Heritage Based Initiatives in Joint Tourism Development</td>
<td>Regional Chamber of Commerce Subotica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint SMEs Co-operation for Strengthening Export Capability</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Research cooperation to prepare cross-border patient database and establishment of first Liquor and Genetic banks in Vojvodina in order to improve Multiple Sclerosis diagnosis.

Ice-hockey development of the Serbian-Hungarian cross-border cooperation

CINEMA CONTACT - Promotion intercultural exchange and understanding between people in border regions through film

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3rd call of Hungary–Serbia IPA Programme</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border transport route planning and scheduling platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elaboration of design for approval of Szeged-Röszke-Horgos-Subotica railway line and further documentation concerning Subotica-Csikéria-Bácsalmás-Baja railway line -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunshine route from Szeged To Szabadka with photovoltaic solar panel systems and sustainable intelligent technologies for Újszeged Sport Hall and for a new Kindergarten in Subotica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewels in turn of century - thematic rovings of the world of Art Nouveau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Logistics helping the city development of Szeged and Subotica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherishing Common Cultural Heritage through Education to Create a United Region - A Precondition for Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Cooperation for Disadvantaged Children and Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural travels in the region of Szeged and Subotica</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Partner Institute of Geography of Russian Academy of Sciences (IGRAS)**

**Case study- Transdniestria/Moldova and Abkhazia/Georgia/Russia**

**Research highlights:**

**Transdniestria and Moldova**

- The conflict between Transdniestria and Moldova is the only conflict in former Soviet space which has some chances to be resolved in the visible future: firstly, because it has no ethnic basis and no deep history of difficult relations between its protagonists; secondly, because its violent phase was brief and did not provoke a massive displacement of refugees; thirdly, because the boundary between Transdniestria and Moldova remains relatively permeable and allows for the circulation of people and goods. Moreover, the very configuration of the boundary between the two political entities makes interactions unavoidable.

- The independence of Moldova resulted from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The politics of Moldovan leaders aimed at reunification with Romania, and the building of a new political identity on the basis of Moldovan/Romanian national values provoked soon the proclamation of Gagauzian and Transdniestrian republics. Kishinev succeeded later in accommodating the requests of Gagauzia and was able to keep it within Moldovan legal space. As for Transdniestria, the short military phase of its conflict with Kishinev in 1992 shaped administrative boundaries along the de facto front line on the day of ceasefire.
When the government of the Alliance for European Integration came to power it seemed that it would be more efficient in conflict resolution. Prime-minister Vladimir Filat held a series of informal meetings with the new Transdniestrian leader Evgeny Shevchuk (so called football diplomacy). Their meeting in Rottach-Egern (Germany), as well as contacts between Moldovan, Russian and German leaders gave rise to the hope that some shifts were real. Though these contacts led to some progress in the restoration of railway traffic and the mutual recognition of education degrees, negotiations were frozen again soon. Neither Moldova nor Transdniestria were ready for any decisive steps. Attempts of rapprochement were only voiced but never implemented. Some interviewees on the Moldovan side explain the situation with the interest of big businesses and influential political groups which could lose their benefits from export-import operations, smuggling, etc. Another reason is political instability and fragility of right parties’ electoral majority. Even if the Moldovan side wished for a rapprochement, it seems that it has no understanding how to move and does not have any strategy.

The case study also demonstrates the importance of the relationship between wider geopolitical developments and everyday life practices of bordering in shaping the form and effects of CBC, and its impact on conflict amelioration. The first period of Shevchuk’s presidential mandate was marked by a more pragmatic discourse about the EU promoting a policy of ‘small steps’ focused on the solution of concrete problems blocking economic and social development. However, the small opportunity to reset the situation around Transdniestria had been largely lost well before the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis and has entirely disappeared with its development.

Expert interviews testify to perceptions of conflict, partly resulting from changes of government on different sides. Starting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a predominantly political conflict related with different regional/ethnic identities and values, the situation on the Dniester became exploited by different political and economic stakeholders for getting benefits, which determines their interest in keeping the status quo and obstructing any acceptable solution. Ordinary people are tired of endless and fruitless debates and have ceased to believe that conflict can be resolved in the foreseeable future. National polls show that they are preoccupied with more pressing problems such as employment and low income. Most experts believe that the Transdniestrian conflict remains in a state of deep freezing.

Abkhazia/Georgia/Russia

The case of Abkhazia/Georgia/Russia is an excellent example of what Oren Yiftahel calls ‘homeland ethnicity’, e.g. when two or more ethnic groups closely connect their origin and identity with the same territory. In a similar vein to Transdniestrian official discourse, Abkhazian political discourse never calls into question sovereignty. Authorities firmly declare that a dialogue between Abkhazia and Georgia is possible only if conceived between two independent states. Political discourse presents Georgia as a hostile country, i.e. one which, irrespective of political forces and persons in power in Tbilisi, seeks to resolve the conflict with its break-away territories by violence. The question of Abkhazia’s political status is seen as an issue that has
already been resolved once and for all. It is envisioned that international community will eventually recognize Abkhazia. Economic development and rational use of natural resources, primarily the potential of tourism development, allows a gradual insertion of the republic in international economic and political space.

- The relations between Abkhazia and Georgia, the perspectives on Abkhazia’s recognition, and the situation in the south of the republic, along the border with the ‘parent state’, are to a large extent determined by the return of more than 200,000 Georgian refugees. The discourse about this problem is based on the assumption that the flow of refugees from Abkhazia was a ‘direct result of Georgian aggression’ and non-stop-terrorist activity of Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Former Abkhazian president Alexander Ankwab has stated that all refugees who wanted to return have already done so.

- Abkhazian politicians are adamant that the persistence of the Georgian threat is a result of the US and EU’s pro-Georgian policy. Backed by Western powers, Georgia refuses to sign an agreement on restraint from the use of force in Abkhazia. Abkhazian officials stress that in these conditions stable and solid good neighbourly relations with Russia is the only guarantee for Abkhazia’s economic and social development. Hence, the ‘Russian vector’ is proclaimed the main direction of Abkhazian foreign policy. Its role is explained in particular by means of kinship relations between Abkhazians and titular people living in the neighbouring republics of the Russian Federation.

Partner: KKNU
Case Study: The border between Russia and Ukraine
Research highlights:
- The beginning of Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014 marked the beginning of a new European geopolitical conflict. Neighbouring regions of the Russian Federation and Ukraine have become bridgeheads of military and political threat.

- The Russian-Ukrainian border has become a space of geopolitical confrontation.

- The idea of Euroregions (whose mission is to support, develop cross-border partnership and co-operation, turning the border into a ‘zone of growth and development’) has been strategically used as a tool in Russian - Ukrainian politics.

- The question of the ‘Slobozhanshina’ Euroregion (uniting the main bordering cities of Kharkiv in Ukraine, and Belgorod in Russia) arose during the research in the context of changing geopolitical orientations. The Euroregion was established to promote close economic relations in the area, thus improving the welfare of the population. The positive impact of the Euroregion project could be seen in its contribution to blurring the boundaries between the two countries (meaning that a step towards Europe, where the borders between the two countries are almost non-existent, is being made). However, at present, due to the economic and political crisis in Ukraine (which has strengthened Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation towards the EU, and is accompanied by abandoning existing forms of co-operation with Russia, including economic ones) this idea has receded in relevance and is described as disappearing. ‘Slobozhanshina’
Euroregion is gradually being replaced by an orientation towards newly established European projects to promote co-operation between the regions.

- Our research indicates the centrality of the following factors in shaping the possibilities for cross-border co-operation (CBC) in the aftermath of conflict and instability:
  - Belgorod - the capital of the People's Republic of Kharkov (HNR) (the capital of Russian ‘Slobozhanshina’) has become a center of anti-Ukrainian separatist activities. According to official information from law enforcement agencies, terrorist attacks committed in Kharkiv region (47 terrorist attacks, 11 which in 2015) are co-ordinated from Belgorod. On the territory of the Belgorod region there is a constant concentration of military units of the Russian Federation.
  - Propaganda and confrontation discourses in Ukrainian and Russian local and national media have had a destructive effect on regional CBC.

- The case study highlights important methodological and practical implications for the research: a) Several obstacles hindered undertaking work ‘on the border’ as it is now a zone of increased securitization; b) Barriers/impossibility of interviews with officials as the topic is seen as extremely ‘sensitive’; c) Despite the fact that the Euroregion has existed for more than 10 years and there are levels of everyday personal co-operation the topic of CBC between Belgorod and Kharkiv regions ‘has not had time to catch’ the mass consciousness, i.e average Kharkiv citizen knows practically nothing about the ‘Slobozhanshina’ Euroregion; d) Key Ukrainian experts in European regional co-operation in Kharkiv and Belgorod regions serve as executive bureaucrats and this makes their opinion biased; e) Discourse analysis of the press is very complicated since Russian and Ukrainian media are in a state of ‘information war’; f) Due to a decision of the Ministry of Education, Ukraine is not allowed to have scientific and technical co-operation with Russia.

Partner Nijmegen Centre for Border Research (NCBR)/Radboud University Nijmegen

Case study: Cyprus

Research Highlights:

- Contrary to the conflict’s mainstream conception, the foundations of the Green Line severing Cyprus lie neither exclusively nor mainly in its ethno-religious divisions but in a glocal web of competing cartopolitical misperceptions that have naturalized an otherwise non-dominant history of antagonism between Turkish and Greek Cypriots since the 19th century.

- Drawing on the notion of cartopolitics, the case study traces the evolution of such discourse to examine how its legacy has not only prevented any lasting resolution but perpetuated the conflict.

- A genealogy of the Cypriot conflict can provide insights into the most pressing conundrums haunting the geopolitical imaginations about the EU’s borders.
Partner Middle East Technical University/Centre for Black Sea and Central Asia (METU)

Case Study: Turkey-Armenia

Research highlights:

- The common past/shared history, especially the controversy between Turkey and Armenia about the events of 1915, affects the relations both between the states (closing of border gate since 1993) and societies (memories have been passed from generation to generation).

- Presently, even though air traffic is allowed between Istanbul and Yerevan, the land border between Turkey and Armenia remains sealed and appears hostage to the macro-political stalemate between the two states. This situation prevents the possibility of trade and commerce between border cities as well as other forms of cross-border co-operation initiatives and dialogue. Instead, circulation of goods and people flows via Georgia and Iran. This situation has led to a significant economic, social and humanitarian losses for both sides, and has visible implications in almost every field, such as social structure, the economy, social life, education, health and development.

- NGOs try to establish social and cultural interaction by organising conferences, oral history seminars, summer schools, and cultural activities.

- External forces:
  - Armenia depends on Russia both politically and economically.
  - Azerbaijan should be considered as an important third party affecting Turkish-Armenian relations.
  - Georgia benefits economically from the indirect trade flow (tariff) from Turkey to Armenia due to the closed border.
  - Iran is another important actor for security and energy policies in the region.
  - The US and EU support the collaboration between Turkey and Armenia.

- Projects supported by Hrant Dink Foundation, Anatolian Culture and Helsinki Citizens Assembly (funded by the EU) have come into prominence to enhance dialogue between societies through common projects realized both in Turkey and Armenia.

Partner: The Centre for Advanced Study Sofia (CAS)

Research highlights:

Case Study - Croatia

- The analysis focused on political and cultural debates in Croatia emerging in related literary works and texts, and traced narrative patterns, rhetorical devices, keywords and the clusters of thinkers.

- The emerging themes strongly support the idea that the social change associated with 1989 in the Balkan context is manifested over broader historical timeframe, starting from the early 1980s and incorporating the 1990s. Hence, the whole period reflects the transformation of political systems that included the emergence of regional themes.
related to issues of nation-building, identity making, nationalism, conflict, and warfare. The necessity to extend the research timeframe so as to incorporate the whole period from the early 1980s to 1990s applies to the whole post-Yugoslav space.

- It is in this context that the so-called ‘Bulgarian question’ debate between eminent Croatian and former Yugoslav literary critics Igor Mandić and Stanko Lasić was selected. The debate reflected the importance of post-1989 social transformations, together with significant regional issues related to the legacy of a common Yugoslav past and challenging post-conflict relation between Croatia and Serbia. The issues discussed among Mandić and Lasić became part of larger public debate that have individualized significant themes investigated also in other case studies.

Case study - Serbia
- The research tackles contentious issues of Serbian and Croatian national lexicographic work in the post-World War II period. It focuses on the 'Lexicon of Yugoslav Writers' - a project initiated in the early 1960s which lasted for more then five decades, with a final volume published in 2014.

- The research was presented in the international conference 'Post-Communism and Identities: East-European Perspectives' at the University of Padua, in June 2014. A paper was accepted also for the international symposium on 'National Symbols across Time and Space' planned for September 2015 and related to the 'Discourses of the Nation and the National' Project coordinated by the University of Oslo.

Case study - Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH)
- Considering the work package theme, in the context of this case study it was decided to examine the interplay between ‘bordering’ processes and perceptions of conflict articulated as a part of cultural discourses. The research related to Bosnia is to be included in the final WP7 publication project. The first research phase in Sarajevo was conducted during 2013 focusing on political and cultural narrative, and in particular the issues of citizenship, ideology and conflict.

Partner: Queen’s University Belfast
Case study: Conflict amelioration and cross-border cooperation in Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina
Research highlights:
- EU peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been shaped by a fundamental tension between a largely rhetorical commitment to a conflict transformation approach and the predominant focus on member state-building.

- Underlying the road into Europe discourse and its penetration into everyday life are familiar war-time tropes of a dysfunctional, backward and divided society that variously highlight BiH’s many failures, such as unwillingness to push for reform, cooperation and change, and its lack of a functioning and healthy civil society.
• Instruments that could open up opportunities for conflict amelioration such as cross-border co-operation, state building and support for civil society are driven by the priorities and technologies of European Integration, rather than by a broad and multi-level approach to conflict transformation.

• Small interventions take place outside the strictly institutional domain. These are situated at the intersection between the grassroots and the cultural realm and often do not squarely fit within the technocratic notion of civil society and cross-border cooperation that is at the core of EU interests, albeit in some cases these interventions might obtain EU funds.

• Cultural initiatives revolving around the regional film industry, particularly the Sarajevo Film Festival, offer opportunities for meaningful co-operation, difficult discussions and cross-border encounters that are not easily captured in top-down and technocratic approaches to CBC. Similarly, local cinematic narratives bring to the fore the complexities of the post-Dayton borderscape that are too often marginalized in policy making and official documents

Partner: Ben-Gurion University (BGU)

Case study- Israel-Jordan relations and border environment

Research highlights:

• CBC practices include regular and semi-regular cross-border co-operative interactions, at 3 levels: 1) National –institutionalized level: security and water policies; 2) Civil society - NGOs: FoEME; 3) Private initiatives: business, tourism. These co-operative interactions vary in many ways, including in their chosen area of activity, scope and regularity, identity of initiators, and regional vs national actors. They also share many characteristics, having operated under the radar for nearly 20 years, with hardly any public attention in the media of both countries. This preference for minimal exposure both enables the continuity of these interactions and, understandably, drastically limits the development of a perception of CBC as a legitimate activity between neighbouring countries. Thus, the link between CBC and conflict amelioration, so basic to normalization processes, is denied in the context of Israel-Jordan relations. The forces which sustain these regular cross-border co-operative interactions rely on the specific context shaping border region populations and interests.

• Forces which minimalize their legitimacy, impact and potential spill-over to wider areas of activity are totally external to the border realm and lie entirely in national perceptions and practices of security. Crucial examples are:
  • The development of a powerful anti-normalization lobby threatens the pro-Western oriented monarchy with exposure of the depth of Jordan’s co-operation with Israel as betrayal of the on-going Israel-Palestinian conflict.
  • As a result of the Arab Spring Jordan has implemented a series of US–backed security protocols which have led to increased emphasis of securitization discourse regarding borders; increased reliance and co-operation with Israel’s security and intelligence agencies; and increased perception of threat to the regime posed by civilian CBC with Israeli institutions, organizations and individuals.
There has not been much pressure to change Israel’s contradicting policies regarding its border with Jordan due to the general dominance of securitization discourses in Israeli political and social realms of life.

Local border region actors, farmers, environmentalists, scientists, civil servants and business people together with various NGO representatives, have been left to deal with the many costs and efforts of planning and executing CBC as a marginalized activity in an extremely securitized environment.

Case study – Hebron Kiryat-Arba

Research highlights:

- Drawing on interviews, and including combined research work in WP7 (Cross border cooperation and conflict amelioration) and WP10 (Border crossing and cultural production), a documentary film was produced examining the socialization processes that justify the separation wall/fence, and thereby the connection between securitization and cultural production of borders.

- The disengagement from the Palestinians together with the initial stages of the construction of the ‘security fence’ resulted, inter alia, in a change in the day-to-day relations between the two populations due to the de facto separation between them. In fact, Israeli children who were born in the early 2000s in the Judea and Samaria borderlands have on contact with Palestinian children: they are separated by community boundaries, on the roads and highways and by the security wall/fence.

- Older residents of Kiryat Arba and Hebron state that the casbah – Hebron’s ancient quarter with a mixed Arab and Jewish public domain – has been an integral part of their daily routine. However, from 2002, the Jewish population of Kiryat Arba and Hebron and the Palestinian population of Hebron became almost completely disengaged as the existing shared areas in Hebron’s Arab quarters were closed off to Israelis (accompanied by an almost complete restriction on the freedom of movement for the Palestinians).

- The security fence has been a ‘work in progress’ over the last twelve years, demonstrating that it is not merely another tangible object, but rather an on-going process of border creation. Essentially, the never-ending dispute over the route of the fence is confirmation of the fact that this is not a natural border and that the defence establishment feels the need to repeatedly justify the fence, in part by creating cultural narratives of security requirements and the existential threat posed by the ‘Other’.

- The border comprises two processes that feed one another: first, security-related policy making which supports and justifies the creation of the border; second - the manner in which security policy develops into social and cultural narratives expressed at the daily level that reinforce the security perspectives driving these from the outset. It is this second process which is the focus of our study. The study centres on the borderlands of Judea and Samaria where construction of the security fence is still underway. Moreover, this topic cannot be completely separated from the process of creating the border
between Israel and the Gaza Strip, given that both relate to the on-going positioning of a border that took place concurrently.

Evidence of conceptual and theoretical development

Key theoretical contributions of this analysis include: The exposure of the constructed and shifting nature of security and its problematic ramifications in border management policy, both on civilian life in the borderlands, and on the prospects for post-conflict normalization; A critical and broader understanding of the potential and limitation of current concepts and practices of cross-border co-operation.

Research undertaken within WP7 pays attention to the multi-situated, pluritopical and multilevel negotiations and contestations of borders, and explores the practices through which borders are inhabited, but also crossed and traversed (Brambilla, 2014). This is reflected in the wide range of issues highlighted by the case studies which include cross-border co-operation among cities, the role of Euroregions, historical memory of genocide, cartopolitics, the role of cultural interventions and cultural institutions (e.g. photography, cinema, festivals), local environmental policy and cooperation, children’s experiences of bordering and security.

The research provides empirical evidence on contexts of relative peace shaped primarily by the legacy of WWII (Poland/Ukraine), case studies influenced by post-Soviet geopolitical transformations (Turkey/Armenia), examples of ongoing conflicts (Ukraine/Russia; Israel/Palestine) and broadly defined post-conflict scenarios (Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Israel/Jordan). In so doing, a key contribution of this research lies in illustrating the ways in which concepts and top-down policies of cross-border co-operation intersect, both historically and in the current moment, with specific institutional and political scenarios. Moreover, the case studies illuminate how these concepts and policies resonate concretely (or fail to do so) for a range of different actors (e.g. children, grassroots activists, film makers, businesses, political representatives), in particular spaces (e.g. cities, regions, borderlands, the security fence) and as a result of global dynamics (e.g. post-WWII, post-Cold War, post-9/11). Last but not least, case studies also explore how bordering practices and identities are enacted and performed through specific cultural products (e.g. maps, photographs, literature) and initiatives (e.g. film and music festivals).

From a methodological point of view, this research brings a critical borderscaping approach to bear on political theory and political geography, literary and cultural studies, theories of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, and employs methods as diverse as ethnography, interviews, filmmaking, critical reading of texts and cultural products, and historical and genealogical analysis to most effectively investigate the complex nature of border conflicts and border-crossing.

Future paths

Dynamically changing geopolitical situations and macro-political problems, within and without Europe, significantly influence the nature of cross-border co-operation as well as bordering processes and the perception of borders across all case studies. The influence of macro-political problems often has the potential to destabilize border regions, particularly...
those outside the EU or at its outer fringes. As a counterpoint, actual levels of integration and local initiatives between communities on both sides of a given border contributes to stabilization. In cases of active inter-state and/or internal ethno-national conflicts, research teams emphasize the necessity for economic, environmental and technical forms of cross-border co-operation, to be encouraged through new and existing EU policies.

Israel’s Borders
The EU should constantly examine and support even the most limited cross-border activities between Israel and all of her neighbours, wherever it is possible. This should be limited to non-political activities and focus on issues relating to mutual quality of life – especially in the field of environment, pollution, water management and phosphate development. In the case of the West Bank, the EU should encourage the gradual relaxation of the Separation barrier restrictions, enabling more Palestinians to work in Israel and to enhance their own economic livelihoods, and enabling the smoother transition of goods from Israel into the West Bank (and the Gaza Strip).

The Turkish – Armenian Border
In the past several years, members of civil societies and others have made substantial progress in deepening the dialogue between communities. The analysis and debate of future Turkish-Armenian affairs, within a broader regional and international context, offers a promising avenues that can prepare the conditions for the opening of the border. These could include: Establishing a dialogue through culture, arts, concerts, films, travelling funds, cross-borders projects, exchange programs for youths to develop mutual understanding and to address prejudices between Armenians and Turks.

The EU can play a major role in promoting dialogue between the two societies through several mechanisms. Primarily, development of mutual understanding should be a sine qua non while encouraging collaboration between states and communities with the help of civil society organizations. The EU could also offer specific funding and assistance to foster reconciliation measures, such as joint research projects, involving Turkish and Armenian institutions as well as projects researching the Turkish-Armenian common cultural heritage, and the rehabilitation of transport and tourist infrastructure in the Turkish-Armenian border area. Also, the EU can foster good neighbourly relations as a part of the Copenhagen criteria that are necessary for the accession process of Turkey. Turkey’s integration into the EU could have an impact on Turkish-Armenian relations as well as on solving the historical problems.

The Ukranian – Russian Border
The Ukrainian border needs further settling and reform: simultaneously with the removal of barriers on the border with the EU, the security infrastructure of ‘post-Soviet borders’ with Russia, Belarus, Transdniestria (Transnistria) needs to be strengthened, as in fact it is at these borders the continuum of the EU security will be achieved (the fight against illegal flows of people, arms, drugs). There is not enough Ukrainian government resources for strengthening these boundaries even in the medium term, so the main donor of technical and financial assistance for this purpose must be the EU.

Programs of the Eastern Partnership Project have shown in general the lack of efficacy in such issues as attraction of post-Soviet countries to the EU and the stabilization and
democratization of domestic processes in these societies (a good example of this is the lack of engagement of Ukrainian society in these programs). The idea of forming a general project frame aimed at countries whose foreign policy is oriented towards integration with the EU (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) and such focusing on different forms of Eurasian integration with Russia (Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan) has appeared unreasonable. An ‘Ostpolitik (Eastern politics) restart is required, first of all, for the first group of countries, which would complement the internal logic of the development of these societies ‘to return to Europe’, and with a clear signal to the possibility of joining the EU.

Transdniestria
Many respondents affirm that the very existence of the Moldovan state depends on conflict resolution. A main path towards conflict resolution is seen in federalization of the country which can take different forms: Transdniestria can survive only if it re-addresses its export to Russia and other countries of the Eurasian Economic Union but for both economic and logistic/political reasons this is a difficult task at present and can provoke new geopolitical tensions; A more optimistic scenario supposes integration of Transdniestria with Moldova within a ‘soft’ federation. Its realization is possible only if Moldova keeps its statehood and refuses reunification with Romania guaranteed by the EU, remains neutral, and the Transdniestrian elite keeps its positions in a reunited country. At a broader scale, it is possible only if a dialogue between Russia and EU is restored, and the West informally recognizes the specific place of Russia in the post-Soviet space.

Solution is possible only under the conditions of regional stability. This would require:

- to continue confidence-building measures;
- to develop joint local and regional economic projects contributing to the reintegration of the country;
- to contribute to the country’s economic and social modernization;
- to consider as much as possible the needs of Transdniestrian citizens;
- to establish a two chambers’ parliament with the representation of Transdniestria and other regions (Gagauzia and Northern Moldova populated mainly by Ukrainians);
- to restore normal relations with Russia and Eurasian Economic Union.

Polish Borders
The situation on the internal borders of the European Union is much more stable and predictable (the case of the Polish-German border). The advanced level of cooperation, mainly of economic character, but also cultural and social initiatives, provide a kind of a buffer for rapid geopolitical changes. The change of the Polish-German border from a sixty years old traditional border into the post-traditional border of intensive daily contacts took place in the period of ten years. It is a good example of the integrating role of the EU, despite a degree of weaknesses and turbulences of the integration process. As for the Polish-Ukrainian and the Polish-Russian borders, the current situation and the ongoing geopolitical changes preclude clear and long-term scenarios.

The Hungarian – Serbian Border
Two main factors for EU external borders are suggested: 1) The crucial financial role of the EU in the establishing and perpetuating forms of cross-border co-operation (which is the only relevant financial source for cross-border relationships in the case of Szeged and Subotica); 2)
The current refugee crisis complicates existing relationships and extends beyond the (financial, organizational, administrative, etc.) possibilities of individual countries.

WP8 (Rebordering State Spaces: Cities, Borders and Integration Processes)

General goals and philosophy

Work package 8 deals with economic and political integration processes associated with European integration and their impacts on the conceptual evolution of borders. This WP explores bordering as a “rebordering” of the EU in terms of cross-border urban regions and “twin cities” on the EU’s internal and external borders. The principal objective of the WP 8 is to examine how the process of cross-border integration can modify our understanding of state borders and how it has affected the concept of borders at different levels of social action and in different contexts. The research conducted within the WP 8 is centred on the stakeholders’ perceptions and their understanding of bordering processes. The aim is to investigate the significance of the border and the meaning of the process of cross-border integration by conducting interviews with policy-makers, economic entrepreneurs and representative of the civil society. Three specific spatial contexts are taken into account for fieldwork: cross-border metropolitan regions (CBMRs), urban border regions and twin-cities. This WP is linked conceptually to WP 4 (Europeanization) and to WP 7 (Cross-Border Co-operation) in investigating if and how politics and policies of the EU have influenced functional interaction across national and external borders.

The WP was divided in four research tasks (RTs):

RT1: Dynamics of cross-border urban integration and conceptual change
This RT is dedicated to the development of the research questions and the conceptual frameworks to be mobilized within the WP 8.

RT2-3: Studying Cross-border Integration within cross-border urban regions and twin cities
These RTs deal with fieldwork.

RT4: Synthesis
This RT aims at summarizing the overall work conducted within the work package.

Overall progress of the RTs from project start

RT1: Dynamics of cross-border urban integration and conceptual change

Four main activities were achieved for the Research Task 1:

1) Research questions: Two main research questions have been identified. The first one concerns the significance of borders and deals with the attitudes and perceptions of local and regional actors involved in the territorial restructuring of twin cities and cross-border metropolitan regions. How do these actors perceive the state border that runs across their action space? What is their understanding of the border in functional as well as ideational terms? How does the border relate to their everyday practices, discourse and representations?
To what extent does the border represent a resource or a constraint for the actor's discourse and action and how is this achieved?

The second question highlights the process of cross-border integration that occurs within the cross-border urban spaces under scrutiny. What forms and processes of cross-border urban integration are developing at state borders and what is their significance from the viewpoint of local/regional actors? To what extent are the different forms of integration (see Figure 5 below) supported, contested and by whom? What are the drivers and the hindrances that 'shape' these processes of cross-border integration? Is there a congruence between the way the border is conceived and the signification attached to the process of cross-border integration? If not, how do we explain such discrepancies?

(2) Research strategy: In order to conduct empirically grounded research on the three research questions raised, an eclectic and pragmatic posture has been adopted. It composes an inductive approach which mobilizes qualitative methods (mainly through interviews with local and regional actors), and a deductive approach based on theoretical frameworks and hypotheses (whose perspective is to test hypotheses in order to validate the theoretical models).

(3) A conceptual framework dealing with the significance of borders has been formulated (Table 1). Derived from the structuration theory, this framework considers the bordering dynamics (i.e. de-bordering and re-bordering) in the light of their structuring effects (constraining and enabling). A preliminary version has been presented at the European Border Studies Conference in Bergamo in July 2013 (Sohn, 2013). The conceptual framework has also been mobilized in a comparative analysis of North-American and European bordering dynamics (Herzog and Sohn, 2014).

Figure 5 - The significance of the border: a conceptual framework derived from structuration theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border dynamics/structure</th>
<th>Effects over agency</th>
<th>Enabling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De-bordering</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-bordering</td>
<td>Obstacle</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sohn (2014).

(4) An ad hoc analytical framework has been built to take into consideration the different processes of integration that contribute to the development of cross-border urban areas. These processes can be structural (actions to connect and to bring closer borderlands), functional (economic flows and exchanges), institutional (governance and the coordination of public policy) or ‘ideational’ (identity construction, common representations and symbolic representations) in nature. This framework presenting the different dimensions of the process of cross-border integration has been published in the Journal of Borderlands Studies (Durand, 2015).
### Figure 6 - Dimensions of cross-border integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Converging/Diverging</td>
<td>• Space and socio-economic composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linking/Separating</td>
<td>• Dynamics of convergence (or divergence) of spatial development of territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Communication networks (infrastructure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Crossing/Filtering</td>
<td>• Cross-border economic flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchanging</td>
<td>• Individual and collective spatial and social practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Coordinating/Hampering</td>
<td>• Networking of actors and setting up of cross-border collaborations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>• Structuration of cross-border collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Willingness and resources of actors to cooperate and define strategies and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>common projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Cross-border planning and policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideational</td>
<td>Sharing/Differentiating</td>
<td>• Language skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representing</td>
<td>• Same cultural (incl. historical), social and political references</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Adjustments of identities and sense of belonging to cross-border living areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(individual practices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Perceptions of actors/people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Durand, 2015

**RT2-3: Studying Cross-border Integration within cross-border urban regions and twin cities**

Three main activities were achieved for the Research Task 2 and 3:

1. The methods mobilized in WP 8 emphasize on expert interviews (focus on opinions, representations and strategies of stakeholders), data gathering and desk research. Discourse analysis or speech analysis will be part of desk research, but should not be the main methodological tool used in WP 8. In order to better apprehend the different case studies and envisage meaningful comparisons, it was decided to conduct a background research for each twin city, respectively cross-border metropolitan region selected. The idea of this background research is to help us refine our research questions and allow for the selection of the stakeholders to be interviewed.

2. The selection of the case studies has been conducted according to three criteria: (i) Various spatial categories: cross-border metropolitan regions, urban border regions and twin cities; (ii) Different European border contexts: within old EU member state; between old and new EU member state, or between EU states and non-EU states; (iii) Expertise of the WP partners. Nine case studies were chosen representing a broad range of different geopolitical and geographical situations encountered in Europe:

- Barcs–Virovitica (Hungary–Croatia)
- Copenhagen–Malmö (Denmark–Sweden)
- Eurométropole Lille–Kortrijk–Tournai (France–Belgium)
- Frankfurt (Oder)–Slubice (Germany–Poland)
Gibraltar–La Linea (UK–Spain)
- Görlitz–Zgorzelec (Germany–Poland)
- Greater Geneva (Switzerland–France)
- Kaliningrad–Gdansk (Russia–Poland)
- Sátoraljaújhely – Slovenske Nove-Mesto (Hungary–Slovakia)

(3) For each case, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with a selection of policymakers, economic entrepreneurs and representatives of the civil society. The interviews were paraphrased and partly transcribed to allow for categorization according to the principles of qualitative contents analysis.

Three types of urban configurations have been investigated:

a) Cross-border metropolitan regions (CBMRs)
Three CBMRs have been included in the empirical analysis, namely the Eurometropolis Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai (France-Belgium), the Greater Geneva (Switzerland-France) and the Oresund region (Denmark-Sweden). In the case of the Eurometropolis Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, 28 interviews have been conducted jointly by the teams from LISER and PACTE between October 2014 and February 2015. The same collaboration has been implemented in the case of Geneva where 31 interviews were carried out between October and November 2014. Finally, the Oresund region has been investigated by LISER and 26 interviews were conducted in April and May 2014.

b) Urban border regions
Two border regions localized either at the external borders of the EU or at the Schengen borders have also been investigated. The first case is the border region Gdansk-Kaliningrad at the Polish-Russian border where interviews were conducted by the team of the University of Gdansk and IGRAS in the summer 2014. The second case is represented by Gibraltar-La Linea at the Spanish-UK border where 16 interviews were conducted by the team from the UAB between May and September 2014.

c) Twin cities
Finally, four twin cities have been included in the selection of case studies. Along the German-Polish border, the cases of Frankfort (Oder)-Slubice and Görlitz-Zgorzelec have been investigated by the IRS team and the University of Gdansk in the summer and fall of 2014. Respectively 18 and 16 interviews have been conducted. The twin cities of Sátoraljaújhely-Slovenske Nove-Mesto (Hungary-Slovakia) and Barcs-Terezino-Polje/Virovitica (Hungary-Croatia) have also been surveyed by RKK.

RT4: Synthesis

The production of a synthesis summarizing the overall work achieved in WP 8 is currently engaged. For each case study, specific questions relating to the objectives defined in RT1 have been identified. Based on the responses, a summary will be developed.
Synthesis of the overall results

The results presented in this section are derived from interviews with stakeholders involved in cross-border cooperation. The grouping of the case studies into three geographical categories is meant to structure the presentation of the main empirical results.

a) Cross-border metropolitan regions (CBMRs)

The three CBMRs display both similarities and differences. Concerning the similarities, Lille, Geneva and Copenhagen-Malmö are all three emblematic cases of European cross-border cooperation aimed at building a cross-border metropolitan area and strengthening its governance. Besides variation in demographic size and economic power, the three cases also display some peculiarities. The case of the Greater Geneva is characterized by sharp socio-economic differentials and intense cross-border labour flows (towards Geneva) and residential mobility (towards France). In the cases of Lille and Copenhagen-Malmö, differences between the two sides of the border also exist although they are less pronounced; cross-border integration patterns are thus less unbalanced. Another key difference relates to the spatial setting: whereas Lille and Geneva constitute cross-border urban agglomerations cut in two by a state border that is often quite invisible in the urban landscape, Copenhagen-Malmö is characterized by the presence of the Oresund strait which physically separates the two sides and materializes the border.

- The evolution of the border and its perception

In the Eurometropolis Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, the interviewed actors have the feeling that the border is more pregnant than before. They are aware that the border is more than just a simple line. They see the complexity of the border and its effects, the difficulties to cooperate and to implement cross-border actions. Paradoxically, for many of them, the most striking representations of the evolution of the border in the region are both the disappearance of the “classical” inter-state border and the relevance of the mental barrier which still remains and distinguishes border territories.

Within the Oresund region, many interviewees link the border to the presence of water (Oresund strait) separating the two cities/countries. It is thus often perceived as a physical barrier that was partly overcome by the opening of the bridge. The cost of crossing remains quite high and this is perceived as an obstacle for developing further cross-border flows and exchanges. In the meantime, economic entrepreneurs and the political elite are supporting a business-oriented cross-border cooperation and they conceive the border as a resource in terms of market-driven integration and territorial marketing (global positioning of Copenhagen).

The case of the Greater Geneva is characterized by contrasted understandings and perceptions of the border. In their great majority, the traditional local political elite, both in France and in Switzerland conceives the border as artificial and irrelevant. The Greater Geneva basin is portrayed as a natural economic area and, as a matter of fact, most cartographic representations of the cross-border urban agglomeration do not indicate the presence of the Franco-Swiss state border. The meaning attached to the border is quite different for economic
entrepreneurs. On the Swiss side, the border is conceived of as an economic resource, especially thanks to cross-border differentials (high wages attract skilled and flexible labour force). On the French side, mixed feelings co-exists as the border is seen both as an opportunity (gateway to the Swiss market, positive spill-over effects for the French side) and a threat given the comparative advantages enjoyed by Swiss firms (flexible labour market, attractive jobs). The opening of the border and the intense cross-border flows, notably labour mobility (from France to Geneva) and residential mobility (from Geneva to France) have triggered some resentment against cross-border workers held responsible for unemployment and insecurity in Geneva. Populist movements have thus gained momentum and national rebordering is gaining support by the population in local and national elections.

The meaning of cross-border integration

The fieldwork conducted in each case study has led to consider the various ways the process of cross-border integration is perceived and understood. In Lille and Geneva, the interviewed actors conceived cross-border integration as an intense process, while in the Oresund case, the actors consider this process as something relatively weak in comparison with the demographic size and the potentialities of the cross-border region (including a capital city).

Despite these divergences, strong similarities have been observed in these cases. Firstly, cross-border integration is seen as something positive, linked with the idea of erasing borders or border effects (supposedly negative). It is perceived as a removal of the restricting aspects of the border (no obstacles toward free movement). It is thus related to the idea of the debordering process: “You don’t make any differences which side on the border you are.”

Another aspect of cross-border integration is linked to economy, which is really relevant for the cross-border metropolitan regions since they compete to be attractive urban centres. In such a perspective, cross-border integration constitutes a benefit for the territorial development of the cross-border space. It is a mean to create partnerships across border, to seek economic complementarities or synergies, but also to develop the attractiveness of such an area by providing a common labour market with some facilities for working.

For some actors, cross-border integration is a bottom-up process, made by people who produce and generate cross-border interactions. But politicians have to frame and regulate these cross-border flows and their spill-over effects through a cross-border collaboration which enables to elaborate responses to the needs of citizens and businessmen. De facto, cross-border integration is related to the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation and to the achievements of common initiatives made for citizens: “It is when there are cooperation at all levels, joint initiatives, a sharing of public equipment”.

Last, cross-border integration should also lead to transcend existing mental and cultural barriers in order to create a cross-border living area where people think that they belong to a recognized and named space. In a sense, “it is when cross-border spatial proximity is higher than national belonging”, that is to say, that the national interest shall pass after the local/regional interests.
b) **Urban border regions**

The urban cross-border region of Kaliningrad-Gdansk is specific due to the presence of an EU external border which separates Poland from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The agreement on the state border between Poland and Russia was signed in 1945. The border had been delimited along the so-called Curzon line. During the socialist system, contacts between the citizens of Poland and Kaliningrad were extremely limited. But after the dissolution of the USSR and the decisions of central authorities, the relations between Poland and Russia have been more and more active. Since the agreement on small border traffic came into force in 2012, the number of people crossing the Polish-Russian border exceeds 4 million yearly (shopping, cultural events). In such a situation, how do the regional stakeholders apprehend the border and its change?

- **The evolution of the border and its perception**

Polish respondents unambiguously identified the Polish-Russian border as a physical barrier, characterized by its variable permeability and its unpredictability, which discourages people from crossing it. The border is also perceived as a resource by the local entrepreneurs, who take advantage of price and quality differences of goods and services provided on both sides of the border, and by the local authorities because its opening has a positive impact on increasing the recognition of the border cities and regions as a result of rapid development of cross-border activities.

For the Russian stakeholders, the significance of the border varies according to their affiliation. The view of federal authorities is more politicized. Their priority is national security. For the regional government the situation at the border is directly related with everyday life. For these latter, the rent of border location is perceived as a way to compensate negative consequences of isolation from mainland Russia, including the supply of consumer goods, cooperation in different sectors where they feel a lack of competence, modernization of cross-border infrastructure, solution of common environmental problems. For business actors as well as for the representatives of the civil society the border is seen as an obstacle (customs procedure, certification of goods and services, contracts, transport costs), but also as an opportunity (extension of the market, mean to consolidate trust and communications between Russian and Polish organizations). The driving force of cross-border cooperation is *pragmatism* based on the use of the border location’s rent. The difference in prices of goods and services creates a significant resource for so-called “tanker” traders, shuttle traders and local residents. Nevertheless, the cross-border interactions are uncertain and vary according to the fluctuation of the rubble, and to the international relationships between Russia and Poland or the EU.

- **The meaning of cross-border integration**

In the Kaliningrad-Gdansk border region, many interviewees were afraid that the geopolitical crisis and new economic challenges could change the situation on the border and destroy the achievements in cross-border cooperation. At the same time, they highlighted the goodwill of Russian and Polish populations to cooperate and meet. These experts believe that such
resistance to external shocks and pressure from the central authorities is a sign of real cross-border integration.

If we look at the four dimensions of cross-border integration, the perceptions of experts are different. Even if the borderlands have a similar level of social and economic development and economic structure, the structural integration is not perceived by regional officials as a goal to reach. Businessmen noticed that the main condition for cross-border integration was the development of border infrastructure: checkpoints and access roads, bridges, public transportation connection. All in all, positive changes were emphasized by all categories of interviewed experts. The functional dimension of cross-border integration appears limited. It is still developing as a result of the local border traffic regime introduced in 2012. However, daily routine of the local communities is restricted to shopping and tourism activities. All experts emphasized positive shifts related first of all with the stability of actors’ networks, which enables to maintain and develop the institutional dimension of cross-border integration. The process of networking was launched in the late 1990s-early 2000s when the first Euroregions were established. Thanks to European programs such as the INTERREG Neighbourhood Programme (2004-2006 and especially 2007-2013) the institutional actors’ network has been structured. Concerning the ideational dimension, the experts stressed that free movement across the Russian-Polish border contributes to the change of individual social practice and life style even if the stereotypes remain important. The growing confidence and changing perceptions of populations are considered by experts as an important result of cross-border cooperation and a basis for future projects, even if the sense of belonging to a cross-border living area remains limited. The weight of history is still a penalizing factor in the relations and exchanges between people across the border.

c) Twin cities

The four twin cities included in this research are characterized by a common historical and geopolitical background. They were all united at the beginning of the twentieth century and were part of the socialist system after the Second World War. They got divided after the two main wars in Europe. The cities of Barcs and Sátoraljaújhely were cut in two following the delineation of the Hungarian borders in the frame of the Trianon Peace Treaty (1920). For the Polish-German cases, the Potsdam agreement (1945) determined the future demarcation between the two countries, principally along the Oder River, separating Frankfort (Oder) and Gorlitz in two urban entities. Despite these similarities, the fieldworks and campaign of interviews with the local political and economic stakeholders as well as the key persons from the civil society show that the perspectives on cross-border cooperation and integration are markedly different.

- The evolution of the border and its perception

In all cases, thanks to the European support (establishment of Euroregions, Phare programs, IPA Cross-border Co-operation Programmes, Interreg programs), the cooperation between twin cities was launched and received public attention. These European initiatives have enabled to change the cross-border situation, and to institute partnerships at the cross-border scale. Local stakeholders assessed cross-border cooperation as being on the upswing after a long period of inertia and stagnation, even if cross-border activities were rated unanimously low by the interviewees.
For the case of Frankfurt (Oder)/Slubice, this situation has changed after 2010. Joint municipal action plans were drawn up, joint city marketing using a common brand and logo was established, a formal cooperation centre was founded as part of the Frankfurt administration, etc. Stakeholders representing municipal institutions ascribed the recent trend of institutionalizing joint activities to a change of generations in Frankfurt’s administration and other organizations involved in cross-border cooperation. The young professionals have been supported by like-minded actors in Slubice; together they built private networks and tried to establish future-oriented projects such as bilingual private kindergartens and schools. They described themselves as pragmatists who sought to avoid former ‘Europeanized’ symbolic action, ineffective political blatancy and dependency from the EU’s political rationale. Business protagonists support this estimation while at the same time describe the economic situation and future outlooks in more pessimistic words. While supporting symbolic upgrading of the city marketing kind they bemoan that cross-border economic activities still lack initiative and support. Apart from well-established cross-border enterprises following the factory outlet model (i.e. lower-wage production in Poland combined with local sales in Germany) it has been difficult to lure investors into the region after a large solar panel factory established at the middle of the millennium decade had closed down. Civil society protagonists, such as artists and representatives of civil society associations, stressed the significance of pragmatism to overcome the dividing effects of the border. Apart from the harsh language barrier – which they sought to mitigate through bi-lingual education and youth projects based on common interest in music and sports – they were optimistic about further debordering. Nevertheless they indicated that ironically it was exactly the remaining cultural dividing line between Germany and Poland that in everyday life guaranteed for their jobs and symbolic returns. To comment on the cultural difference from an artistic perspective and establish educational institutions became a new albeit marginal source of business occasions.

The three other cases constitute a considerable contrast, both in structural pathways of development (economic and demographic decline) and in stakeholder orientations (low cooperation between municipalities). Most cross-border activities were established by private agents and civil society organizations. In spite of the creation of the label “Eurocity” in Görlitz/Zgorzelec, the building of the “Europa House” in Sátoraljaújhely, hardly any joint activities have been developed within these twin cities. Political and social everyday awareness of the ‘other side’ has been characterized by ignorance or ‘looking away’.

- The meaning of cross-border integration

The level of cross-border integration was described by all stakeholders as fairly low. Nevertheless, this process does not have the same intensity with regards to the four twin cities. In the Polish-German cases, the institutional and functional dimensions of this process are clearly visible. Indeed, for the later dimension, it is reflected in the daily routine of people living on both sides of the border. Having a job on the other side, doing shopping, using services and schools is a normal experience of people living in the borderland. Concerning the former dimension, it is mainly manifested by formal cross-border cooperation of the local authorities, implementation of joint projects and creation of cooperative development strategies. In the Hungarian cases, the functional dimension dominates. The level of cross-border trade continuously fluctuates, its intensity is determined by the currencies exchange
rate. The institutional dimension is on a basic level, mainly due to political tensions. In all the cases, the structural dimension of cross-border integration is low, due to socio-economic inequalities existing between border territories. Concerning the ideational dimension, a large majority of respondents stated that the borderland citizens do not feel part of the cross-border region. However, the European identity is becoming more and more popular, especially among young people.

The result of comparative analysis confirms that contrasting development trajectories of twin cities were related to the heritage of different local potentials created by post-socialist transition. It was represented by continued economic crisis and population loss. In Frankfurt (Oder), political support and the expansion of higher education obviously created a symbolic surplus which however was downplayed by the local interviewees. Instead, they sought to redefine cross-border cooperation as an incremental development that originated by independent local initiative. Factual economic upgrade consisting in an internationally renowned high-tech cluster and business incubator was hardly ever rated as a major achievement, except by business stakeholders. Cross-border cooperation was generally esteemed important and increasingly successful yet limited to single initiatives in a small number of areas. On the whole, cross-border integration between Frankfurt (Oder)-Slubice was depicted by all interviewees as being sufficient; most of them referred to the symbols of such integration (close cooperation of the universities, a multitude of cross-border projects), rather than records of factual cross-border networks or economic flows. In the three other cases, institutional stakeholders, and to a lower extent also business representatives, rated overall cooperation potentials as low. Civil society agents felt they had been left alone when trying to establish cross-border activities, receiving hardly any support by local politics and the population as well.

Evidence of conceptual and theoretical development

The analyses undertaken within WP8 based on fieldwork research conducted in 9 case studies across Europe allow to challenge some ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions relating to the cross-border integration and cooperation nexus.

The first idea challenged by empirical evidence is that cross-border integration results from debordering in the sense of the reduction of border impediments. Indeed, it is true that the level of cross-border exchanges and interaction depends on the opening of the border and the ability for people, goods, information and services to easily cross the line. Cases like Geneva or Copenhagen-Malmö show that the growing number of cross-border workers is, to some extent, related to the reduction of border obstacles and the improvement of crossing capacities (e.g., transportation infrastructure). If a relative open border is a necessary condition, it is nevertheless not sufficient for cross-border interaction to occur and develop. There also needs to be significant cross-border differentials that constitute a key driver. The trajectory followed by the process of cross-border integration of the Oresund region (Copenhagen-Malmö) illustrates this rationales. This cross-border metropolitan region has witnessed a steady increase of cross-border flows following the opening of the fixed-link in 2000 until 2008 and the hit of the financial crisis. During that period, it was beneficial to work in Denmark (higher wages and booming economy) and live in Sweden (lower housing prices and property taxes). So, on the one hand side, many Danes decided to reside in Sweden while retaining their jobs.
in Denmark. On the other, Swedes were attracted to work in Denmark in order to fill-in labour shortages. This double cross-border differential altered from 2008 onwards. The blast of the housing bubble in Copenhagen induced a decline of real estate prices. In the meantime, housing prices went up on the Swedish side, making it far less attractive for Danes to live in Sweden. Fluctuations in currency exchange rates between the two countries happened to aggravate the aforementioned trends. The impact of these converging dynamics on cross-border work and residential mobility is obvious: since 2008, the number of cross-border workers is slightly declining and many Danes that had chosen to live in Sweden have returned to their home country.

If the influence of the cross-border differentials on interactions and flows may be strong, it is however not automatic. The mobilization of border-related resource remains contingent and context-specific. The examples of Görlitz-Zgorzelec and Frankfurt (Oder)-Slubice at the German-Polish border that share a similar context but have followed contrasted cross-border urban and economic development trajectories demonstrate the relevance of local idiosyncrasies. Besides ‘objective’ place-specific settings, it is also the ability of actors to take the opportunities and efficiently mobilize border-related resources that matters. And this depends on the ways the border and the opportunities it represents are perceived and interpreted. What is conceived of as an opportunity or a resource by some on one side of the border (e.g., attraction of cheap labour) can be seen as a threat by others on the other side of the border (e.g., enticement of employees). The mobilization of a resource often implies that the benefit for some goes at the expense of others. This explains why the mobilization of border-related resources is underlined by power struggles about the maintenance or erasure of cross-border differentials and, by extension, about the ways the border is conceived and what cooperation initiatives should or shouldn’t be taken by the various stakeholders involved in the development of the border cities and regions.

The second aspect investigated relates to the inherent virtue of cross-border cooperation for the development of ‘integrated’ cross-border regions. The cross-border metropolitan area of Geneva (called Greater Geneva) appears as an emblematic case of the incongruent relationship between the dynamics of cross-border integration and cross-border cooperation. On the one hand, the process of cross-border functional integration is driven by a geo-economic perspective enhancing cross-border differentials in favour of value capture. In doing so, there is a reproduction of a centre-periphery model based on labour mobility (Geneva attracts more than 120,000 cross-border workers) and a functional division of space (economic activities concentrate in Geneva, residential developments sprawl across the French periphery). On the other side, local and regional institutional actors have developed ambitious planning actions, notably in the domain of public transportation and urban development, which aim at eliminating the obstacles linked to the border and promote a functionally integrated cross-border economic region. This well-established cross-border cooperation has nevertheless recently experienced serious setbacks, particularly because of the rise of xenophobic discourses against cross-border workers in Geneva and more widely in Switzerland, and attempts towards national rebordering motivated by pressure on public finances. Despite the strong interdependencies that link the two sides of the border and lead them towards a common destiny, the Greater Geneva territorial project is facing a serious crisis.
Examining the different meanings attached to the border by the cross-border cooperation stakeholders interviewed and the local communities helps to understand the logics and outcomes of these tensions. In doing so, we have mobilized a processual and multi-perspectival approach to borders within which it is the actors with their social practices and representations related to a particular context that construct the meaning given to a specific border. The political and economic elites involved in the promotion of the Greater Geneva have emphasized the functional effects of the border both as an economic resource and an obstacle to be overcome. The rationales behind is to legitimize what they conceive of as ‘natural’ cross-border economic region. The fact that the national border is and remains, even when it is fairly open, a strong marker of identity and difference seems to have been neglected, hence the resurgence of national and protective rebordering claims by those who fear threatened in their lifestyle or their economic well-being by debordering. In the end, it seems that an instrumental approach to cross-border cooperation is not sufficient in order to sustain cross-border integration. Confronted with a relative deterritorialization, there is a need to re-semantize the state border as an object of recognition able to promote a shared sense of place and belonging.

**Future paths**

One of the major outputs envisaged for WP 8 is the publication of a special issue investigating the ways the processes of cross-border cooperation and integration interact. More specifically, the aim is to assess the apparent benevolence of cross-border cooperation and integration, as well as their supposed virtuous combination, from the perspective of border cities and regions that face the challenge of reconsidering their cross-border relationships. Do cooperation initiatives systematically aim at enhancing the social, economic or cultural interactions between both sides of a border? If yes, what are the preconditions for them to succeed? If not, what are their rationales and with what effects on the social, economic and territorial cohesion of the border regions? In the absence of actual or potential socio-economic interactions, does cross-border cooperation make any sense? Moreover, in cases where economic interactions feed off cross-border differentials and contribute to reproducing them, what is the role and meaning of cross-border cooperation and to what extent do these understandings conform to the ideals and the beliefs that are constitutive of the European ethos? Put differently, does cross-border cooperation as practiced in specific border regions contribute to the emergence of a balanced territorial development linked to a transnational sense of place or is it not rather, and in the most favourable cases only, an expedient to support and foster the expansion of cross-border economic transactions and investments and to regulate their negative externalities?

To disentangle the contingent as well as open-ended relationships between cross-border cooperation and integration and answer these questions, a nuanced and context-specific reading of the role and meaning of borders and bordering dynamics in these processes is brought to the fore. The hypothesis underlying this approach is that borders are not merely hindrances or barriers set up and managed at national level and that could be overcome by cross-border cooperation and regional integration policies and processes. On the contrary, they are dynamic institutions, symbols as well as social processes that might generate unforeseen options for heterogeneous stakeholders and their projects. Borders are thus not only constraints but must also be considered as potential political, economic and social
resources. On the one hand, borders, or more accurately the meaning given to them by the stakeholders and the local communities, impact cooperative practices and discourses. The ways borders are apprehended and mobilized by the proponents and opponents of cross-border cooperation and integration allows a better understanding of the logics at work. On the other hand, being actively involved in the everyday cooperation and integration practices also means that borders are reworked and acquire new roles and meanings.

**WP 9 (Borders, Intersectionality and the Everyday)**

**General Goals and Philosophy**

The central objective of this WP was to promote hitherto neglected areas of border research agendas that address lived, experienced and intersectional (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity) aspects of borders and bordering processes. The bordering perspective has thus been developed in terms of discursive, practical and interpretational categories that reflect issues of citizenship, identity and transnational migration. This WP also explored how borders affect groups with regard to gender, race, citizenship, socio-economic status and sexuality. The comparative perspective encompassed in-depth case studies that involve internal Schengen borders (UK/France, Spain/Gibraltar) and the external EU border (Finland/Russia, Ukraine/Poland, Turkey/EU). In addition, urban case studies (London, St Petersburg & Barcelona) of intersectionality and bordering were carried out. This WP is linked conceptually to WP5 (Post-colonial) and more directly to WP10 (Cultural Production) where literary representations of borders by migrants are studied.

The project objectives were to develop, operationalize and then present to a variety of audiences a framework for studying bordering processes, which draws upon a situated intersectional approach. This involved designing and carrying out the ethnographic fieldwork of the research project in a coordinated way (as much as possible) among the different research partners in WP9.

**Research Task 1: Intersectionality and Conceptual Change**

Since the 1990s, we have seen a shift away from understanding borders as static lines ‘containing’ states and separating one ‘people’ or ‘nation’ from another to a processual approach (Brambilla, 2015), which frames ‘bordering’ in terms of complex processes of differentiation within space (Van Houtum and Van Naerssens, 2002: 126). At the same time, a proliferation in the forms and practices shaping these bordering processes has emerged (Green, 2013), which has ‘brought them in from the margins’ both in real and discursive terms (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2000). Cons and Sanyal (2013) have argued that we see these internal and external bordering processes as both relational and comparative. We would argue that as studies of bordering have shifted focus to everyday life there is a need for further engagement with theoretical approaches to understanding social relations. In this work package we draw upon intersectionality as one approach to understanding social relations to enhance our understanding of these processes of everyday bordering in Europe.

Intersectionality (cf. Crenshaw, 1989; Hill –Collins, 1990; Brah & Phoenix, 2004; Yuval-Davis, 2006, Anthias, 2012) has become a major theoretical and methodological perspective in analysing social relations. Indeed, it is argued that it should be adopted as the most valid approach to analysing social stratification, as it is the most comprehensive, complex and
nuanced and does not reduce social hierarchical relations into one axis of power, be it class, race or gender. The analysis in this special issue will follow the specific approach to intersectionality that Yuval-Davis (2014) has named ‘situated intersectionality’. Fundamental to this approach is that intersectionality analysis should be applied to all people and not just to marginalized and racialized women, with whom the rise of Intersectionality theory is historically linked, so as to avoid the risk of exceptionalism and of reifying and essentializing social boundaries.

Epistemologically, intersectionality can be described as a development of feminist standpoint theory, which claims, in somewhat different ways, that it is vital to account for the social positioning of the social agent. Situated gaze, situated knowledge and situated imagination, construct differently the ways we see the world. However, intersectionality theory was interested even more in how the differential situatedness of different social agents relates to the ways they affect and are affected by different social, economic and political projects. In this way it can no doubt be considered as one of the outcomes of the mobilization and proliferation of different identity group struggles for recognition (Taylor, 1992). At the same time it can also be seen as a response to some of the problems of identity politics (however important they have been historically in terms of mobilization and exposure of different kinds of oppression), when they conflated social categories and social groupings, individuals and collectives and suppressed the visibility of intra-group power relations and plural voices for the sake of raising the visibility of the social grouping/social category as a whole. An important facet of our situated intersectionality approach, therefore, is to differentiate between social positionings, identifications and normative values which are all related but not reducible to each other.

Methodologically, different intersectionality approaches have tended to use what Lesley McCall (2005) calls inter- or intra-categorical approaches. By inter-categorical approach McCall means focusing on the way the intersection of different social categories, such as race, gender and class affect particular social behaviour or distribution of resources. Intra-categorical studies, on the other hand, are less occupied with the relationships among various social categories but rather problematize the meanings and boundaries of the categories themselves, such as whether black women were included in the category ‘women’ or what are the shifting boundaries of who is considered to be ‘black’ in particular place and time. Our approach to the study of everyday bordering has seen the two as complementary, combining the sensitivity and dynamism of the intra-categorical approach with the socio-economic perspective of the inter-categorical approach.


In this work package we recognize two important aspects of bordering processes: the first is the situated nature of bordering experiences, which we capture through our intersectional approach to the research. However, such an approach also enables us to explore the temporal aspects of bordering or change over time, as each bordering gaze is being reshaped as part of a dynamic, ongoing process. So we have also been utilising an autobiographical narrative approach to capture the shifting dynamics of bordering encounters. In the outputs from the research we explore the narrative accounts of interviewees and their complex intersection
with history/the past in their own narratives. What emerge are not additive cause and effect relationships but contextually framed intertwinings of past and present. Borders are the outcome of multiple relations, unpredictable happenings and everyday activities. The mere fact of being positioned means a difference from being positioned elsewhere. We understand present bordering experiences through not only ‘stories-so-far’ or ‘traces’ of the past but also within the context of the everyday imaginary. On the other hand, we would argue that it is not only traces from the past that can be found in our present but that these ‘traces’ are being continuously reconstructed, reimagined and re-‘remembered’ as a result of later developments and thus it can be said that past and present (as well as future projections) are mutually constituted within the context of the intersectional situated imagination. This is crucial for the understanding of the multilayered analytical facets in which everyday situated practices of bordering are embedded. All of this clearly speaks to an intersectional approach, with multiplicity reflecting the differentially situated gazes of the various social actors.

*Research Task 3: Roma Communities and the Shifting borders of Europe*

There are currently between 10 and 12 million Roma living in Europe. Estimates are variable, in part, because of the contested nature of Roma identity (Nirenberg 2010). Recent academic research and human rights monitors have repeatedly identified a significant decline in the socio-economic status of Eastern European Roma/Gypsies, marked by deepening poverty and increasing levels of residential segregation (Barany 2002; Ladányi and Szelényi 2006). The process of EU accession and enlargement has been one of the key reasons for the emergence of a focus on Roma within EU policy circles. The EU has suggested that they and their members have a ‘special responsibility towards the Roma’. Not only are there many more Roma living in the EU since its eastward expansion, but they have also been highly visible in the east-west migration, which has dominated the continent both prior to and following 2004. The extent of the exclusion of the Roma within the Union led the Commission to adopt a Framework to address the complex issues facing Roma people living in all its member states. It is these processes of bordering and exclusion that this work package seeks to explore through a particular focus on Roma communities.

Anti-Gypsyism lies at the heart of Roma exclusion and the EU’s Framework can hardly be successful whilst it fails to tackle the associated everyday manifestations of this phenomenon, which include intimidation, harassment and violence against Europe’s Roma people. Anti-Gypsyism is by no means the same in every country. Roma as a reified ethnic group play different political and social roles within the domestic and international politics of different states. Research on Roma was carried out in the UK, Finland and Hungary.

By the millennium, in Hungary, Roma communities had emerged as some of the most socially excluded groups in the country (Virág, 2010). As social exclusion, segregation and the societal problems of ethnic minorities have come to the forefront for a while in the EU, political debate and media discourse has also intensified. As the economic crisis has impacted upon underdeveloped societies more than developed ones, our hypothesis was that since 2008 this discourse – as underdeveloped communities are more affected in media and political language is more intensive. Therefore we have sought in this work package to analyse media discourses not only in Hungary, but also the UK and Finland, from 1990 until 2013, focusing on identified peaks on the Roma minorities in the media.
Research Task 4: Everyday Bordering in the Metropolitan City

Over the last three decades, immigration legislation has shifted the policing of Europe’s borders away from the margins and into everyday life, as punitive measures seek to transform ordinary citizens into agents of the state, verifying the immigration status of others. Members of European communities are increasingly subject to ‘bordering’ practices in their day to day life (Balibar, 2002) that produce inclusion and exclusion (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). At the same time, ordinary people have become involved in doing this ‘borderwork’ (Rumford, 2008); they have been encouraged to play the role of the ‘citizen-detective’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2008), reporting any suspicions to the authorities. A coercive regime of fines and penalties has introduced bordering practices into the roles of employers, landlords, healthcare workers and teachers/lecturers (Yuval-Davis et al., forthcoming). All of this impacts upon the ‘conviviality’ (Gilroy, 2004) of communities across Europe. Metropolitan cities with their diverse populations offer a vast field for research on socio-spatial bordering of everyday life. In this work package we will be focusing on three different European cities to explore these bordering processes: London, St Petersburg and Barcelona.

The internal reach of the UK border has been extending since 1996 when the Conservative government’s Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act imposed fines on employers who took on migrants who were not authorized to work. These laws were rarely enforced but subsequent Acts passed by Labour governments (the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006), introduced requirements for employers to carry out more rigorous and annual document checks of employees, increased fines to £10,000 per irregular worker and made it a custodial offence to knowingly employ unauthorized migrants. (Webber 2012:156). At the same time enforcement operations significantly increased with 15,500 raids having taken place in 2007-8 (ibid). These raids were widely publicized by the UK Border Agency on its website and via press releases to local news media which included requests to the public to report suspected immigration crimes. Nowhere has the impact of these changes been more apparent than in multicultural London, a global city, and home to one of the world’s most diverse populations.

Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has experienced a number of waves of visa-free labour migrations from various former Soviet republics. One of the most noticeable migration streams is labour migration from Central Asia. This phenomenon emerged in the beginning of the 2000s and gradually gained strength. The boundary between migrants and locals is one of the most visible, articulated and discussed social divisions in Russian society nowadays. St. Petersburg is the second largest city in Russia and is naturally very attractive to migrants. By January 1, 2014 it had about 5 million residents and by different estimations from 300 to 500,000 migrants from Central Asia. According to the statistics provided by the Federal Migration Service of St.Petersburg and Leningrad Region, within 9 months of 2014, it issued 225 224 work permits and 80 127 patents – out of quota work permits – a type of license that entitles an immigrant to work legally for a private person as domestic help. The Labour and Employment Committee of St.Petersburg and Leningrad Region informs that the percentage of visa-free labour migrants with regard to country of origin is as follows: Uzbekistan 42%, Tajikistan 21%, Kyrgyzstan 10%, Belarus 7%, Ukraine 7%, Moldova 6% and others.
Everyday bordering in contemporary metropolitan cities, therefore, are not homogenous and are embedded in their own social and political history and location as well as by global neo liberal processes that affect them all.

**Overall progress of the RTs from project start**

**Research Task 1: Intersectionality and Conceptual Change**

The Umea/UEL team has worked on the theoretical framing from the beginning of the project. This work has included an extensive review of relevant literature, which has been frequently updated during the period of the project, as new work has emerged and as the team has extended their literature search. The initial literature review drew on work from a wide range of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, geography and cultural studies. The conceptual framework was initially presented in a working paper, published on the EUBorderscapes project website and authored by the work package leader, Professor Yuval-Davis. As well as extending the literature search, this framework has also been enhanced by the organization of a seminar series on Bordering at UEL over the period of the project, which has included presentations on new work by leading scholars. This has also been drawn upon to extend and enrich the framework in both the data collection and dissemination phases of the project. Professor Yuval-Davis further defined the approach in her working paper as ‘situated intersectionality’, which highlights the fact that the work package has been exploring numerous different perspectives or situated gazes and not just the marginal voices with which the rise of intersectionality theory is associated.

This perspective played a key role in informing not only the theoretical framing of the work package but also the approach taken to data collection so that migrants, people working on the border and local community members on both sides of the border became part of our study. As the role of the work package within the research programme was to explore bordering processes from differentially situated social positionings within everyday life, an ethnographic methodology was adopted in order to capture the multilevel complexities of different bordering processes through focusing on a range of everyday situated intersectional encounters. Through careful contextualization of these everyday encounters work package teams were able to link the level of macro-politics and policy-making with related media coverage of immigration and identity issues and the lived bordering experiences of differently situated people. Through analysing their individual perspectives on these internal bordering processes have been able to see how they construct and reconstruct borders as well as their own identities and claims of belonging through the creation of socio-cultural, political and geographical distinctions. The capture of such multilevel complexity necessitates a methodological approach, which is sensitive to broader contextual processes and recognizes the shifting nature of connections between research subjects and multiple sites and spaces. This is particularly important given the variety of research sites being explored within the work package, where the volume and intersection of connections to other places leads to a plurality of encounters with bordering processes.

The Umea/UEL team were responsible for briefing and supporting other work package team members on operationalizing this approach in their particular case studies. The work package
teams have also been contributing to this research task through dissemination of their research findings, where the utility of the framework has begun to emerge (see section below on key findings). Work package teams have been disseminating their findings at conferences and also through a special issue being edited by the Umea/UEL team. A proposal for which was submitted and then revised for *Political Geography*, a high-ranking, peer-reviewed journal.

**Research Task 2: The Story of the Borders: Autobiographical Narratives of Border Crossings, Migration and Gender.**

**Umea/UEL**

Umea/UEL has carried out observations, 8 focus groups and 62 interviews in Dover, Folkestone, Ashford and Calais. The 31 formal narrative interviews and 31 informal interviews were with women and men from a range of backgrounds and ages and including people who cross/have crossed the border with and without papers, who live nearby but do not cross the border, labour migrants, people whose everyday employment is directly or indirectly related to the border, those who are ‘local’ and those who have had experience of crossing multiple borders inside and outside Europe. They have also attended 11 meetings by state and voluntary organizations involved in border work in Kent. Discussions have involved both everyday experiences of the border and reflections on specific experiences of border crossing.

UEL/UMEA was able to overcome its most significant challenge of gaining official access to make observations of and question people who work ‘at the border’ through attending Home Office sponsored Migration Strategy meetings where contacts were made that resulted in two Border Force officials being interviewed formally and two informally as well as gaining access to an immigration removal centre.

Initial analysis supports the initial observations of the significance of past lives and distant places have in the experiences and understanding of borders. Families have different border relations, border emotions and the ways the border works in the context of pensions, education and welfare legislation.

**METU**

Within WP9 METU did not initially have any fieldwork or a case study to conduct. Therefore, from the beginning of the WP9 it was decided that METU would conduct desktop research and submit a paper on EU-Turkish relations within the framework of visa issue. The research was conducted in two phases. The first phase included the review of the current literature on the relationship between the EU and Turkey in terms of visa requirement by the EU. Based on this research METU submitted a paper to UEL.

The second stage of the research comprised fieldwork conducted in the Schengen visa offices in Ankara, Turkey. Using qualitative methods, the METU team sought to understand the impact of visa regime applied by the EU on the perception of the EU amongst Turkish nationals. Given the theoretical framework of the Work Package 9, “situated intersectional framework”, the research focused on how bordering encounters are shaped by the differentiated social positionings of Turkish citizens and the purposes for their travel. To this end, the METU team have conducted 8 in-depth interviews with the Turkish citizens applying for visa through the visa offices in Ankara. In accordance with the theoretical
framework of the WP9, we also interviewed with 4 Turkish citizens working in these agencies as well as 2 officers from the EU embassies.

**UH**
The UH team has been working on their publications and finalizing a PhD-thesis which is carried out as part of the project, which deals with the bordering of family relations and how private lives are regulated by immigration regulations, with the title “Gendered family norms and intersecting axes of inequality in policies, practices and discourses on family migration to Finland”. UH has been finalizing fieldwork with activists, church representatives and journalists about a case of a hunger strike of Afghan asylum seekers in the Helsinki city center. The analysis expands the perspective of bordering and the everyday by looking at political contestations of borders and visibility. The analysis shows how the hyper-visible can be silenced and sidelined, and does this through an intersectional analysis of situated power relations. This paper is part of the WP9 proposal for a special issue in Political Geography. UH has also been involved in establishing a Nordic network on Borderscapes, memory and migration: cultural representations of forced migration, which also involves cooperation with Borderscapes researchers from Norway.

**UAB**
The team has carried out fieldwork in Gibraltar / La Línea, interviewing 16 cross-border workers, journalists and other interested parties and are considering doing a last round of interviews after the summer. Several publications have resulted from this research.

**UG**
UG have been focusing on the case of Ukrainian students living and studying in Poland evokes many problems and discussions. The number of media reports involved in commenting the situation of Ukrainian students in Poland is still growing and still the same problems/fields of conflict are discussed and analysed: language barrier, lack of assimilation, funds and accommodation. In the first report interviews conducted with Polish students studying in Gdańsk and Lublin who have Ukrainians in their lecture groups were analysed while the surveys with 30 Ukrainian students conducted in the period of 2013-2014 were being translated at that time. The questionnaire consisted of 15 detailed questions. They were focused on personal experiences of Ukrainian students living in Poland who crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border. Finally, 26 out of initial 30 surveys could be analysed as four of them were incomplete.

Most of the respondents were female students who usually cross the border by bus twice a year. Only one person crossed the border by plane, 3 people by car and 1 person on foot. The second phase of the fieldwork which took place in June, September and November 2015 involved four semi-structured interviews with lecturers teaching Ukrainian students. They were asked to give their opinion on the students (their involvement, dedication, determination, problems and barriers) and on the relations between Polish and Ukrainian students they observe.

**IRS**
The team has completed their task which was a contextual policy paper on EU policy ‘Did the European Union ever consider everyday bordering and intersectionality? Reconstructing
imaginaries of the everyday from the EU’s sectoral policies’. The paper will be submitted for a special issue journal.

**KKNU**

Due to the political situation the focus of the team’s research changed from Transnistria border to Kharkiv as a border city between Ukraine and Russia. This border does have a particular history, which characterized by changing its status: from internal border (within the USSR) toward national – external border (during the last two decades of Ukraine’s independence). Recently, due to the armed conflict in the Donbass region Kharkiv city (and Kharkiv oblast’) have emerged as sites of double borders – between the border with the Russian Federation and with the Donbass armed conflict zone. This role of ‘a front-line city’ is a very new status, which people experience daily and have to recognize, interpret it and adapt to it.

The main focus of our research is old and new borders and the remapping of Kharkiv in everyday life. The target groups have been residents of Kharkiv with family/ work/ cultural and etc. connections with Russia. The research aims to understand changing perceptions in bordering, the borders of Ukraine-ness and Russian-ness – the 'double borderland' as Kharkiv is seen as a sandwich city located between 2 borders, the 'Institutionalization of the border’ in the situation of geopolitical challenge and a shift from ‘borderlands – to bordered lands – to bloody lands'.

The team interviewed people due to issues that emerged from the Maidan protest and developed farther in the situation of armed conflict. There was an Anti-Maidan movement with a discourse of ‘Europe not for us as Europe supports LGBT and this is not acceptable’. The Anti-Maidan movement is pro-Russian as well as for traditional heterosexuality and notions of masculinity and femininity. Our team conducted 28 interviews with Maidaners and Anti-Maidaners who are heterosexuals and homosexual people of different genders, under 50, all born in Kharkiv and all of them have relatives (or friends) in different parts of Ukraine and Russia. Methodologically it was quite difficult to recruit participants as many not open and refuse to speak on these issues. The team is currently working on papers incorporating our research findings and conclusions. One of the papers is being prepared for the special issue of Political Geography put together by WP 9 researchers. Another paper is being prepared for the bilingual book (in Ukrainian and Russian) that reflects KKNU team research results of the EUBorderscapes project and will be published in 2016 by Karazin Kharkiv National University Press.

**CISR**

The team conducted research on the Russian-Finnish border with the goal of reconstructing an understanding of the symbolic locations and meanings of the boundary between Russia and Finland as it is perceived by the inhabitants of St. Petersburg with a vast array of experience in travelling to Finland.

The starting point for the study was the awareness and articulation of specific experiences and being from the Russian North-West (and St. Petersburg in particular) predefined by its border location. Since the opening of the border in the 1990s, ‘Finland’ has become a part of everyday life in St.Petersburg, evidenced in the Finnish products sold in supermarkets or
semi-formal stands, Finnish services, or trips to Finland easily accessible thanks to the simplified visa regime introduced by Finland for the inhabitants of the North-West. While many people live without direct contact with Finland itself, there are also several groups for whom Finland has become an unalienable part of their lives as a place for shopping, recreation, source of income or inspiration, or even a second home.

To study how Finland and the boundary with Finland is perceived by contemporary St. Petersburgers, the team collected altogether 30 interviews, most of which (21) were with regular travellers to Finland. To provide for the multiplicity of border gazes, CISR also conducted three interviews with owners of cottages in Finland, two interviews with drivers transporting people to Finland, two interviews with entrepreneurs, an interview with a tour guide to Finland, and an expert interview on the transborder economy.

Research Task 3: Roma Communities and the Shifting borders of Europe

The Umea/UEL team has completed and submitted a special issue entitled ‘Racialized Bordering Discourses on European Roma’ for Ethnic and Racial Studies. The special issue incorporates seven papers and an introduction, written by the Umea/UEL team. Within the special issue is a comparative paper written by the Hungarian, Finnish and UK teams based on the media discourse analysis described below. In addition, the UEL team contributed a paper on the impact of media and policy discourses surrounding the removal of transitional controls for the A2 countries on Roma communities in Dover and Folkestone. The RKK team contributed to two further papers in the special issue, the first on the impact of a regeneration scheme on Roma communities in Budapest and the second an exploration of media discourse in Hungary and Canada from the late 1990s when Hungarian Roma sought asylum in Canada. The Finnish team also contributed a paper on how Roma from Eastern Europe who have migrated to Finland navigate a ‘limboscape’ where indirect bordering techniques limit their access to social rights and welfare provision.

3a: Political languages and Media Discourses:

The Finnish, Hungarian and Umea/UEL team have been carrying out a comparative study of the political language and media discourses relating to Roma. As part of this analysis, they’ve written together a comparative paper in which two papers – one centre-right and one centre-left in each country were examined, focusing on 3 significant case studies in each country during the last twenty years. In addition, they also compared the discourses of the media towards one common case study – the news story regarding the alleged kidnapping of ‘blond Maria’ by a Bulgarian Roma married couple.

RKK

Firstly, based on a press analysis, we examined the main issues of Roma representation in the Hungarian press, and secondly, based on research cooperation from the St Petersburg conference, we elaborated a comparative research with a Canadian researcher, revealing the different media representation of Hungarian Roma systematically migrating to Canada.

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1 The British team looked at The Sun and The Guardian. The Finnish team looked at Helsingin Sanomat and Iltalehti. The Hungarian team looked at Magyar Nemzet and Népszabadság
In this RT, the Hungarian Team’s task was to contribute to a comparative media discourse analysis between 1990 and 2013. Using the database of the Parliament Library (PL) we selected all the news items dealing with Roma in the period of 1990-2013. This yielded a total of 2256 items in MN and 2719 in NSZ. The PL database consists of the title of the news items and a short content description. Based on the meta-database we created on Roma we identified three peaks: 1997-98, 2001 and 2009. Afterwards we read through all the articles (in the printed version of the newspapers) in those years examining the features of the content behind the peaks. After the selection we are focusing on the three main peaks and using a guide on categories of analysis we read through the relevant articles and summarized the results for the comparative paper submitted to Ethnic and Racial Studies.

In the second part of this RT we were focusing on Hungarian Roma migration to Canada. In 1994, Canada removed its visa requirement for Hungarian and Czech nationals. Although this resulted in a major influx of Roma from the Czech Republic migrating to Canada and successfully claiming and receiving refugee status, there were few Hungarian nationals. In 1998 the number of Hungarian refugee claims increased and in 1999, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) decided to create a legal precedent – what they termed ‘a lead case’ – in order to provide guidance for similar cases. Due to trade negotiations and other bi-lateral agreements, in March 2008 Canada lifted its visa restriction against Hungarian nationals once again. As a result, the number of Hungarian refugee claims increased precipitously the following year. In order to reveal media representation about the Roma migration to Canada we chose to analyse the co-constructive relationship across various media outlets.

In order to analyse the predominant media discourse, we selected the largest newspapers in Hungary and Canada that also reflected political diversity. The daily newspapers selected for the Hungarian analysis were the Népszabadság (NSZ) from the left-centre and Magyar Nemzet (MN) from the right-centre. Given that Canada is a bilingual (French/English) country we strove to include the largest French language paper in addition to the most circulated English press. The Globe and Mail is considered the ‘newspaper of record’ covering the major news events in the country. Politically it would be considered centre-left. The National Post is typically considered a more centre-right paper supporting the Conservative government’s policies. Lastly we included the Toronto Star because it is widely read and so many of the articles regarding Roma focused on the arrival and housing of Roma in Toronto. Particular time frames were selected reflecting the waves of Romani emigration as well as significant political and policy changes in both countries: 1999-2001, 2008-2009 and 2011-2013. There were a total of 141 articles in six papers covering the particular issue of Roma from Hungary immigrating to Canada. We searched for themes, by creating ‘codes’ to analyse both Canadian and Hungarian papers. Some of these codes – such as ‘judicial’ or ‘The Economy’ – were clear going into the research; others emerged as we began coding such as ‘Visa’ and ‘Czech/Hungary comparison.’ Following Stake’s (2006) suggestion, we coded all documents for each country separately and then engaged in a cross analysis. We were looking for themes and patterns, including patterns of difference.

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2 Even it was about segregation or Roma art.
For the Roma-case, a UH researcher co-authored two publications that were submitted in October 2015 for *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. The researcher was instrumental in developing the methodology for the discourse analysis of newspaper articles undertaken by the UH, Umea/UEL and RKK teams.

3b: Roma Migrants at the Borders of Schengen:

The UEL team has found that the long-term settlement of Roma in Dover and Folkestone means that political and media discourses examined in (3a) relate to the lived experiences of Roma today. Roma informants in Dover and London have been interviewed in parallel with other local people interviewed as part of RT2 above. Discussions include their reflections on media discourses about Roma as well as other aspects of social and political bordering, regarding both local and migrant Roma. The UEL team has also explored the ways in which media and policy discourses surrounding the removal of labour market restrictions for A2 nationals in the UK at the beginning of 2014 led to increased racism towards Roma communities in Dover and Folkestone. This work was developed into an article and submitted as part of the WP9 Special Issue on ‘Racialized Bordering Discourses on European Roma’.

3c: Roma and the Bordering of Inner-City Budapest

At the beginning of the 20th century Józsefváros was home to artisans, musician Romas and poorer Jewish strata. In the 1950’s poorer unskilled workers from the impoverished countryside moved into the district in large numbers, while wealthier social groups departed causing deprivation all over the district. Nowadays the poorest part of the district, especially the “Magdolnanegyed”, characterized by the high proportion of Roma population, immigrants and poor Hungarians, mostly homeless people. These poorer parts of the district have a ghetto like subculture. Six years ago the local government along with the city council decided to change the living conditions in this area, within a “Social Regeneration Program”. Besides the architectural renovation of some houses, the program included education and assistance in finding employment opportunities for the unemployed, offered micro grants for new entrepreneurs, and came up with several further initiatives with the aim of developing the local community. As the result of this program a couple of culture and community centres emerged in this part of the city, mostly representing Roma initiatives. Our aim was to analyse the social effect of this development program. We investigated a specific case of bordering analysing the reimaging of an inner-city neighbourhood of Budapest. We were equally interested in the impacts of these place-making exercises which are informed not only by explicit economic and design agendas but also by implicit socio-ethnic objectives. The local Roma population is particularly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of urban renewal and we considered links between socio-cultural borderings of urban spaces and the top-down, often punitive regulation of access to those spaces.

Our research reconstructed developments in the Magdolna neighbourhood which during the early 2000s became the focus of Budapest’s – and East-Central Europe’s - first socially integrative urban renewal programme. This case study developed bordering perspectives that shed light on the rationales behind appropriating and demarcating urban spaces as means to promote political, ethno-territorial and economic agendas. Our research was based on
extensive fieldwork, including interviews with local stakeholders, as well as a literature review.

**Research Task 4: Everyday Bordering in the Metropolitan City**

Umea/UEL selected two contrasting but diverse boroughs in London, Tower Hamlets and Merton and focused on obtaining narrative and focus group interviews with individuals whose experiences of state bordering encounters differ because of their specific situations. The research timeframe coincided with the period leading up to the passing of the 2014 Immigration Act in October 2014 and the ongoing implementation of state bordering requirements which require citizens in their work and day to day life to increasingly adopt ‘border-guard’ roles. The team’s research therefore focused on the situated gazes of those required to act as border guards and of their subjects, for example marriage registrars of different ethnicities and those seeking to marry with varied immigration status, Border Force officials from different backgrounds and those whose shops and homes were raided as well as well-paid frequent flyers. The team attended 9 community meetings, carried out 4 focus groups and 43 interviews mainly in two London boroughs. The 34 formal narrative interviews and 9 informal interviews were with women and men from a range of backgrounds and ages. In addition 9 individuals were interviewed and one focus group discussion conducted as part of the Everyday Borders film produced by the team (see section on publications below). The significant theme emerging from the early analysis is of the complex ways processes of everyday bordering impact negatively on the existing conviviality of the multicultural metropolitan city, affecting the lives of diverse citizens and non-citizens in different ways.

**CISR** explored eight migrant cases (four men and four women) from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, through a sequence of interviews and conversations with each of them taken throughout the year. In addition, we used the method of ‘going along’ with the aim of revealing the relationships of a migrant with the city: to reconstruct their habitual routes, important places and perceptions of these places amongst our interlocutors. The methods of drawing mental maps and analyzing photo archives of migrants were also used.

Locals: ten interviews with local inhabitants (established dwellers of St. Petersburg), both ‘lay people’ and ‘neighborhood practitioners’ (for instance, the staff of communal services dealing with migrants as employees in their daily life) on their experiences of interacting with migrants and their reflections on transformation of the city space and everyday life due to the growth in migrant numbers. We also conducted 20 interviews with state migration officials.

The CISR team carried out a case study of seven NGOs (interviews with two representatives and two NGO clients in each case, observation and ethnographic description of communication with clients). They also engaged in non-participant observations and ethnographic fieldwork in ‘migrants’ places across the city. The team are currently working on a paper on bordering in the city embracing our research findings and conclusions. The paper is being prepared for the special issue of Political Geography put together by WP 9 researchers.
WP 10 (Border-Crossings and Cultural Production)

General Goals and Philosophy

Work package 10 in the EUBORDERSCAPES project relates “cultural production” and artistic endeavour to the social construction of borders. It has, within various local and transnational perspectives, explored different literary and artistic examples of how culturally produced representations have contributed to socio-political interpretations of state borders, as well as challenged official meanings, symbolisms and functions attached to state borders. WP10 has analysed cultural and literary works in ways that frame national and European border issues (e.g. citizenship, cultural identities, inclusion/exclusion, migration, cooperation across borders) and contextualize them in terms of historical and changing contemporary relationships. More specifically, WP10 has demonstrated how artistic expression and the media address borders and border crossings (e.g. concerning migrants and people living at borders) and their impact for everyday life in Europe (e.g. in terms of cultural tensions and cultural hybridization).

WP10 is most clearly linked to WP9 (Intersectionality), but also has strong connections to WP5 (African-European Borderscapes). It also builds on research within separate research projects such as Border Aesthetics and antiAtlas des frontières. WP10 has opened a humanities perspective that is not merely supplementary to social science approaches and that promotes a more comprehensive understanding of the role of cultural production as a bordering practice.

Major research questions addressed throughout have been: Which role does artistic expression have in the bordering process, in specific borderscapes and in ongoing transformations of border concepts and European border imaginaries? Are there differences and connections between the different types of artistic expression (informal/formal, fictional/real, mimetic/musical/performative/textual) in their relationship to the conceptualization of borders? What is the role of artistic expression in different specific social contexts: transborder spaces, migrant communities, urbanscapes, etc.? Where are the locations for (re)presenting the border? What narratives do border-crossings produce, what border-crossings do narratives perform? How does artistic expression perform and interrogate external national borders, European/EU/EA borders, internal borders and related concepts of hybridity, tension, third space, etc.? Do these cultural productions confirm or challenge border policies, such as the expansion of migration control? What alternative cultural-aesthetic strategies might be used for research and visualize borders and create new scenarios?

WP10 was divided into 4 research tasks. Our object in Research Task 1: Culture and Conceptual Change has been to locate questions of the contribution of artistic and cultural production to bordering processes within a wider broderscape, through reviews of existing literature and research, structuring WP10 with respect to its main objectives. In Research Task 2: Art and the Re-Inscriptions of Borders as Symbols and Landscapes, we have studied voluntary and more formal modes of spatial inscription and landscape interventions signifying renewed relationships to “others”. We have looked at borders through the artistic production that they arouse, and the way in which it subverts the violence imposed on landscape by ruling powers. Political landscapes can be as much transformed as represented in “artscape”
and “borderscapes”. Anthropological questioning of practices, imaginaries and narratives of the border has strengthened our understanding of “personal territorialities” in borderlands affected by artistic presentations of borders. Our departure point in Research task 3: Cultural Borders of Europe: “Bordering” and “Re-Bordering” Europe through Fictional Narratives: The Case of Immigrant “Others” was that Europeanness has often been understood as a unified narrative supported by discourses of a borderless Europe, while novels give testimony to Europeanness being more changing, drifting, and heterogeneous. We have focussed on the representation and bordering of Europe in published narratives (fictional-autobiographical) by “immigrant Others” in Europe, opening up new perspectives for understanding alternative experiences and imaginations of European borders rooted in different historical layers and narratives. In Research Task 4: Synthesis we have synthesized the Research Tasks by addressing central questions and formulating the main insights and practical consequences of our results.

The main methods of WP10 have been qualitative, combining media analysis (frame/discourse/content) with cultural analysis (meaning/representation/performativity). Archival documentation has been framed around central research questions: archival access through archives, libraries, newspapers and the web to books, artworks, experimental documentary films, performances, graffiti, photographs, music, historical documents, media response (interviews, debates, blogs, etc.), etc. Field work has used participant observation (festivals and activist meetings), photography/video, narrative and semi-structured interviews (professional and “spontaneous” artists, cultural actors and consumers), fields notes, travel diaries, surveys recording the reactions of people on the street/at events to different artistic expressions, etc. Cultural analysis has approached literary, artistic, cinematic and informal works as performative representations, using literary and other forms of aesthetic analysis (textual/visual narratology, rhetoric etc), content analysis, border poetics analysis, interpretation of meaning and intended reception. Contextual analysis of actants has allowed us to see them as embedded in social and historical fields. Discourse analysis has helped us connect meanings in artistic expression with wider fields of discursive value. Comparative analysis has been offset with contrapunctual examples in order to avoid reductionism and methodological essentialism. We have organized participative events with artists in order to test, in situ, border performances.

The different contexts, the transdisciplinarity of the researchers involved and the different quantities of work time available have necessitated variations on the methods used in each case study, encouraging a contrapuntal rather than a strictly comparative approach. Research in WP10 has been disseminated through academic articles, conference papers and book publications, along with film showings, public exhibitions, blog posts (at the WP10 blog http://bordercult.hypotheses.org), newsletter contributions, lectures, newspaper articles, etc. in the public sphere. Collaborative artSci research has been used to bring academic research and public dissemination into dialogue.

2. Overall progress of the RTs from project start (2 pages per RT)
In the following, all references are to the list of dissemination (also to conference papers where indicated). References to research by researchers outside the WP10 team may be found in the referenced publications.
Research Task 1: Culture and Conceptual Change

WP10 has to a large degree grown out of ongoing work on border aesthetics focusing on literature, cinema and art within a more general cultural context. Central to this research has been the enormous growth in the amount of these forms cultural production thematizing borders during the last decade, including novels, short stories, poetry, photography, street art, installations, performances, site-specific art, documentaries, fiction films, etc.

Research feeding in to WP10, partly from related research projects, has resulted into a line of connected insights:

- In a general fashion, appreciation for the role of cultural production in bordering processes and in the borderscape has increased (State of the Debate Report I; Amilhat Szary and dell’Agnese 2015; Schimanski 2015a; Brambilla 2014b, 2015d); “cultural production and borders have developed a more-than-representational relationship” (Amilhat Szary and dell’Agnese 2015).
- On a theoretical level have become aware of the necessity of an aesthetic (in the sense of ”sensible”) component in any act of bordering: a border must be perceived in order to function as a border (State of the Debate Report I; Schimanski 2015a; Schimanski and Wolfe 2013; Wolfe 2014a).
- Cultural production is often a way to negotiate the border, connecting it through aesthetic categories (fiction, realism, the fantastic, the grotesque, the sublime, etc.) to ethical, political and other values (Schimanski 2015a, 2015b; Schimanski and Wolfe 2013).
- Border-crossings produce border narratives and border figures (images or rhetorical figures) which can be analyzed with the help of models from border poetics (Schimanski 2015b; Schimanski and Wolfe paper 2013; Wolfe and Rosello 2017).
- Cultural production in the form of onsite art, festivals etc. can also transform the border and the borderland into spectacles and tourist attractions (State of the Debate Report I; Schimanski 2015a).
- As we began the project, it was suggested that more research was needed on the idea of the ”creative” border (State of the Debate Report I; Amilhat Szary 2014b).
- Artworks, literature and cinema can also be analyzed for their spatial relationships to the border and their ambivalent (hegemonic and counter-hegemonic) contribution to b/ordering within a borderscape (Amilhat Szary 2014; Brambilla 2014d; Mekdjian 2014; Schimanski and Wolfe 2013).
- Underlying the aesthetic dimension of bordering, which cultural production is heavily involved in, are questions about cognitive in/visibility which are central to the inclusion and exclusion of border subjects (Pötzsch 2015a; Brambilla and Pötzsch 2017) in the public sphere (Brambilla 2014d) and the border control technologies which Pötzsch (2015b) has dubbed the ”iBorder”; similar questions may be raised about other media than the visual, e.g. the textual and the aural (Amilhat Szary and dell’Agnese 2015).
- Cultural production can making visible subjective experience central to everyday bordering and to border-crossing practices (such as those of migrants), it can be used as a instrument for cross-border cooperation (Schimanski 2015a), and it can provide a key to understanding the imaginary dimension of peripheries as
Key to these new approaches to borders and cultural production have been 1. the nearing of a more philosophical/critical theory/cultural studies tradition (border theory), as it undergoes a cultural turn, to the tradition within political geography/social studies (border studies), as it undergoes a spatial turn, 2. the development of a processual, plural and networklike understanding of borders through the concepts of bordering, b/ordering, de/rebordering, multidimensionality, borderscapes and borderscaping (Amilhat Szary and dell’Agne 2015; Brambilla 2014d; Schimanski 2015a; Wolfe 2014a), and 3. Rancière’s description of the political as a partition/sharing where the aesthetic (in the meaning ”to be sensed”) is central (“partage du sensible”). These and related considerations were not only important because they constituted the conceptual background for WP10 work, but also suggested the performative and participatory methods (Brambilla 2014d) parts of our research set out to make use of.

The results of research task 1 have been disseminated through the referenced texts, contributions to special issues on “The Aesthetics of Border Demarcation” (Amilhat Szary 2015c), and contributions to the article anthologies Borderscaping: Imaginations and Practices of Border Making (Brambilla et al. 2015b) and Border Aesthetics (Wolfe and Schimanski, 2017).

**RT2: Art and the Re-Inscriptions of Borders as Symbols and Landscapes**

The Grenoble borderscape from the point of view of its artistic expression. CNRS-PACTE has completed Grenoble area participatory artistic mapping workshops (Crossing Maps/Cartographies Traverses) with paperless migrants, with multiple outcomes in terms of both academic and public dissemination. Through work with paperless migrants om mapping narratives in a counter-cartographic mode, questions have been raised about the narratives asylum-seekers are required to give to officials, and whether research and art using such narratives reduplicates the symbolic violence of migration control, or potentially provides alternative performativities (Mekdjian 2015a, 2016; Mekdjian and Amilhat Szary paper 2015b). The artworks have been exhibited in various venues, include exhibitions arranged by with the antiAtlas de frontières artsci project, in which CNRS-PACTE has been an active participant. A film, Out of the Border Box, is under production by workshop participant and migrant Gladeema Nasruddin. New urban mapping workshops are planned with prostitute asylum-seekers.

**Mediterranean Euro-African Borderscapes.** UNIBG has completed fieldwork and data collection on exhibitions and festivals on Lampedusa, with preliminary articles already published (Brambilla 2014a, 2015c); on school children in Mazara de Vallo and their perceptions of the Mediterranean border; and partly thematizing the latter, a film for WP 5 in collaboration with WP10. The fieldwork on Lampedusa concerned the LampedusaInFestival 2013 and the Museum of Migration, both initiated by the Askavusa association, with more fieldwork taking place in 2014. Archival work especially focussing on migrants’ participatory videos followed. Crucial changes took place during the project period, with the number of actors within the field of cultural production took place during the project period, with conflicts central to question of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic borderscapes arising as
Askavusa perceived their initiatives were being institutionalized and created a counter-initiative, Porto M. UNIBG also created relationships with other actors connected with Lampedusa, including the collective “Le Mamme di Lampedusa”, and carried out WP10-based workshop activities with children of the island, mapping their border imaginaries and developing ideas on “Lampedusa – a border island how it is and how the children of the island would like it to be...”. The film “Houdoud al bahr | The Mediterranean Frontiers. Mazara - Mahdia”, directed by UNIBG researcher Chiara Brambilla, has been made as a deliverable for WP5 in close connection to conceptual and methodological reflection in WP 10 (see RT1), and shown in various academic and non-academic spaces, including the LampedusaInFestival 2015; using experimental strategies of disorientation, this film highlights the common borderscape of two port communities on each their side of the Mediterranean.

**Medialization of Spanish-Moroccan Borders through Documentary Films.** UAB has completed an extensive database of documentary films across the Moroccan-Spanish borderscape from the last two decades, content analysis of six selected films, fieldwork based on ethnographic methods such as participant observation in the highly active film festival scene and social-activist-cultural encounters, field notes, travel diaries, photographs, and informal conversations and interviews with artists, and taken part in the Cineforum in the Spanish border enclave in Ceuta, which turned into a documentary film laboratory/workshop resulting in a video made by UAB together with migrants in Ceuta. The documentaries were analysed for the way in which they negotiate the border and its regimes of identity and mobility/control through its aesthetic and political dimensions, constantly returning to the visual icons of border control, but also borderscaping through experimental and transgressive use of the audiovisual media (Espiñeira, Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas paper 2014). The collaborative film directed by UAB researcher Keina Espiñeira is being shown in a long version at academic symposia, *The Colour of the Sea: A Filmic Border Experience in Ceuta*, and in a short version, *Tout le monde aime le bord de la mer*, at film festivals in Europe, Africa and the US. The latter has been nominated for the European Short Films Awards. As a lyrical fiction film scripted and acted by migrants, it strikingly shows the potential of creative, resistant (it does not show any spectacular images of border control), disruptive and performative collaboration between researchers and migrants taking on artistic roles while situated in a limboescape between EU thresholds in Ceuta. In connected work connected with WP5, UEF has published the results of research on invisibilization practices on the European peninsula of Punta Tarifa (Ferrer-Gallardo, Albet-Mas and Espiñeira 2015a, b; Ferrer-Gallardo and Espiñeira 2015).

**The Israel-Palestine-Lebanese Borderscapes.** CNRS-PACTE have carried out studies of artist relationships with Palestinian-Israeli borders focusing on artworks and itineraries, showing how border art questions the viscosity of border-crossing (Amilhat Szary 2013). BGU (WP 7 in cooperation with WP10) has produced and shown a research film shown at various conferences and available on youtube, *The Invisible Enemy Across the Wall: Israeli and Palestinian Children’s Perspective of the “Other”* (dir. Renen Yezerski). This film focused how the sense and perceptions of threat and fear emanating from the other side are both a result of, and feed into, an ongoing situation of conflict, institutional socialization and daily practices lacking in physical access to the other side, and suggested routes to greater understanding. Interviews with Israeli and Palestinian initiatives and analysis of childrens’ drawings from both sides of the separation fence has been carried out. Within the framework
of CNRS-PACTE contribution to the WP, a study has been carried out of the Hizbullah Memorial Museum in southern Lebanon, a site which inscribes politics, aesthetics, memory, resistance and tourism in a wider borderscape using location, architecture and narratives (Meier 2015a).

**Border Art in the Barents Region.** UITs fieldwork at the “X-Border Art” event in Rovaniemi, Finland, has lead to an article investigating the role of artworks in processes of bordering in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, involving cross-border locations and ambivalence between on the one hand critical defamiliarization of borders and on the other exclusion and commodification (Pötzsch 2015a). UIT has also developed work stemming from the *Border Aesthetics* project on art and literature in the Russian-Norwegian borderscape, focusing on a similar ambivalence within a postmodernist framework (Schimanski 2015a).

**Borders and Bordering in Contemporary Art in the Russian North-West Border regions.** CISR has been making an overview of reflections on borders and bordering in the realm of contemporary art in St. Petersburg and more broadly in the Russian North-West, in the context of the strong ties and cooperation this region has developed during the last twenty years in the sphere of art and culture with partners from Scandinavia, and of ongoing changes to those relationships. In the St. Petersburg art scene, work focussing on migration has dissappeared from the work of artists, with the boundary between Us and (familiar, post-Soviet) Others losing its sharpness in face of other challenges. The theme of migrants, borders, and border crossings has however returned in an updated and globalized version in an international exhibition at the Museum of Street Art. Together with other independent and critical activities in Russia, contemporary art, has become a very risky enterprise with blurred economic prospects as the symbolic border between “tradition” and “modernity”, and its intertwining with geopolitical borders, has come to dominate the Russian public sphere. CISR has also planned an article based on analysis of three dramatic artworks (a play, a horror movie and an extensive art video) on Russian-Finnish and Russian-Norwegian cross-borderings. UIT has done related research on the cultural production of the borders of “New Russia” on the internet in response responding to ongoing bordering processes in Russia and the Ukraine (Ristolainen papers 2015a, b).

**The Immigrant ‘Other’ and Artistic Expression: (de-)bordering via festivals and social activism in Finland.** In 2013 UEF did field work (deep semi-structured interviews) on the *World Village Festival*, an multicultural arts festival focusing on multiculturalism and transnational development and sustainability held every year in Helsinki. The research focused on bordering processes and liminalities among cultural performers and organizers (Németh papers 2013, 2015). UEF also undertook research on immigrant writers in Finland within a new initiative organizing debates, workshops and poetry performances at already existing festivals, *Sivuvalo/Sidelight – Is this Finnish Literature?*, with a focus on community-building and border-crossing as writers writing in other languages engage in translation and interact with the Finnish public sphere (cf. RT3). Individual interviews, group discussions and festival visits were carried out in 2013-2014 (Németh paper 2014). More specific inquiry in both cases was directed towards the ways in which artistic expression can actually and potentially reduce perceptual barriers, as well as situations when it may in fact re-enforce existing mental boundaries. An academic paper, questioning whether art really is a
simple and universal solution for decreasing barriers or even, eliminating borders, and if so, how the can entailed processes be explained, is under review.

**Research task 3: Cultural Borders of Europe: “Bordering” and “Re-Bordering” Europe through Fictional Narratives: The Case of Immigrant “Others”**

**Immigrant ‘Others’ at the Borders: UK, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish immigrant literature.** UIT and UEF have completed textual analyses of two corpuses of published immigrant narratives, one from Norway/Sweden/Finland and the other on the UK, focusing on changing border concepts and specific themes such as culinary bordering, musical bordering, access to border romances, metaphors for the border and reversed/repeated border-crossings. The focus has been on how historical processes and configurations of migration have been regulated by specific border concepts and regimes (i.e. a historical shift from imperial to post-/neocolonial border concepts). Literary narratives mirror and imagine 1) metropolitan contexts of immigration which have created new textual, sonic, and culinary borderscapes along with diasporic and transethnic communities set in their own urban bordering processes, 2) disseminated (spatially distributed) crossings and labyrinthal journeys back and forth across major geopolitical borders, and 3) inter-generational boundaries or symbolic borders connected in different ways to cultural and territorial borders. The research has partly been academically published, disseminated publicly, and will be the basis for masters courses at UIT.

The British corpus has provided grounds for arguments around especially culinary and sonic borderscapes, transitional ethnic public spheres and labyrinthal migrant journeys. "Ethnic" food is not just a marker of nostalgia, a an umbilical border object; representation of food in contemporary culinary memoirs also negotiates cultural identity in transnational spaces (Nyman 2016). The central role given to home, family, and the past in such texts is an attempt to address the reconstruction of the migrant’s self in the context of cultural contact and border crossings challenging the maintenance of tradition. Migrant texts and communities of writers both worry the nation by focusing on the border crossings and passage figures (famously, the “middle passage” of historical slavery) and building transitional public spheres bordering the British public sphere (Wolfe paper 2015a).

The Norwegian and Swedish corpus investigated by UIT consists of published narratives (fictional and autobiographical) by 2nd and ”1.5” generation immigrants who have access to written language. They often feature narratives of liberation or escape from traumatic situations, increased mobility and return border-crossings (Schimanski papers 2013a, 2014c). The most prominent Swedish writers have grown up in crosscultural (Swedish-African) families in Sweden (Schimanski paper 2014b). A common motif, also in the Finnish corpus investigated by UEF, is cross-border romances as part of a disseminated or labyrinthal border crossings into a host culture, sometimes creating intergenerational conflict across internal borders in migration communities or privileging host community identities (Nyman paper 2014; Schimanski papers 2014c, 2016b, d). Recent examples address public concerns such as the migrant boat crisis and making visible other migrants, without spectacularizing them; Amalie’s use of glass as dominant border figure in her 2004 autobiographical narrative sequel introduces a critique of self-representation as a form of self-surveillance (Schimanski paper 2016a).
From Jazz to DJs: Dissolving Performed Boundaries in Black Britain, 1950s-2000s. UEF and UIT have collaborated on analysis of migrant texts on music and archival work in London and Oxford on the Windrush Generation, the first generation of Caribbean work migrants to the UK in the 1950s. In texts focusing on sonic borderscapes, music and other sounds organize space and generate diverse borderscapes where the interaction between the host and the migrant community is newly structured through sound, music, and radio (Nyman papers 2015, 2016; Wolfe paper 2016a). The transformative, fluid force of borderscapes produced through music or food etc. can provide transitional migrant or racialized public spheres in which migrants become “visible” to each other and to host populations (Nyman paper 2015; Wolfe papers 2015b, 2016a). The medium itself can produce border figures, for example in the focus on the discontinuous style of jazz music (Wolfe papers 2015b, 2016a).

Representations of Crossings. Both UEF and UIT have also been doing analyses of how migrant border-crossing are represented in literary texts, with these texts becoming site of exploring new border concepts through various border figures. Migrant journeys become the basis of counterhegemonic texts which relocate the border and transforms European nation states into borderscapes where racial and national differences reconstruct the allegedly pure identities of the nation-states through the transnational identity of the new migrant (Nyman 2015b). The texts emphasize the transformation of identity as an experience generated by the crossing (ibid.), and it is clear that crossings have become more complex, reversed and repeated, labyrinthal and disseminated than one has been used to in stereotypical stories of work migrant coming to Europe in a period before cheap air travel (Nyman 2015; Schimanski paper 2013a; Wolfe paper 2013d). The border becomes a borderscape.

Border figures (narrative configurations of border crossings on different levels and rhetorical imagery) have been used to map different border concepts (Schimanski papers 2013a, 2014c), creating a repertoire (Schimanski paper 2014b) of figures that are ascribed often ambivalent political and ethical values (Schimanski and Wolfe 2013), and that are often set in dystopic/gothic and imagine utopian/idyllic landscapes (Schimanski paper 2014d). Glass walls are used to convey the concept of invisible cultural borders; umbilical border objects migrants and their children to cultural memories of originary cultures and border-crossings, or to postcolonial traumas and melancholia; border-crossings are connected with disorientation or panic, with coming of age, and with captivity or its opposite, in images of flying (Schimanski 2016, papers 2013a, d, 2014b, 2015b, 2016b, c; Wolfe 2016, paper 2016a). The symbolic borders between originary and host cultures are often confused through defamiliarizing chiastic or oxymoronic reversals/repetitions of stereotypes across topographical borders, or through an erasing, borderless whiteness (Schimanski papers 2014b, 2016b). Crossings explicitly read against colonial and postcolonial histories (cf. WP5) can emphasize the creative potentials in resistant borderscapes (Nyman 2015b; Schimanski paper 2016c).

 Whereas the texts present a complex variety of border figures, public reception (reviews and newspaper notices) reveals a more reductive repertoire (Schimanski paper 2015d), in line with hypothesized reader motivations: aesthetic, ethnographic, political, and therapeutic (Schimanski paper 2013a). Published migrant narratives in Norwegian and Swedish are explicitly in dialogue with such motivations, often figuring becoming an author/writer as the
last stage of migration seen as a disseminated border crossing (Schimanski paper 2016a), with the writing of the book itself often figuring in the narrative as a performative act, completing a series of remedializations (Schimanski papers 2014a, 2016b). Such border figures highlight the transition from private experience, often of everyday bordering (cf. WP9) to public publication, contributing to a public social imaginary, as central to this cultural production (Schimanski papers 2013a, 2014c).

**Research Task 4: Synthesis**

WP10 has been active in producing this synthesis of WP results for the final report, also in terms of practical consequences. Thematic panels and round tables at the last three project conferences in November 2015, January 2016 and May 2016 have helped bring together the results, and definite themes have crystallized out of the WP10 research, detailed below. Group meetings in November and January, as well as a dialogue between UNIBG and UIT on the WP10 blog, have helped formulate policy proposals further developed as the WP10 leadership arranged a meeting of the different WP leaders across the EUBORDERSCAPES project in Oslo in March 2016. WP10 has also put together a set of responses to the request by WP13 for input to their cross-sectional analysis. Various articles of a more conceptual nature developed as the work of WP10 has progressed (Amilhat Szary 2015a, b; Amilhat Szary et al. 2014; Brambilla 2016a, b; Brambilla et al. 2015) have highlighted common theoretical concerns.

3. **Synthesis of the overall results (3-5 pages)**

The different teams contributing to WP10 have 1) together developed a **conceptual framework** for approaching cultural production related to bordering processes, building on related work in border poetics, border aesthetics, migration studies, postcolonial theory and critical border studies.

They have 2) carried out **field work** in the cultural production field in specific border locations, and undertaken cultural analyses of literary works, artistic productions, documentary films, festivals, and exhibitions, using a previously formulated empirical template and taking into account variables including geographical distribution, historical/contemporary contexts, border-crossers/resident populations, and institutional/popular registers.

Besides traditional qualitative analyses within a social science framework, researchers within WP10 have 3) used literary hermeneutics and analysis, combined humanities and social science approaches, and contributed to additional **methodological development** by employing innovative techniques such as participatory mapping of geographical and conceptual spaces (together with school children and illegal migrants), performative and participatory filmmaking (together with migrants), and artSci collaboration (with researchers and migrants collaborating on artistic maps and metafictional cinema). WP10 researchers have also engaged actively with different publics in multidirectional forms of research dissemination.

Through this empirical, interpretative and performative work, WP10 researchers have 4) **identified evolving border concepts** related to historical developments in Europe and globally concerning geopolitical neighbourhoods, cross-border cooperation and not least migration. WP10 researcher have developed on partly established and emerging concepts of bordering,
b/ordering, de-/rebordering, border zones, mobile borders, in/sensible borders, public borders and borderscapes, using theory in combination with the identification of border figurations in order to locate border discourses in the discourses of cultural production.

Part of the aims of our research in WP10 and indeed EUBORDERSCAPES has been to examine how border concepts have been shifting. The RT3 work on migration literature in Scandinavia and Great Britain has taken as its departure-point large-scale geopolitical borders, i.e. the borders between Europe and Asia, Europe and Africa and Europe and the Caribbean, and to see 1) how those borders have been configured through migrant-border crossings from the 1950s to the present day and 2) how the same borders are connected to many different smaller-scale topographical (national, local, architectural, bodily, etc), symbolic (cultural, gendered, racialized, etc.), temporal, epistemological and medial borders (mainly textual in our case).

WP10 work in more conflictual contexts, such as in Israel/Palestine, have aimed to understand the significance of borders as a barrier to communication and knowledge, even in an era of cyberspace and internet dissemination of knowledge. Border art in cross-border regions such as the Barents Region may be used as a tool in international relations policy, creating people-to-people contact across borders, connecting borders rather than centres. Border art runs the risk of alienating local populations in border regions if it appears as being part of a removed cosmopolitan art world, with artists being “helicoptered in” from metropolitan centres for local site-specific projects. Other forms of cultural production, such as competitions for irridentist anthems in Russia and the Ukraine, can actively contribute to creating conflictual borders. Border art can often provide frameworks for cross-border cooperation, using the instruments of artist mobility, collaborative art, biennales, and cultural festivals. Border art, literature and film can emphasize commonalities which may contribute to cross-border cooperation.

Reading a novel or seeing a photo of an artwork in the media are in themselves everyday border-crossings (cf. WP9) on the level of medial borders; also, novels and artworks can also engage (or allow people to engage) with borders on a geopolitical level, becoming parts of a borderscape. Daily experiences of border-crossing and bordering are thus negotiated on a continual basis through the widespread reading of literary narratives and the consumption of other art works. Literary and testimonial narratives provide both indirect and complex representations of daily experiences of borders, utilizing narrative perspectives and rhetorical figures well-adapted to making sensible subjectivies and counter-hegemonic disourses. They cross the borders between the private or domestic and the public or political. On a basic level of narrative and visual construction, biographies, literature and art utilize various border figures (metaphors, topoi, etc.) to conceptualize borders in many different ways, addressing the complexity of bordering on an everyday level. Narratives and images can also express everyday utopian and dystopian imaginations.

The construction of borders in diverse narratives examined emphasizes the problems linked with border crossings. Rather than seeing them as simple moments of entering security, the migrant experience extends the borderscape and its discursive and ideological baggage to the urban and metropolitan centres where various ethnic enclaves and other spaces are formed. While these may appear problematic from the perspective of dominant culture and conflict with their values and aims, they may offer moments and spaces of relative security to the
migrants inhabiting these spaces. We have examined them as producing alternative public spheres and ways of encountering the problem of the border. Narratives and images, for example in the autobiographical texts examined, locate border-related phenomena through historical and personal memory, often using the story of the ethnic subject as a form of producing cultural memory that distinguishes the migrant from the host. While also representational, the narrative construction of borders generates new tropes and genres that contribute to ways of approaching and coming to terms with borders and engaging in resistant borderscaping.

Border narratives may address directly migration to Europe and the problem of encountering the policed and patrolled border. These are often approached from the perspective of the unwelcome border crosser and offer an alternative reading to Eurocentred perceptions of migrants at the border, showing how border crossers have individual reasons and narratives that lead them to this situation. Literature, film, comics, graffiti and art are part of the public sphere, but can provide alternatives to more standard mediated narratives of border-crossing and bordering. Especially more immediately accessible forms of art can however be co-opted into a simplified medial narrative.

Here the role of literary and cinematic representation of diverse border-induced phenomena should be noted: as borders frame lives in nation-states, their role in representations can be approached from within or from beyond the border, urging us to define borders as dynamic sites that can be fully understood in only transnational contexts. The possibility of countering processes of othering is often linked to such moments of transgression and problematizing one-sided ideas of borders. In some cases, the constructed symbolic borders between femininities and masculinities can intersect with cultural borders and with geopolitical borders. This becomes especially visible in narratives of immigrant LGBT resistance to established norms in host and diasporic communities and in narratives of inter-generational conflict focusing on patriarchal honour cultures, arranged marriages, FGM or cross-cultural families.

In our case studies migration, citizenship, and diaspora are closely linked with the post-traditional borders. Our work shows how it generates new border spaces in locations that may have been formerly monocultural. In this sense the border travels with the migrants as categories such as ethnicity and race – and how they are performed in various encounters – remain visible and erect further borders in e.g. metropolitan spaces. In addition to focussing on metropolitan borderings of diasporic urban spaces, literary migration narratives increasingly address the physical crossing of geopolitical borders, pre-migration situations in the “South”, border-crossings on return journeys to the “South”, and processes of cultural integration, which include the crossing into the public sphere (often precisely through writing).

The major ongoing social shift in modernity has been one of democratization, in which peoples have been given voice, people made visible and social hierarchies levelled. This has caused major political shifts such as nation-building and cultural shifts such as the creation of mass-market cultural production. In a postmodern, postcolonial, postnational and postsoviet era we have seen a tendency to fragmentation and hybridization of cultural canons, nations, grand narratives, ideologies, materialities, identities etc., simultaneous with (and perhaps
dialectically connected to) a paradoxical resurgence of social differences and hierarchical control. These changes are clearly manifested in public discourses on multi-culturalism, neo-liberalism, migrant crises, electronic surveillance, sub-cultures, epidemics, social media, terrorism, cheap travel, climate change, etc. In line with these shifts, borders have shifted away from the edges of clearly-defined national territories, been externalized or internalized, become both erased and spectacularized in the form of walls and security fences, etc. The academic response has been to develop concepts of borders such as bordering and borderscapes which are more distributed, flexible and aware of the connections between borders on many different levels and scales. The challenge is to remain aware of the material violence and injustice present in many border situations and to create analytical tools which are resistant to being pre-opted in order to continue this violence and injustice.

Evidence of conceptual and theoretical development

Work within WP10 has not only confirmed the active role of cultural production in bordering processes (not just providing a representation of such processes), but also shown the specific values in its potential to:

- transform borders into creative spaces,
- build counterhegemonic borderscapes in which other subjects are given visibility,
- mediate between private experiences of borders and the public imaginaries,
- form practices and norms through the political/aesthetic nexus,
- experimentally develop new border concepts through border figures, and
- “despectacularize” political and medial narratives of border “crises” by introducing new levels of discourse to the public sphere.

Perhaps most strikingly, WP10 has brought attention to:

- the role of cultural production as a potentially defamiliarizing level of discourse in the public sphere, with the crossing between private and public often figuring as an element in geopolitical border-crossings;
- in extension of this, the creative and inclusive potentials of collaboration between performative cultural production and research;
- but also, a need to be aware of the ethical paradoxes and political ambivalences of border culture production, which can contribute to hegemonic as well as counterhegemonic borderscaping.

More specifically, WP10 has mapped a wide array of border figures accessible in art, film and literature, forms which in themselves sometimes confirm and sometime contribute new border concepts, including:

- border-crossings as distributed narratives of multiple border-crossings on different levels (the disseminated border),
- borders as spaces of captivity, disorientation, limbo and panic,
- border-crossing as a form of oxymoronic escape from borders,
- borders as potential perceptual barriers,
borders as places of negotiation between tradition and modernity,
- borderscape as potentially including crossing points into the public sphere through processes of translation and personal development,
- sonic and culinary borderscapes,
- borderscapes as labyrinthal locations of border-crossing and criss-crossing,
- borders as fluid and discontinuous, and
- borderscapes as memoryscapes, traumascapes, gothic dystopias and utopian idylls.

WP10 has thus developed an understanding of the borderscape as plurivocal and involving multi-agental: both top-down and bottom-up; both human/institutional and material/discursive. Most of these actors are regulated by the way public spheres are formed, and a specific focus in our research has been on the interaction between transnational, national, and minority public spheres. The material also makes clear that top-down discourses can be subverted into bottom-up discourses, while bottom-up discourses can be preopted and appropriated for top-down discourses.

Future paths

1) “Despectacularize” and “dereduce” narratives of border crises presented in the media by journalists and politicians by uncovering the historical depth, multilayered complexity and creative potential of borders. Research on cultural production helps make visible an extended borderscape over the long term, beyond such immediate issues as the current refugee crisis in Europe. There is an important role to play for “slow media” such as literature and research to bring more longue durée, historical, genealogical and wide-ranging narratives into the public sphere. Research and cultural production within the public sphere can help bring into play past experiences of migration, and also foster an awareness that migration is a deep process spanning extended geographical processes and often several generations of time, an awareness which will help ensure the sustainability of border-crossing. In border conflict crises, research on cultural production may be instrumental in breaking down perceptual barriers. Border policies could be finally enhanced only by grasping and critically addressing the multilevel complexity of the border-migration nexus – from the geopolitical level to the level of social practices and cultural productions. Research must adopt a both kaleidoscopic and double gaze on contemporary borders, a gaze conveying complementary and dialogical perspectives, grasping the interaction between the “big stories” of political visions of borders and the “small stories” everyday socio-cultural border practices, as well as social representations and artistic border imaginaries. Research can help us move beyond the “fabricated” rhetoric of crisis by rethinking borders as spaces of creativity, spaces of possibilities for new political agencies and subjectivities. Art, literature and research can work together in fostering despectacularization as a form of creative visibilization.

2) Develop creative, collaborative and ethical ways of making experiences of border-crossing accessible in the public sphere. Individual experiences of border-crossing must be made visible, audible and tangible in order to strengthen political life and a democratic public sphere. Such sensibilization needs to involve other subjects, including bureaucrats, police, borderland inhabitants, NGO workers, host populations, constituencies, etc: you do not have to be a border-crooser to experience border-crossing. The close interweaving of border imaginaries with aesthetic activity has political implications, with aesthetic language
articulating and transforming spatial imaginaries, which in turn translate into beliefs, rules, policies, and practices. Create new ways of thinking the bordering of public spheres delinked from national identities, acknowledging the role of transitional public spheres connected to minorities and diasporas. Adopt dialogical approaches to bordering, using bottom-up perspectives so as to avoid simply projecting and replying European values. Investigate how aesthetic semi-autonomy can ensure that parts of the public sphere remain in which new borderscapes can be produced on an imaginative basis. Formulate an ethics of representation (avoiding spectacle, victimization & surveillance) when dealing with border-crossings. Facilitate sharing of the sensible without risk to actants and depoliticized appropriation of experience by control regimes. Undertake critical discussion of the ethical and resistant use of appropriated surveillance techniques current favoured both in border art and research, and of how border art and research are used by border control agencies such as Frontex. Interact with the creative sphere emerging around borders by engaging in participatory artSci activities. Foster participation by marginalized subjects in the public sphere: a border-crossing from private to public experience which is ultimately part of the deeper, extended border-crossings involved in migration and borderland identities.

3. Explore the memory and utopia dimensions of migrant border-crossing. Examine of historical memory of previous migration and border conflict, collective memories of nations, minorities, originary countries and diasporic stories, and the role of short-term, individual memories in creating representations of border-crossing journeys and routes. Focus on various memory objects or umbilical border objects: not only heirlooms and personal photographs, but also books, films, artworks etc. Bring into play forms of presentation such as museum exhibitions, participatory workshops, etc. Research utopia dimension of borderscaping, focusing on the imaginative forces in literature, film and art as they provide room for alternative bordering solutions and places to test out and critically perspectivize present bordering practices. Investigation of the memory and utopian dimensions would bring with them increase knowledge of the emotional values bordering processes and border-crossings bring with them.

4. Improve research infrastructure, including a participatory database platform registering cultural production connected to border-crossing. An easily accessible, GIS-coded database of border art works, festivals, literary works, films etc would make it much easier for researchers and policy makers to take into account the many symbolic and historical layers of respective borderscapes. It should be natural for any researcher studying a specific border to make herself familiar with literature, film and art negotiating the imaginaries of that specific borderscape in a genealogical perspective – but in practice, it can be difficult to find out what cultural production is connected with any specific border. While the digital humanities brings with them arbitrariness and power-blindness, it does however help draw the circle of actants wider and increase recognition.

5. Foster actor-centered interdisciplinarity and collaboration in research on borders. Carry out a multi-sited, interdisciplinary participatory research aimed to foster engagement of a wide range of different actors. Develop tools for communication and cooperation among different actors, strengthening existing relations and to add new actors previously not included. Advance an act(or) centred approach involving participant and non-participant observations, cultural cartography and counter-cartographies, notes related to the research.
process, photographic documentation, informal interviews and correspondence, aesthetic, multi-sited ethnographic and geographic fieldwork. Use participatory and performative methodologies to understand people’s perceptions, interpretations, experiences and representations of borders. Use video as an artistic, communicative and analytical tool, not only for visually describing social practices and discourses, but also for understanding how space is reshaped by its perceivers.

WP 13 Cross-Sectional Analysis

1. Introduction

The overall objective of this WP has been to consolidate the cross-cutting aspects of the project and thus link in an effective manner the different WPs. The Workpackage relates bordering processes to salient issues of scientific, social and political importance (e.g. migration, securitization and border management, questions of European identity, intersectionality, etc.). With this aim, under WP 13 we have scrutinized the research findings gathered during the fieldwork conducted in the course of different work packages, as well as compare different cases. WP 13 also indicates global as well as specifically European challenges that derive from changing conceptualizations and functions of state borders (e.g. challenges that border management imply for national policies in terms of immigration, welfare, labour laws, etc). The WP also aims to inform and raise awareness on issues that often are neglected in border research. A further major objective in this context is to generate and formulate policy relevant insights, in particular different policy options and their cost-benefit considerations. There are many conceptual and empirical links between work packages which will be exploited to achieve synergy effects in fieldwork as well as in synthesising overall project results. WP 13 was one means of achieving this.

The Cross-Sectional Final Report (Deliverable D13.49) is the output of Research task 4 (RT 4) of the Work Package 13. The report reflects links established between various work packages (WPs) as per Research Task 1 (RT1), and is based on the reports on cross-cutting issues composed by individual partners according to a special template prepared by METU team. These individual reports were composed after the completion of fieldwork, and aimed to synthesize the findings. The report also incorporates Scenarios of Transnationalism and Flexible Bordering, as per Research Task (RT 5), which is also based on scenarios and policy orientations of individual members.

The report is structured according to the template which was prepared in the course of Research Task 2. The template, aimed to guide project participants in their efforts to consolidate and structure fieldwork findings in accordance to specific cross-cutting issues that were identified as relevant for the EUBORDERSCAPES research project, consisted of three sections. The first section focuses on conceptual issues; the second on the links between power relations and bordering process. These two sections cover most of the issues that were investigated in the course of the fieldwork. As many important geopolitical developments affecting bordering and conceptualizations of borders in the EU and beyond took place close to or after the completion of the fieldwork, a special section devoted to the impact of emerging problems on borders was added. Finally, a section on policy orientations and possible future scenarios developed in the course of RT 5 of the Work Package, allows to link
and integrate findings of research with policy recommendations, both for individual case studies and for the whole project in general.

1. Understanding the shifting conceptions of borders How does each team define border?

In all work packages and for all case studies the research teams have adopted a complex, multidimensional and dynamic concept of borders, encompassing not simply territorial delineation, but also political, social and cultural distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Furthermore, borders are conceptualized as social and political constructs, open to change. The concept of ‘borderscapes’ (reference) plays important role in the conceptualization of border. It expresses “the (geo)political and epistemic multidimensionality of the border, enabling a productive understanding of the processual, de-territorialized and dispersed nature of borders and their ensuing regimes in the era of globalization and transnational flows”. Adopting the borderscapes viewpoint allows to view borders genealogically and to historicize border-making and particularly border-migration nexus. This means rethinking Europe as an “ambiguous space” that reflects its colonial and post-colonial experiences, also understanding the ambiguity that marks the EU’s engagement with its various neighbourhoods.

In our case studies, the understanding of borders as lines of division and barriers, both physical and mental, prevailed. However, in some cases borders’ dual nature, as both dividing lines and areas of contact, was underlined. Understandably, the contact aspect of borders was more pronounced in more open and peaceful borders, where security concerns are not so strong.

Beyond these general understanding, some regional differences can be noted across various case studies. Thus, the bordering processes over the Mediterranean can be conceptualized as subject to ‘dual spatial logic of of cohesion and fracture’. Different approaches are adopted towards ‘desired’ and ‘undesired’ migrants. The neighborhood countries which agree to cooperate in policing and control of EU’s external borders and regulation of ‘undesired migrants’ are granted privileged access to the EU’s own debordered space. At the same time, the undesired migrants, including economic migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the refugee flows from the Middle East face severe restrictions in their attempts to reach Europe. Morocco, which was granted ‘Advanced status’ in relations with EU in 2008, is a paradigmatic case in point, receiving funding and privileges in exchange for assistance in border control. A similar agreement is now being negotiated with Turkey, in order to control forced migration from the Middle East.

In the post-Soviet cases, the divisive aspects of borders are emphasized and borders are perceived more as issue of state-building than of cultural divisions. In Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine the unjust and arbitrary nature of the current borders, which dates back to early Soviet border-making is emphasized. This contributes to the perception of borders as fundamentally changeable. There is also differentiation among various borders: thus, some borders, such as border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, are completely sealed off, both politically and socially; other borders are seen as more friendly, open, and permeable. In Russia, there is a differentiation between ‘good’ borders (those with ethnically and culturally close Slavic states) and ‘bad’ borders with South Caucasus and Central Asian states, which are perceived as sources of violence, conflict, and migration.
Within the EU, the top-down cross-border cooperation projects have been effective to a greater or lesser extent in changing perceptions of borders from separation lines to areas of contact and exchange. This impact is especially visible between Central and Eastern European states such as Poland or Hungary on the one hand and ‘old’ EU members on the other. The sharp divisions of the Cold War have been replaced by more open, interactive views on borders.

To summarize, borders can be conceptualized along two dimensions: dynamic (de-bordering and re-bordering) and structural, understood in the sense of Giddens’ structuration (enabling and constraining). These dimensions produce four different modalities of bordering process: threat, obstacle, resource and protection.

How are borders made?

In all Work packages and in all case studies, we adopted the view of borders as social and political constructs, which are open to change. The borders can be made through various means, including institutional practices, state-led policies at the national and local level, daily interaction, construction of various narratives, discourses and imaginaries through media and art. Yet, the processes involved in making of specific borders vary greatly from case to case: top-down and bottom-up border-making can be complementary, or the two processes can be at odds with each other. Important regional differences can be noted. Thus, within the EU, there is a top-down institutional process of debordering, aiming at removing of borders. However, this top-down policies have resulted in different outcomes in different contexts and for different groups of people. Thus, while business people and civil society generally welcome such debordering policies, they are often resisted on the ground by ordinary citizens, as is the case, for example, on the German side of the German-Polish border. Many citizens remain attached to their national identities and feel that these identities are threatened by the EU debordering. In the Mediterranean, the process of externalization of European border and securitization are most prominent. With externalization, the EU seeks cooperation of neighborhood countries, most notably Morocco, and more recently Turkey, in providing security for EU’s external borders. In former Soviet Union, state plays the leading role in border-making; although in some cases, as in Eastern Ukraine until the recent crisis, everyday practices of interaction and cooperation challenged the formal borders.

Which actors are involved in border-making processes?

There are various levels of actors involved in the border-making processes. These can be conceptualized as institutional vs interpersonal levels, or hierarchically, involving supranational, national, and local levels. The supranational level is represented most obviously by the EU, with its policies of de-bordering within the Union, cross-border cooperation initiatives both within the EU and with the neighbourhood, and cooperation with neighbourhood countries in securitizing EU’s external borders. Furthermore, several types of actors can be identified, including authorities, civil society organizations, entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens. These actors can also operate on different levels, including for example national and local authorities, and local vs national and international civil society organizations. The interests and practices of different actors of the border-making process can
sometimes complement or be at odds with each other. Thus, the EU projects often support civil society organizations who are willing to engage in cross-border cooperation. In Swiss-French case, while both the political and business elites have very positive views about open border, some groups of population and some populist movements have been against this. In Russian exclave Kaliningrad region, local authorities, business people, and population alike support softening and opening of the border with Poland, while federal authorities in Moscow are more concerned with issues of state and border security.

How does each team understand the changes in the conceptions of borders socially, politically, culturally and a reflections of territoriality?

The changes in the conceptions of borders can be influenced by a wide variety of actors (see above) and various processes. Within the EU the most important changes were initiated by EU institutions and policies, namely, by the institutional debordering and programs aimed at promoting cross-border communication. But the external borders of the EU are more susceptible to geopolitical processes and changes, for example, the Eastern border of the EU, between Poland and Ukraine/Russia has been affected by the geopolitical changes and the crisis in the Ukraine. Along the Southern borders, in the Mediterranean, our research teams have noted struggles that consist of strategies of adaptation, contestation and resistance that challenge the externalization and the top-down geopolitical control of EU’s external borders, often perceived through the metaphor of ‘Fortress Europe’. Cultural production plays an important role in this process of contestation and challenge of the top-down narratives and policies, such as for example the LampedusaFestival. The festival has become a counter-hegemonic borderscape in which migrants engage in performance and representation of their in-between identities which challenge notions of nation-state and citizenship.

In the post-Soviet states the impact of the dissolution of Soviet Union still exerts influence on the understanding of borders. The conceptions of borders are undergoing continuing change in the region: thus, in Ukraine there is a shift from more state-centered (borders between states) to more nation-centered (borders between nations) perspectives. In the Caucasus there is a process of re-orientation and differentiation among various borders: thus, borders with neighbours who used to be part of the Soviet Union have become stronger and even closed (between Azerbaijan and Armenia); while former Soviet external borders have become more permeable (border with Iran for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and border with Turkey for Azerbaijan).

2. Power relations with regard to borders

In this section we explore the cross-cutting issues in the impact of power relations upon borders. The first question deals with existing and possibly entrenched political problems, focusing particularly on the intersection of geographical, political and cultural borders. This question focuses on the issues that were addressed in the course of fieldwork conducted in our case studies. The second question addresses emerging problems which began to emerge towards the end or after completion of our fieldwork, and thus could not be fully covered during our research. Yet, the research teams have tried to follow the latest developments and to conceptualize them in the context of fieldwork findings.
How do political problems affect borders and conceptions of borders in terms of:

a. Sovereignty  
b. Ethnic and national claims  
c. Self determination and political autonomy  
d. Self realization and contingencies of social autonomy

The issues of sovereignty carry different weight in different regions. In Western Europe, for example, fears of loss of sovereignty to the EU do not play significant role in public discourses. However, in South-Eastern Europe, the problems of sovereignty are more acute, and the EU is blamed for failing to guarantee national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is especially noticeable in the discourses emerging during the recent refugee and immigration crisis. The subsequent erection of fences against immigration from the (non-EU) Balkans and Middle East regions was commented in most national media as an act of “re-establishing sovereignty and the national power to decide”. In another Eastern European case, in Poland, the annexation of Crimea by Russia has raised concerns about security and national sovereignty. In the Southern neighborhood the issues of sovereignty are perceived in the context of de-colonization, and are strongly debated in the cases of Gibraltar and Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, whose belonging to Spain is disputed by Morocco. Rather paradoxically, despite having territorial claims against Spain, Morocco nevertheless cooperates in controlling the EU’s border in these enclaves.

The issues of state sovereignty are more acute in the former Soviet states. Russia under the Presidency of Vladimir Putin has begun to pursue a policy of multi-level and multi-speed reintegration of post-Soviet space, with most advanced form of such reintegration represented by the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) comprising Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Other initiatives included attempts to construct single energy space, including also Turkmenistan and Ukraine. However, what was seen in Russia as mutually beneficial forms of integration has often been perceived by the leaders of post-Soviet countries as constraints on their sovereignty, in both economic and political sense.

In the case of Israel – Palestine, political problems lie at the very heart of border conceptions. They affect notions of sovereignty because of conditions of occupation in which one side has both sovereignty and control, while the other lacks both. The construction of borders, both physical and perceptual based on fear of the other, strengthens notions of self determination and political autonomy for BOTH sides, leading to a desire for the construction of borders based on bilateral agreement rather than the current situation of imposed borders by the stronger side.

The issues of ethnic and national claims are dominate border discourses as well as practices in the post-Soviet space. There is a number of ethno-political conflicts, dating to the late Soviet period, including conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, conflict over Transnistria in Moldova, conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and most recently the crisis over Crimea and Eastern parts of Ukraine. All of these conflicts have in common incongruity between formal borders and cultural and ethnic borders, which can be dated back to the Stalin’s administrative divisions as well as imperial history of Russian, Habsbrug and Ottoman empires.
But the territorial claims can also be found beyond post-Soviet space. Thus, Armenia has territorial claims towards Turkey; the disputes over Gibraltar and Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellilla are other examples. Yet, within the EU, internal de-bordering has mostly had positive effect on such ethnic and national claims. In Gibraltar, the EU promoted cooperation and interaction with Spain. In Central and Eastern Europe the debates about national minority rights have also become more moderate, for example, in the cases of Hungarian minority in Romania and Serbia. Overall, within the EU, geopolitical issues continue to play bigger role than ethnicity.

In the Southern Mediterranean, the issue of ethnicity has less to do with national claims and more with cultural, and especially religious divides. The associations between European/Christian versus non-European (Middle Eastern or African/Muslim) are rather strong across the southern EU borders, from Morocco to Turkey. In Turkey, for example, it is widely believed that the EU is a “Christian club” which would never accept Turkey as its part.

c. Self determination and political autonomy

Ethnic and national claims are also closely connected to the issues of self-determination and political autonomy. For example, in all of the post-Soviet conflicts cited above the ethnic and national claims have self-determination, ultimately in the form of independent statehood, as their aim. However, there are also some issues pertaining to political autonomy that are not directly connected to ethnicity. The case in point is Russian exclave Kaliningrad region, which has no autonomy and thus is thoroughly dependent on the decision-making in the federal center in Moscow. This is an important constraint on the region’s economic cooperation with the EU, and more specifically with Poland, with whom it shares a land border. The dependence on federal authorities often results in diversion of interests of local and federal authorities. In Eastern Europe, there are some concerns about loss of political autonomy to the EU. However, expectations of funding usually overrode these concerns.

3. How emerging problems affect borders and conceptions of borders with regard to:
- The Refugee Situation
- Geo-strategic Problems (e.g. current crisis between Russia and Turkey)
- Radicalism and violence

The refugee crisis that unfolded in Europe last year has begun after the completion of the fieldwork for most of the Workpackages, and therefore no detailed findings can be presented. However, monitoring of media and observations in the countries of case studies research suggest a general tendency towards fortification and securitization of the borders. There is a strong tendency in to medialize “the refugee crisis” which spectacularizes and simplifies narratives of migration, and these narratives dominate the public sphere. Migration from Middle East is often perceived not as refugee crisis, but also as a potential source of criminality and especially terrorism for Europe. While these tendencies are strongest in the countries closest to the external borders of the EU, particularly Mediterranean and South-East Europe, there are also calls for fortification of internal EU borders, thus challenging the achievements of debordering process. This has to do less with the migration flows themselves, but more with the perceived unfairness of the proposed quota system, which is especially opposed in Central and Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. In
these countries the refugee crisis and the failure of the EU to deal with it have given rise to Euroscepticism and critique of liberalism and multi-culturalism.

In the Mediterranean, where the issues of refugees and more generally forced migration have been significant for a longer period of time, there is a more complex response. The inadequacy of EU’s response to migration from Mediterranean has long been observed in the region. The recent crisis on the one hand resulted in the tendency towards fortification and securitization of borders; however, because of the perils of the sea-crossing which results in many tragedies and loss of life, the humanitarian narrative here is stronger. Thus, Mediterranean becomes the space where humanitarian and securitarian discourses collide, as migrant (i.e. A person in need for humanitarian action) meets a smuggler (i.e. a criminal). In this aspect, the cooperation of the EU with its neighbors in controlling the borders is becoming even more important. The mechanism of joint control was previously already tested, with some success, in the case of Morocco, where Morocco has received privileged access to the EU and softening of the border regime, as well as financial assistance, in return for its cooperation in readmission of migrants. The current agreement on Middle Eastern migrants between the EU operates according to a similar logic; however, there is strong opposition within EU towards the opening of borders with Turkey.

The rise of radicalism and violence on the borders is also related to the refugee crisis, and more generally, to perceptions of migration. This is a widely used narrative, that can be found, for example, in the West bank, where Israel justifies building of a wall with the threat of terrorism and violence emanating from Palestine. Similar logic has been employed by Russia, which had closed its borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia due to fears of terrorist threat. However, radicalism and violence also rise on the other side of the borders. Currently in Europe in addition to fears of trafficking of goods and people, and of the terrorist threat spreading into Europe with the flow of refugees, there has also been radicalization of right-wing groups in Europe itself, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Western Europe.

Among the emerging geostrategic problems that affect borders the most important issue is the so-called Ukrainian crisis, following the annexation of Crimea and unfolding of violent conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The strongest impact has been on the Russian Ukrainian border, outside of the areas of military conflict. There is considerable strengthening of border controls from the Ukrainian side, restrictions on crossing the border by Russian men, and these actions are in contrast with the previous practices of open border that used to be crossed on foot. The perceptions of this process of fortification in Ukraine depend on the geo-political orientations: thus, pro-Russian citizens do not perceive the border as a source of threat, while pro-Ukrainian support the fortification. The crisis has also affected border with Poland: there is decreased border traffic between Poland and Russia, while at the same time the traffic between Poland and Ukraine increased. Furthermore, the perception of threat coming from Russia gave rise to calls to abolish visa-free regime with Russia. Similar concerns with security were expressed in Finland, where the Ukrainian crisis was interpreted as a collapse of multi-polar world, and the Finnish-Russian border became seen not simply as EU’s external border, but as a civilizational boundary between the West and Russia.
Further away from Russia’s borders, in Bulgaria, the Ukrainian crisis led to a separation of discourses into pro-Russia and pro-EU strands, and a raising awareness of Bulgaria’s importance in the new geopolitical context. In Germany, the response has been more mixed, and changed considerably over time. In the beginning, it was perceived as an outcome of intervention of multitude of players, including US and EU, and only after unfolding of conflict in Donetsk the discourses shifted towards the confrontation between ‘the West’ and Putin. These interpretations pointed to a new perception of Ukraine’s border as and external border of the EU, and thus are a case of ‘rebordering from a distance’.

The crisis also had an indirect impact on borders in post-Soviet space. Thus, following the Ukrainian crisis Armenia and Georgia have found themselves separated by new division line, as Armenia joined Eurasian Economic Union, and Georgia reaffirmed its integration with the EU. This has potential of complicating relations between the two neighbouring countries 4.

4. How are borders perceived and constructed through:
- Daily experiences
- Stories (e.g. narrative-building with regards to everyday bordering in terms of biographies, literature, art)
- Interpretations of crisis situations (e.g. Ukraine, refugee crisis, Austerity and Euro crisis)

Different patterns of daily practices of cross border interaction can be noted in different regions: Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, external borders of the EU, and post-Soviet borders. In Western Europe, which constitutes debordered core area, open borders are routinized and seen as 'business as usual'. However, considerable differences can continue to exist between everyday practices and official discourses. Thus, in Geneva and Lille local authorities have fully embraced EU debordering, while ignoring anti-EU sentiments on the ground. In the case of UK-Ireland border, there is an ‘active reconceptualization of a national border as an EU border’. Both national and local media downplay the role of the EU and interpret the developments as part of the UK-Ireland peace process or unification of Ireland, thus “re-nationalising” the European impact on the border”.

One common observation from a variety of case studies is that formal debordering, i.e. opening of borders, implementation of visa-free regimes, and promoting of cross-border cooperation, does not necessarily lead to removal of social borders or mental barriers. Language differences play important role in perpetuating these mental barriers. This has been observed in cases as different as German-Polish and Polish-Russian border and the metropolitan area of Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai. The mental barriers are deconstructed only in relatively small sectors of population, i.e. among bilingual young professionals.

In the case of more conflictual and closed borders, one of the interesting findings, reflected in the film produced for WP10, has been the lack of understanding of similarity between border practices and border narratives on different sides of the border. The images of threat, fear, dirt exist on both sides of the border, and in fact mirror each other. This is also true for social borders in ethnic/migrant enclaves that exist in urban and metropolitan areas.
Furthermore, the cross-border interactions are often asymmetrical. Thus, while both Polish and Russian citizens frequently cross border in Kaliningrad region, Russians do so much more frequently, and the main goal for them is shopping for all kinds of consumer goods, which are cheaper on the Polish side of the border. Polish citizens cross the border to buy gasoline, which is cheaper in Russia. The interaction across Polish-Ukrainian border is similarly asymmetrical, with Ukrainians crossing mostly for reasons of work and study, while Polish visit Ukraine for short 'sentimental vacations'. Similar process is taking place in German-Polish border, which is crossed much more frequently by the Poles.

Everyday experiences of borders vary greatly according to various groups of population. Thus, younger people in Central and Eastern Europe are more active in cross-border cooperation and interaction; the mental barrier remains stronger for older people. Similar dynamic is observed in Italian-Tunisian border, where second generation of Tunisian migrants have multiple and hybrid Arab/Italian identities. Businessmen in all our case studies have been active in exploiting the economic opportunities presented by the border. On the other hand, civil society is most active where it is also supported by the EU or local authorities. In the absence of such support, cross-border activities can fade away, as was the case with Russian-Ukrainian border region Slobozhanschina.

In terms of narrative construction, the opening of the borders and increased interaction does lead to more multi-vocal perspective and can help to change perception of borders from division lines into areas of contact. However, care must be taken not to silence those voices that oppose debordering. This is especially relevant in the core debordered area of Western Europe, where debordering has become a dominant discourse. Yet, populations often resist that and emphasize the significance of national belonging, even as they engage in cross-border activities.

An important aspect of cross-border interaction has been the communication via various technological means such as Skype, without physically crossing of border. While this form of interaction is rarely considered in border studies, our research, especially in the Polish-Ukrainian case, has demonstrated that technology can be a powerful tool in reducing the separating effects of borders. For Ukrainian students in Poland such communication, which can be very frequent and regular, has been crucial in retaining contacts with their families.

Daily experiences of border are also affected by the interpretation of crisis situations. The constraints imposed on interaction across Ukrainian-Russian border and the decrease in traffic across Russian-Polish border are some of the examples. In the Mediterranean, Ukrainian crisis had little impact; however, the events of the Arab spring affected border interaction considerably, as the capacity of Libya and Tunisia in controlling their borders was undermined. At the level of discourses and narratives, they play an important role in medializing crisis situation, i.e. Refugee problems. Cultural production such as literary works, autobiographies, art, can both contribute to the simplified hegemonic media discourses or challenge it by creating alternative, counter-hegemonic narratives and imaginaries.

5. Linkages between Traditional and Post-Traditional Borders
How does your WP/case study reflect on the linkages between traditional (geopolitics) and post-traditional (everyday practices) borders and bordering? Please consider the themes below where relevant:

a. Gender
b. Migration
c. Identity Politics
d. Conflict Amelioration
e. Cross Border Cooperation

While the original question suggested binary opposition between traditional (geopolitical) and post-traditional (everyday practices) understandings of borders, our research suggests mutual infiltration of everyday practices with geopolitical imaginaries and hierarchical practices of control. Therefore it is more relevant to speak not of the continuum between the two poles, but rather of the plurivocality of experiences of the border. The concept of borderscapes that we employ is the main conceptual tool that links traditional and post-traditional notions of borders.

A. Gender/Age

Gender can play an important role in structuring experiences of borders. This is especially the case in migration. Thus, in Italian-Tunisian border, where temporary seasonal migration of fishing workers from Tunisia was replaced by more permanent immigration following the restrictions on migration introduced with Martelli law of 1990. While season migrants were generally male, when the migration became more permanent they had brought with them their families.

In some cases, the constructed symbolic borders between femininities and masculinities can intersect with cultural borders and with geopolitical borders. This becomes especially visible in narratives of immigrant LGBT resistance to established norms in host and diasporic communities and in narratives of inter-generational conflict focusing on patriarchal honour cultures, arranged marriages, FGM or cross-cultural families. From the analysis of men’s and women’s narratives of migration we can conclude that masculinity and femininity generate different experiences of the border, and often the role of family and relationality may be more easily addressed in women-authored narratives of border and crossing. The trope of home, however, is central to migrant narratives more generally and has a particular role in the making of diasporic identity and migrant subjectivity – as our analysis of the role of food in autobiographical writing shows it is a link with the past and serves as a means to reconstruct and maintain ethnic identity.

Another important dimension that emerged from our fieldwork was the role of age in the experience border. This is especially true in the Central and Eastern Europe and in former Soviet Union, where the legacies of Cold War borders are felt more strongly by the older generation. Thus, in German-Polish border, young people are much more active in cross-border interaction, and they also feel more ‘European’. Similar dynamic is observed along Poland’s border with Ukraine and Russia. At the same time, within former Soviet Union, older generation has particularly difficult time with accepting the strengthening of what used to be fully open administrative borders between Soviet republics. Although the experiences of
such closures are different, from practically open, until recently, border between Russia and Ukraine to closed border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, many older people are nostalgic about free travel within Soviet Union. In Mediterranean border, intergenerational differences play important role in strategies of adaptation as well as in identity construction. Unlike the generation of their parents, second generation Tunisian migrants in Sicily has developed multiple identities and belonging to both Italian and Tunisian cultures.

B. Migration

One area where the tension between traditional and post-traditional borders is most obvious is migration. The experiences of migration are extremely varied in different cases. In Polish-German border, there has been a change from long-term emigration (from Poland to Germany) to a more temporary, short term travel for work, business, leisure. On the Polish-Ukrainian border the trend is opposite: from short term travel towards long-term migration for work or study. Ukrainians are much more active in this migration flow than the Poles. Another aspect of the tension between geopolitics and everyday practices is the petty trade in military gear on the Polish-Ukrainian border. Thus, a peaceful border is temporarily transformed into an ‘informally militarized zone’. On the other hand, there are also changes in migration between Russia and Poland. While overall traffic has decreased following the geopolitical changes of the crisis in Ukraine, travel for shopping still continues. At the same time, there is also a trend for students from Kaliningrad to study in Poland. Studying in Poland is often preferred to local university in Kaliningrad, while at the same time it is cheaper than studying in Moscow or St. Petersburg.

In the Mediterranean, the practices of securitization and fortification reflect the continuing importance of traditional, geopolitical understanding of borders. At the same time, the practices of control and surveillance from a distance and outsourcing of border control functions to North African states suggests shifts in traditional forms of border control.

C. Identity politics

In CEE region, the cosmopolitan cross border or regional identities hardly ever appeared. Political attempts to implement “Europeanized” identities usually meet with local resistance, and local identities are shaped by national sense of belonging. The only exception is young cultural and functional elites in G-P border, who stress cross-border cooperation and bilingual education, and thus are able to create few local ‘paradoxical enclaves of cosmopolitanism’. However, the existence of ethnic kinship or cultural similarity in the border regions certainly helps to soften borders and make them more permeable. This, for example is the case in Polish-Ukrainian border. New immigrants living on the border stress their ‘in-betweenness’ in relation to the cultures in which they are immersed, which can be considered a form of border identity.

In post-Soviet space, Russia has stressed the importance of ‘compatriots’ and ‘Russian speaking’ people, who continue to live in the countries of former Soviet Union. This group plays important role in the construction of the concept of ‘Russian world’ (Russkii Mir), an association of all those who feel connected to Russian culture regardless of their citizenship. The repercussions of this identity are far-reaching, as the concept of Russkii Mir is also a
cornerstone of Russian foreign policy. The importance of this identity can be further observed in the case of Eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria where pro-Russian orientations continue to shape perceptions of borders, even in the context of military conflict.

D. Conflict amelioration

With regards to conflict amelioration, the EU’s role on Ireland and UK border and in Gibraltar suggests positive impact of increase in daily interaction on the peace process. In Ireland, the opening of the EU border has been interpreted as a part of UK-Ireland peace process. Consequently, there are some expectations that cross-border interaction and the EU can have positive impact on conflicts in former Soviet Union, in particular, Transnistria and Karabakh. However, such expectations have so far not materialized. Even in the case of the most open of the post-Soviet conflict borders, in Transnistria, the regular cross-border interaction has not led to any progress in the resolution of political conflict.

E. Cross-border cooperation

Top-down Europeanization and cross-border cooperation initiatives have had some impact, although long-term effect of such policies in the absence of EU funding remains questionable. In Central and Eastern Europe, these top-down policies were partially resisted by both elites, who sought to protect their privileges, and populations, who opposed the encroachment on their understanding of ethnicity and nationalism. In this region the top-down debordering quickly turned into Euroscepticism and short-term re-bordering with the onset of refugee and Ukrainian crises. In some cases, such as Russian-Ukrainian Slobozhanschina Euroregion as well as cross-border cooperation projects in the Russian-Finnish border, the withdrawal of funding at the end of the programmes have significantly undermined cooperation activities. However, in Kaliningrad region, the cooperation continues with the involvement of local authorities, business people and populations, without significant support from the EU.

In the core debordered area in the Western Europe, despite well developed interaction, the attitudes towards open borders remain ambivalent. In metropolitan border areas, such as Greater Geneva and Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, despite high level of functional integration that is supported by political and business elites, populist movements call for rebordering.

Proximity to border can also have an effect on cultural activities. Cross-border cooperation initiatives often involve various cultural events, festivals, fairs, etc. These activities usually take place at more peaceful borders, and can give rise to long-term partnership and collaboration. This, for example, has been the case in the contemporary art scene in north-west Russia. However, border art projects are also highly vulnerable to the geopolitical changes. Thus, in the Russian case, with the strengthening of state control, the funding from Scandinavian countries, which used to sustain this collaboration, has become unwelcome, and the artists who were engaged in this collaboration have been marginalized as ‘foreign agents’. A new border between ‘us’ and ‘them’ has been drawn.

6. Policy Options and Scenarios

Considering the situation and changes observed in your WP/Case Study how do you see the future developments and what could be the policy option for the countries involved and EU?
In considering future developments and possible policy responses it is important to distinguish between various roles that the EU plays in different borderscapes, as well as different border contexts. The first line of distinction is between internal and external borders. Within the EU borders, the EU has played a role of “mastermind of integration”, and it has been relatively successful. However as reflected above, these successes have not been uniform and there are important differences between the ‘core debordered area’ of Western Europe and the borders with/between newer EU members in Central and Eastern Europe. EU’s top-down policies and initiatives were able to engineer debordering and promote interaction across national borders, not least by mobilizing local civil society. In some cases, such as for example German-Polish border, the imaginaries of top-down EU domination of the border interaction have been replaced by imaginaries of autonomy and self-reliance. At the same time, EU should take more seriously the feelings of those who resist debordering and emphasize their national, as opposed to European, belonging. Silencing of these alternative discourses and neglect of such feeling has potential of destabilizing the process of debordering and can lead to a rise of xenophobic discourses and movements, even in rather prosperous and well integrated areas such as Greater Geneva. "Whatever the level of debordering and related functional integration, national borders remain strong markers of identity and difference, either in a virtual or actual sense. The instrumental approaches to cross-border cooperation (e.g., planning of transportation infrastructures, enhancing labour market integration, resolving negative externalities, etc.) that dominate current initiatives do not address the resurgence of national and protective re-bordering claims and are therefore not sufficient in order to promote a sustained cross-border integration. Confronted with a relative deterritorialization, there is a need to recode the state border as an object of recognition able to promote a shared sense of place and belonging"

In the external borders, EU’s policies have been far less successful. In many cases, such as in the Mediterranean, EU’s response to migration across the sea has been regularly described as ‘inadequate’. The policy of control and surveillance from a distance and outsourcing of policing of EU’s borders to neighboring countries such as Morocco and Turkey has failed to resolve the problems of migration. In the Mediterranean therefore there is a need, even an urgency, for a more committed EU, which would not only promote the Eurocentric vision but would become more attentive to the local contexts and local problems. Such a policy shift would also require “broadening the spectrum of actors involved”; "grasping the dialogic nature of bordering processes and imaginaries, as well as the tension between institutional formal modes of political agency and social non-formal modes of agency”. The currently proposed mechanism of immigration quotas is also inadequate for resolving the refugee crisis. The EU needs to acknowledge that the current arrangement is asymmetric and puts unjustly heavy burden on peripheral states; "There is need for a balanced concept that redistributes costs, and puts security and the humanitarian aspects of migration into a balanced perspective.

The EU’s geopolitical involvement in Eastern neighbourhood, particularly in Ukraine, has been also a controversial issue with greatly differentiated responses across the EU and in the post-Soviet space. The possible scenarios as well as policy recommendations that emerge from the differently positioned actors in this regard are inevitably complex and sometimes contradictory. Thus, in South-East Europe this involvement as led to rising Euroscepticism, and thus threatens still fragile process of European integration. Along the Eastern borders of
the EU fears of getting involved in an international conflict and concerns for the security of national borders has been growing, and in our fieldwork was felt particularly strongly in Poland. The considerations for the stability of the European integration project Eastern Europe in the context of an ongoing military conflict without a solution in a foreseeable future suggest the need “to reduce geopolitical activities in the region as much as possible”.

However, things look very different from the other side of the EU border. Particularly, in Ukraine, which has been the site of the military conflict as well as is at the core of EU/Russia’s tense relations, greater engagement of the EU is sought and recommended. The trajectory of Ukraine’s increasing integration with the EU, most recently through an Association Agreement, suggests a need for a more comprehensive EU policy towards this country. In particular, it is noted that EU’s relations with its Eastern Neighbourhood should be more differentiated and involve close interaction between those countries that have moved further in the process of association with the EU, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. However, in the current geopolitical context such integration trajectory leads to increasing tensions with Russia, which in turn lead to rising security concerns in the neighborhood. Ukraine seeks EU’s greater commitment to its own security; with particular regards to the borders this commitment is envisioned as EU’s assistance, technical and financial, in strengthening Ukraine’s borders with its neighbors.

At the same time, EU has important, and yet not fully tapped potential in conflict resolution. The success of EU’s engagement in Northern Ireland and in Gibraltar, which helped to increase interaction and cooperation of conflicting sides serves as a good example for other conflicts in the region. From Palestine to Transnistria to Nagorno-Karabakh EU is perceived as an honest broker and its mediation in the conflicts there is perceived as having potentially positive impacts. However, at least in the post-Soviet space, such involvement would also require collaboration with Russia, which is difficult to achieve in the current context.

Finally, one area where EU’s involvement has been highly effective is support of civil society, both within the EU and in the neighborhood. Although the impacts of this support may be less obvious and less immediate, they can have significant long-term effects in a variety of contexts, from conflict amelioration to cultural production. This policy recommendation is also related to the call for a more committed EU above and the engaging of wider range of actors.

In the sphere of cultural production, the EU can (1) facilitate the role of cultural production in “despectacularizing” and “dereducing” narratives of border crises presented in the media by journalists and politicians. ‘Slow media’, such as literature and film, can bring more wide-ranging narratives into public debate, reducing the impact of simplified media discourses. (2) The EU can also facilitate creative and ethical ways of making individual experiences of border-crossing accessible in the public sphere. The range of such experiences should not be limited only to border-crossers, but should include wider range of actors, such as bureaucrats, police and local residents. Cultural production can suggest strategies for an ethics of representation (avoiding spectacle, victimization & surveillance) when dealing with border-crossings. Ethical considerations include facilitating sharing of the sensible without risk to actants (3) It is also important to Explore through further research the memory and utopia
dimension of migrant border-crossing, including collective and individual memories of migration and of countries of origin.
3. Concluding Observations on Bordering and Borderscapes
(with contributions from Chiara Brambilla and Johan Schimanski)

During its four years of operation, EUBORDERSCAPES has explored different areas of conceptual change that can be assumed to have concrete impacts on the ways borders both condition and are conditioned by different institutions and actors. Above all, this involves conceptual re-framings of social, political, economic and cultural spaces. This also requires a nuanced and critical re-reading and understanding of borders as resources in terms of the exercise of power, the management of conflict, cross-border co-operation, and the everyday negotiation of borders by “ordinary” citizens and non-citizens. State borders also reflect and thus help us interpret tensions as well as points of connection within intercultural and interstate relations. In a very direct manner, these tensions are reflected in the practical consequences of controlling borders through security policies, border and visa regimes and immigration policies at the same time that global interdependencies require more forceful international co-operation.

This research report has provided insights into the evolving concepts of borders in two general ways: 1) as an important reflection of political, social and cultural change and 2) as an indicator of possible responses to this change. In doing this the project report has also focused on the different ways in which state borders are perceived, understood, experienced and exploited as political and social resources. It has drawn from various sources, such as key academic debates, political discourses, ethnographic research, media representations and shifting cultural understandings of the construction of national borders.

Bordering as a Perspective

Traditional border studies have been characterized by a fixation with states and territories and the notion that borders are physical outcomes of political, social and/or economic processes. The world seen in this way is compartmentalized into state shapes and territories which are fixed, lacking internal fluidity. Accordingly, international relations take place between sovereign governments as determined by Westphalian norms. Contemporary border research debate clearly reflects more general shifts away from spatial fixity. According to this way of thinking borders are connected and/or divided by transitional spaces where a perceived set of unifying attributes and features is gradually replaced by another one. Natural borders are a result of humans characterising spaces as natural areas. Furthermore, political boundaries rarely match ethnic, linguistic and cultural boundaries. In this way, the world political map showing lines separating “container boxes” is largely a representation of political elites, because many people do not recognize or associate themselves with such ossified and fixed divisions (van Houtum 2005).

Theories of the social construction of space have more generally contributed to a deep transformation of analytical approaches in human geography, including the emergence of the so-called critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail 1996, 2003, 2006; Dalby and Ó Tuathail 1998; Mamadouh and Dijkink 2006). As something contrived by society rather given by nature or natural laws, borders can be broadly defined as categories of difference that create socio-spatial distinctions between places, individuals and groups. Furthermore, as part of this
constructivist “turn” the notion of bordering has emerged as a general context for comprehending borders as something continually “being made” (See Van Houtum and Naerssen 2002, Newman, Scott 2011). With bordering, a conceptual transition has also taken place from seeing the border as a physical and often static geographic outcome of socio-spatial dynamics, to a context in which the borders are themselves understood as dynamic functional processes. At its most basic, the process of bordering can be defined as the everyday construction of borders, for example through political discourses and institutions, media representations, school textbooks, stereotypes and everyday forms of transnationalism. There are (at least) two broad and interlinked ways of how bordering can be understood: one **pragmatic** (deriving generalisable knowledge from practices of border creation, confirmation and transcendence) and the other **critical** (theorizing, questioning and contesting the conditions that give rise to border-generating categories). The notion of “bordering” suggests that borders are not only semi-permanent institutions but are also non-finalizable processes. With this perspective, diverse types of borders can be brought within a single but broad frame of analysis for scholars interested in understanding how borders are made and what they mean in concrete social terms (Scott 2012).

General consequences of the bordering perspective include a highly critical re-evaluation of the relationship between states, societies and the borders they create. Furthermore, the bordering perspective also recognizes the profound psychological significance of formal and informal boundaries. As the much-emulated Henri Lefebvre (1972) has shown, the social role, perception and use of space are ineluctably linked to social relationships which are inherently political and constantly in flux. Bordering, as a socio-spatial practice plays an important role in shaping human territoriality and political maps - every social and regional group has an image of its own territory and boundaries.

**Borderscapes**

The work of the EUBORDERSCAPES consortium suggests that more traditional concepts of border-making can be expanded to include more effectively the role social imaginaries; **borderscapes** are social/political panoramas that emerge around border contexts and that connect the realm of high politics with that of communities and individuals who are affected by and negotiate the EU’s Mediterranean borders. As an example of the scientific impact of EUBORDERSCAPES we suggest developing the borderscape concept as a way of thinking about the border and bordering processes not only on the border, but also beyond the line of the border, beyond the border as a place, beyond the landscape through which the border runs, and beyond borderlands with their territorial contiguities to the border. The borderscape functions along the lines of Appadurai’s ethnoscapes, technoscapes, mediascapes, etc. These terms help deal with the “global cultural flow[s]” and the “imagined worlds” in which people live. As such the borderscape is a flexible concept, following interweaving flows and connections, and an inclusive concept not necessarily limited by any clear spatial border. Rajaram and Grundy-Warr privilege the concept of the borderscape as indicating “the complexity and vitality of, and at, the border”, emphasising its status as a landscape of resistance to the simple exploitation of territory by the nation-state. The fact that the borderscape is partially deterritorialized, “not contained in a specific space” and more wide-ranging in its material practices of demarcation than any specific borderline of territorial sovereignty, gives the borderscape an inherent resistance to state demarcation.
As borderscapes, borders in fact cannot be reduced to instruments of terms of inclusion/exclusion as conveyed by metaphors such as “Fortress Europe” but must be expanded to include what is happening every day at the EU’s external borders as reflected in the agency of migrants. What emerges are borders as fields in which processes of traversing and crossing meet those of reinforcement and blocking and in which borders are produced by social institutions and migration as a social force. The borderscapes perspective therefore transcends the panoptic gaze implicit in “border spectacles” as it follows the discursive and performative construction of migration, refugee crises and their consequences in a wider socio-spatial context. This perspective also goes beyond Eurocentrism because migrants and refugees become actors and protagonists of change as well as persons subject to multiple forms of victimization. Different artistic expressions of borders and border crossings can be regarded as expressions of resistance to official understandings of EU southern frontier and as local politics of a new in-between identity that dwells in a borderscape where the very concepts of citizenship and Nation-State are questioned.

One could say that a borderscape is the border, disseminated or diffused across space, defined by what it involves. Rajaram and Grundy-Warr focus on bodies and actors, but mention also histories, solidarities and discourses. To connect it to another comparatively new term in border studies, bordering, the borderscape includes anything involved in the bordering process. Bordering is used to envisage borders as dynamic processes, constantly changing. While bordering is often connected to ordering, also processes leading to alternative, non-binary and transnational concepts of the border can be called forms of bordering. If “anything involved” in a bordering process can be called part of the borderscape, this means that the borderscape is not just a question of what happens on the border or in the immediate borderlands, but also of what happens at any spatial distance from it, at any scale, on any level, in any dimension (including the aesthetical). Borders happen at a distance, as well as at the borderline itself; borders are “in motion”. It remains then to ascertain when and where bordering happens, over which spaces, and to what effect.

To investigate the borderscape is to return to the question of who decides where the border is going to be and what it will mean. The bordering process involves various individuals, groups, and institutions on state and local levels. Newman talks about bottom-up and top-down actors. Sahlins framed this as a centre-periphery problem in his historical studies of the Pyrenees, challenging the perception that the border and the national differences it represents is purely a state concept forced onto local populations. Indeed, in modern nationalism, the power of central state actors cannot function fully without the compliance of larger populations. The rule of the law instated by the border is supplemented by cultural performance taking place in the borderscape. Power requires hegemonic discourses to work, and always opens for the possibility of counter-discourses from the margins and the rescaling of geopolitical relationships. The border is not a stable entity, fixed by a border commission. Rather is it under constant negotiation, also by many everyday actors, borderland populations, border-crossers, immigrant communities, artists, authors, etc., often with perspectives on the border at variance with one another. The border is susceptible to the trickery of its quotidian flâneurs. Brambilla points out that “borderscape” shares with a still current meaning of “landscape” a connotation of seeing things from a specific perspective – which may be
exchanged for other perspectives. The borderscape adds to bordering the spatial and sensible components of power.

Notes


4. Ibid., p. xxviii.


An afterword

iBorder, Borderscapes, Bordering: A Conversation – Chiara Brambilla and Holger Pötzsch

Holger Pötzsch’s article “The emergence of iBorder: bordering bodies, networks, and machines” appeared in issue 1 of the 2015 volume of Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. Extending the insights of that piece, he and Chiara Brambilla discuss a range of theoretical and methodological issues in border research in the conversation that follows.

Holger Pötzsch: In the article on iBorder published in Society and Space, I argue that contemporary borders and regimes of bordering are dislocated, dispersed, and increasingly attach themselves to individual bodies. I move from a description of the socio-technological apparatus of management and control centered upon biometrics, dataveillance, and automation through which these processes are facilitated to questions of the practices through which the varying potentials for individualized in- and exclusion are actualized. I term this transition a movement of attention from iBorder to the contingent practices of iBordering. Would you say that this resonates with your recent demand, made in the article “Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept” in Geopolitics, for a re-introduction of a phenomenological perspective into border research?

Chiara Brambilla: Yes, it definitely does. The shift from technology to cultural technique, proposed in your article, is required, indeed, to comprehend that a phenomenological perspective first and foremost demands a humanization of borders, even in the era of iBorders. As you put it, humans are not transformed into border cyborgs in the era of iBorders, but cultural techniques of bordering influence the formation of subjectivities and co-constitute contingent, rather than simply process given, subjectivities and frames for practices.

HP: To re-introduce a phenomenological perspective into border research, you turn to the concept of the borderscape…

CB: Yes. I argue that the borderscape concept can help us to move towards a phenomenological perspective by bringing together experiences and representations. Following Kenneth Olwig (2008) we can distinguish between two potential meanings of the suffix “-scape”. The first meaning reduces the term to a perspective: the artistic representation of a specified type of view or a scene. The second is concerned instead with the sense of creative work – “shaping and carving”. Therefore, as its etymological evolution reveals, the term borderscape expresses the representation of borders as well as individual and collective practices of border-making highlighting the ways in which the borderscapes concept affords certain sets of reproductive practices and shapes political subjectivities in a particular manner.

HP: I think we agree that rather than determining subjects by simply enforcing particular performances and preventing others, borders resemble contingent frames that systematically encourage certain reproductive practices and discourage others. This means any border regime can be, and in fact always is, resisted and challenged. Both forms of bordering – dominant enactments as well as subversions and resistances – are realized at the level of
everyday practice. This entails a movement away from static, state-centric notions of borders towards frameworks that enable attention to everyday practices and the inherently aesthetic nature of borders and regimes of bordering.

CB: And it brings us back to the concept of the borderscape. Differently from boundaries of nation-states that, according to the modern territorialist geopolitical imaginary, are invented as lines on the flat and two-dimensional surface of the map, borderscapes are multidimensional and mobile constructions that are inhabited by Michel de Certeau’s “spatial practices” (1984). De Certeau’s concept tells us about geographies of actions and stories of the border as place as well as about the mobile subjects that cross it. In the borderscape, representations and practices produce a multiplicity of interrelations that call into question modern state-centric geographies and politics of identity. The ability of the borderscape to bring together experiences and representations helps to develop a performative approach to borders. The borderscape concept allows us to move beyond the often-criticized gap between practices and representations and enables us to abandon the essentialization of borders as divisive lines on modern political maps, moving instead towards an understanding of contemporary borders as continually performed and (re)composed by sets of contingent performances revealing their dynamic character.

HP: These bordering performances, which include both top-down and bottom-up practices, are framed or predisposed by contingent socio-political, historical, cultural, economic, juridical, technological, and other contexts. Adopting this heuristic distinction into different fields or spheres – you talk about multiple dimensionalities –, bordering practices can be approached through a description of static frames – in my case the socio-technical apparatus of iBorder – or through an investigation of the practices through which the reproductive potentials inherent in these frames are constantly negotiated, actualized, or subverted and through which contingent subjectivities are co-constituted – in my case the contingent and predisposed practices of iBordering. To provide a few examples for this, as Rita Raley (2013) argues digital technologies not only process given, but co-constitute contingent subjectivities. She writes that “data is […] performative: the composition of flecks and bits of data into a profile of a terror suspect, the re-grounding of abstract data in the targeting of an actual life, will have the effect of producing that life, that body, as a terror suspect” (128). On a different account, Marieke De Goede, Stephanie Simon, and Marijn Hoijtink (2014) argue that security measures are inherently performative in that they essentially “produce the effects that they name” (416), while Williams Walters (2011) illustrates how the mundane technological work of border control – practices of scanning, inspecting, profiling, investigating – frames subjectivities and predisposes practices along normative lines implied by a socio-technical apparatus.

CB: In my case, I adopt the borderscape as an analytical angle to inquire into the border and migration nexus at and across the Mediterranean, specifically considering what I term as Euro/African borderscapes. I think that the borderscape is a good lens to capture the multilevel complexity of this nexus – from the geopolitical level to the level of social practices and cultural productions. As the borderscape notion highlights, rather than characterize the Mediterranean as the southern border of “fortress Europe” we should strive for more nuanced interpretations. While there is no doubt that we are dealing with an unjust European border regime, what is needed is a more careful analysis of how exactly it operates.
Conceptualizing the frontier-like character of the Mediterranean in terms of borderscapes, it is possible to reveal a situation in which processes of border-crossing meet those of reinforcement and blocking. This shows that the border as a social institution and migration as a social force are both agents in co-producing the borderscape. In this context, I deploy the borderscape notion for taking my distance from the widespread reading of contemporary borders only in terms of exclusion as conveyed by the use of metaphors such as fortress Europe. These metaphors can effectively entrench the idea of a clear-cut division between the inside and the outside as well as the sense of a faultless integration of the inside, thereby paradoxically reinforcing the ‘spectacle of the border’ that characterizes hegemonic EU(opean) border and migration regimes. Nevertheless, moving beyond fortress Europe does not mean to diminish the criticism of the epistemic and political violence of the EU border regime. Rather, taking the borderscape as an analytical angle to inquire into Mediterranean Euro/African border-migration nexus means to grasp the opportunity to advance complementary perspectives, capable of highlighting the dialogic nature of bordering processes and imaginaries as well as the tension between institutional formal modes of political agency and social non-formal modes of agency that co-constitute the borderscape. The borderscape concept allows for a critical inquiry into the (geo)political and epistemic multidimensionality of borders that, on the one hand, enables an understanding of the border’s normative dimension (hegemonic borderscapes) and, on the other hand, points to the fact that borders involve discourses and practices of resistance and struggle against regimes and practices of control (counter-hegemonic borderscapes).

HP: This brings us back to bordering performances and the fact that they include both top-down and bottom-up practices. Each of them can function – as I suggest in my study on the socio-technological frame of iBorder and predisposed practices of iBordering – in a hegemonic or counter-hegemonic manner, i.e. both top-down and bottom-up practices can either reinforce, or challenge and undermine, established discourses, positions, and configurations of power. This leads over to the issue of power, how it is exercised both from above and from below, how it impacts upon the agency of subjects, and this way co-constitutes subjectivities and practices. Foucault has conceptualized the transition of politico-juridical regimes of power that are maintained through the punishment and ultimately eradication of perpetrators breaking the law, to disciplinary techniques that rely upon techniques of surveillance and aim at correcting transgressive behavior and at reinstituting former villains as productive members of society. According to Foucault, both these forms of power are part of an anatomo-politics that is inherently centered upon the individual human body. With the advances of statistics and new means of measuring and predicting, however, he argues, a new form of power is brought to emerge that disregards individual cases and instead regulates populations at the level of abstracted risk assessments and cost-benefit ratios. This massifying trajectory of security apparatuses has today reached unprecedented proportions through a combination of massive dataveillance with data mining techniques and big data predictive analytics that allow for an increasingly sophisticated prediction of patterns of behavior and association at population level. In these processes, that according to Deleuze mark a transition from disciplinary societies to societies of control, power not any longer becomes productive of docile individual bodies alone, but also of digitized data-doubles, so-called dividuals in Deleuze’s idiom, whose contingent identity potentials entail performative socio-political effects that feed back into the bodies, subjectivities, and agencies they originated from. Such co-constitutive relations between technologies, agents, and operations...
lie at the heart of what I mean by the notion of bordering as a fundamental cultural technique. The techniques and technologies underlying contemporary late-modern border regimes emerge as performative and as productive of the very distinctions and divisions they allegedly merely process.

CB: Also the borderscape approach favours such a performative viewpoint on borders and, in addition, brings together the concept of performance and the notion of performativity. In the borderscape, practices of bordering are not just performed, but are also revealed to be performative of particular socio-cultural, economic and political realities and subject-positions. In this way, performativity highlights the political implications of performances and connects these to a critical reflection on the exercise of power. The connection between performance and performativity is also at stake in Mark Salter’s reflection (2011) on borders where he looks at the tensions between three registers of border performances – ‘formal’, ‘practical’ and ‘popular’. Enmeshed in dynamic spatial and temporal relations, formal, practical, and popular performances of sovereignty co-produce hegemonic borderscapes and, at the same time, negotiate, resist, and potentially subvert these in and through counter-hegemonic bordering practices enacted by a plurality of actors beyond the sovereign state. As you explained above, also your conceptualization of practices of iBordering uses the vocabulary of performance and performativity to explain that the practice of bordering as a cultural technique brings to light forms of power that are not only hegemonic and oppressive but productively operate on the agency of subjects and consequently co-constitute both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic subjectivities. I think both our approaches constitute a crucial step beyond what seems to me a core epistemological blind-spot at the heart of border research, as currently configured.

HP: I think border research too often ends up with either condemning borders as inherently exclusive and repressive, or by reiterating them as a priori givens and/or necessary tools to order and disambiguate complex and contradictory socio-political and conceptual terrains. To me it is quite apparent that borders do both. Without borders or boundaries order would be impossible. However, precisely through this ordering function borders also always exclude and oppress what has been defined as the implicitly constitutive outside of an, ultimately arbitrarily defined, inside. Techniques of bordering operate at a juridical, disciplinary, and biopolitical register at once, and frame both reproductive and subversive practices. To account for this, I think the idea of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic borderscapes comes in very handy.

CB: I agree. The idea of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic borderscapes offers us the opportunity to highlight the constitutive role that borders in modernity have played in the production of political subjectivity, thereby showing the potential of the borderscape to also constitute a space for liberating political imagination while opening up spaces within which the organization of new forms of the political and the social become possible. To put it differently, the borderscapes concept opens for a critical border research that embraces ethical and normative issues of in/exclusion with which border research has been rather ill-equipped to handle until now. This way, borderscapes widen the bordering viewpoint by highlighting the tensions between different actors, localities, and modalities that are involved in border-making. As argued by Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr (2007), borderscapes show that every society is in a state of becoming, every political system is always contingent
and the boundary between belonging and exclusion is floating and continually contested. As a consequence, the concept of the borderscape enables an understanding of the transition from a “politics of being” to a “politics of becoming”; and the critical potential of borders can be accounted for in their double-function as both markers of belonging and places of becoming. This requires a nuanced and critical re-reading and understanding of the border not as an entity taken for granted, but as a resource in terms of the construction of novel (geo)political imaginations, social and spatial imaginaries and cultural images. Not only should this approach into border research be developed at the theoretical and conceptual level (as it has been doing since the “processual shift” of the late 1980s and early 1990s), but also a methodological outlook in terms of practical methodological agenda-setting deserves deeper attention. The question is how could this methodological approach actually be carried out?

HP: Here we approach the theme of an article we currently work on together and where we set out to develop a methodology for border research based on the concepts of borderscapes, borderscaping, and bordering as a cultural technique. iBorder/iBordering, for instance, operates at a socio-technical level. I explain how recent technological advances afford new regimes and practices of in/exclusion that at once dislocate the border and render it potentially ubiquitous through its attachment to individual bodies and networked devices. At the same time, however, these technologies not only afford new forms of management, coercion, and control, but always also entail possibilities for unprecedented practices of resistance and subversion. In another article, that is currently forthcoming in the *Journal for Borderlands Studies*, on the other hand, I direct attention to a cultural register and show how cultural expressions play into bordering practices by either reiterating or challenging tacit perceptual, cognitive, and performative schemata and frames. In both cases attention is directed to both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices and articulations. In our planned article we set out to systematize these processes and interconnect the various spheres across which they play out. So far, these issues have only been addressed in a partial and incremental manner.

CB: To understand how a methodological approach based on these considerations can be carried out, we need to direct attention to a political side of method. Taking up what Sandro Mezzadra and Bret Neilson argue in their recent book *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour* (2013): “… for us the question of border as method is something more than methodological. It is above all a question of politics, about the kinds of social worlds and subjectivities produced at the border and the ways that thought and knowledge can intervene in these processes of production” (17). That is, the assumption that “method is as much about acting on the world as it is about knowing it” (17). Hence, moving towards this particular methodological approach involves a shift from a fixed form of knowledge to a notion of knowledge as inherently contingent and the constantly evolving, temporary result of complex negotiations and struggles – the border as “a site of struggle” not only over practices and frames of in/exclusion but also about the very knowledges and processes of knowledge formation underlying these. By highlighting the role of borders as sites of struggle where the right to become can be expressed, this methodology for border research opens a space of political possibilities capable of overcoming the modern territorialist (geo)political imaginary and moving towards a new politics of becoming based on a pluritopical and plurivocal interpretation of borders. This would offer an analytical understanding of a variety of complex processes and practices of borderscaping that can be explaining thinking of borders and acting on them in order to operationalize their heuristic potential through different analytical
dimensions, such as politics and policies, practices, representations, perceptions, and interpretations. Differently said, this methodological approach gives us the chance to relate the somewhat abstract level of conceptual change in border research with actual **borderscaping** as practices through which fluctuating borders are imagined, materially established, experienced, lived as well as reinforced and blocked but also crossed, traversed and inhabited.

HP: This implies a move from the borderscape as a concept to borderscaping as a method. Whereas in your article in *Geopolitics* you investigate the critical potential of borderscapes from a conceptual viewpoint, in the article we are now developing we attempt to push the reflection one step further by focusing on the methodological implications of borderscapes by reflecting on diverse dynamics and spheres of borderscaping. So far, I think we agree that a heuristic distinction between various dimensions or registers (such as society, politics, economics, technology, culture, …), where both top-down and bottom-up processes and practices of bordering take place, is possible. Processes of borderscaping happen at the level of “vernacular” day-to-day practices and through articulations and performances emanating from “formal institutional positions of power”. This understanding of a double-nature of borders and practices and processes of iBordering or borderscaping taking place on a multiplicity of registers at once, and entailing contingent effects and results, can help us to critically explore the complexities of these processes as well as the way in which they operate both spatially and temporally.

CB: I think that these reflections on a possible method of borderscaping bring us back to the urgency to develop alternative approaches to borders along the ontological and epistemological axes of reflection as well. Borderscaping implies a processual ontology of borders that recognizes the contingent, evolving, and constantly emerging nature of reality and that recognizes that borders are both markers of belonging and places of becoming. Along the epistemological axis, borderscaping suggests moving towards a multi-sited epistemological approach, capable of expressing the “multiperspectival view” advocated by Chris Rumford (2012) as being central in critical border studies and defined as “seeing like a border” as an alternative to “see like a state”. It is an epistemology and a methodological gaze that, just like the lens of a kaleidoscope, is able to convey complementary and dialogical perspectives grasping the interaction between political visions and everyday socio-cultural practices as well as social representations and artistic imaginaries. It is also a double gaze able to grasp the configurations assumed by the border on a small and large scale, globally and locally, and taking into account not only the ‘big stories’ of the nation-state construction, but also the ‘small stories’ that come from experiencing the border in day-to-day life. Not only offers this approach a kaleidoscopic outlook to borders but it also gives us the opportunity to develop a *complex standpoint* on borders, which is more than a mere combination of approaches significantly contributing to explain the epistemological, spatial and temporal multidimensionality of b/ordering processes and practices. As the etymology of the adjective “complex” reveals, the term comes from the Latin “*complexus*”, or that which is woven together: prefix “*com-*” [“with”] + the verb “*plectere*” [“to weave, braid, twine, entwine”]. That which is woven together cannot be torn apart without losing the overall pattern, without losing the connection, the interrelationships, the interactions.
HP: We’ll try and explore these complexities and systematize their constitutive elements in a productive manner without loosing sight of this whole. As such, any conceptual distinction we make will be heuristic – a pragmatic attempt to highlight certain elements for particular analytical purposes, without claiming the ability to objectively describe what ultimately emerges as a contingent and constantly emergent reality.

CB: Let’s try then to navigate these complexities through borderscaping.
5 Dissemination (selection)

5.1 Peer-reviewed articles


5.2 Monographs and edited books


5.3 Non peer-reviewed articles


5.4 Major scientific conferences and panels

EUBORDERSCAPES International Conference “Mapping Conceptual Change in Thinking European Borders”, University of Bergamo (Italy), July 1-4, 2013
EUBORDERSCAPES panels at the IVth EUGEO Congress, La Sapienza, Rome, September 5, 2013


EUBORDERSCAPES Panels at the Association of Borderlands Scholars 1st World Conference “Post-Cold War Borders: Global Trends and Regional Responses”, Joensuu (Finland), June 6, 2014

EUBORDERSCAPES panels at the XIV BRIT Conference: The Border as a Source of Innovation, Arras (France), Lille and Mons (Belgium), November 4-7, 2014

EUBORDERSCAPES International Conference “Borders at the Interface”. Beer Sheba/Jerusalem, Israel, December 7-11, 2014

EUBORDERSCAPES panels at the Association for Borderlands Studies Annual Meeting Border Studies and the New World (Dis)order: Relating Theories and Practice, Portland, 8-11.04.2015.

EUBORDERSCAPES panels at the Vth EUGEO Congress, Lorand Eotvos University, Budapest, 1-3 September 2015


5.5 Scientific conference presentations

Barthel, Martin: “Discourses on Cooperation and Conflict: The influences of narratives on the cross-border cooperation in Przemyśl”. Paper given at the ABS 1st World Conference “Post-Cold War Borders: Global Trends and Regional Responses”, Joensuu (Finland), June 6, 2014

Barthel, Martin: “Border Perspectives: Local discourses on the Eastern and Western border of Poland”. Keynote at Recourse Seminar, University of Gdansk (Poland), October 2014


Bueno Lacy, Rodrigo and van Houtum, Henk: “Border linearity or how to cage the world”. Paper given at the ABS Annual Conference, Albuquerque, April 2-5, 2014


Bueno Lacy, Rodrigo and van Houtum, Henk: “Lies, damned lies & maps: EU’s cartopolitical abduction of Europe”. Paper given at the XIV BRIT Conference: The Border as a Source of Innovation, Arras (France), Lille and Mons (Belgium), November 4-7, 2014


Bürkner, Hans-Joachim: „Europeanization from below: how can it be grasped?” Paper given at the ABS 1st World Conference “Post-Cold War Borders: Global Trends and Regional Responses”, Joensuu (Finland), June 6, 2014

Bürkner, Hans-Joachim: “‘Get us some money and leave us alone’: Serbian perspectives on EU accession and neighbourhood”. Paper given at the ABS 1st World Conference “Post-Cold War Borders: Global Trends and Regional Responses”, St. Petersburg (Russia), June 12, 2014


Koeppen, Bernhard “When the absence of borders really matters: EU’s policy and the internal market”. Paper given at the International Conference “Border Regions in Transition (BRIT)”. Arras/Lille/Mons, France, November 4-7, 2014

Koeppen, Bernhard: “The Paradigm Marks the Outer-Border: Thoughts on the EU’s Internal Market as Major Bordering and de-Bordering Feature”. Paper given at the EUBORDERSCAPES International Conference “Borders at the Interface”. Beer Sheba/Jerusalem, Israel, December 7-11, 2014


Krasteva, Anna: “Politics and poetry of borders: western and eastern images and imaginaries”. Paper given at the ABS 1st World Conference “Post-Cold War Borders: Global Trends and Regional Responses”, Joensuu, Finland and St Petersburg, Russia, June 9-13, 2014


Suchet, André: “Destinations touristiques et coopération transfrontalière en Pyrénées: concurrences et complémentarités entre acteurs, organisations et projets”. Paper given at the 14th Congress “Border Regions in Transition (BRIT)”. Université d’Artois, Université du Littoral Côte d’Opale, Université de Lille 1 et Université catholique de Louvain, Arras, Lille, Mons, November 4-7, 2014

Suchet, André: “Les escrocs du transfrontalier ». Enquête sur des acteurs méconnus et non appréciés de la coopération transfrontalière en Europe”. Paper given at the 14th Congress “Border Regions in Transition (BRIT)”. Université d’Artois, Université du Littoral Côte d’Opale, Université de Lille 1 et Université catholique de Louvain, Arras, Lille, Mons, November 4-7, 2014


5.6 Media contributions, interviews


Krasteva, Anna: Krasteva A. TV show “Brussels 1” on the future of Schengen. TV Bulgaria on Air, 9 January, 2016

Krasteva, Anna: To be a foreigner today in Europe and to be a Bulgarian abroad. Bulgarian National Radio, 18 January, 2016


Ristolainen, Mari. “Rajanainen”. Interview by Laura Määttänen (photo Lauri Rotko). Suunnuntaisuomalainen, Sunday supplement of four newspapers: Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, 03.05.2015: 15; Karjalaainen, 03.05.2015: 17; Keski-suomalainen, 03.05.2015: 9; Savon Sanomat, 3.5.2015: 35.


Van Houtum H. (2014) Interview voor Nijmegen1-TV over de film ‘Wegen’ (samenwerking filmmaker en Nijmegen Centre for Border Research)


5.7 Project Video Films

1. *The Invisible Enemy Across the Wall: Israeli and Palestinian Children’s Perspective of the “Other”*, director Renen Yezerski (2015), 30 min., in cooperation with EUBORDERSCAPES Work Package 5:
   c. available on youtube

2. *Houdoud al bahr / I Confini del Mare / The Mediterranean Frontiers. Mazara - Mahdia*, directors Chiara Brambilla and Sergio Visinoni (2015), 60 min., in cooperation with EUBORDERSCAPES Work Package 5:
   b. Opening lecture of the Master Course on Epistemology of Globalization taught by Prof. Mauro Ceruti, Master Programme in Cultural Studies and International Relations, IULM University of Milan, 08.10.2015.
   d. EUBORDERSCAPES Policy Conference “Borders and Bordering in Contemporary Europe”, University of London, 10.-12.11.2015.
   e. Bachelor Course on Migration and Cultural and Linguistic Strategies for Intercultural Services taught by Prof. Paola Gandolfi, Department of Human and Social Sciences, University of Bergamo, 19.11.2015
   f. Centre for Migration and Diaspora Studies, SOAS, University of London, 02.12.2015.
   g. Master Course on Sciences of Globalization taught by Prof. Gianluca Bocchi, Department of Human and Social Sciences, University of Bergamo, 10.12.2015
   h. EUBORDERSCAPES 3rd Scientific Conference “Borderscapes and Beyond: Change and Continuities in Thinking, Writing, Making Borders”, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 28.01-30.01.2016
   i. Auditorium di Piazza Libertà, Bergamo, in cooperation with the course “Le migrazioni nel Novecento. Strumenti per conoscere e capire”, Fondazione Bergamo nella Storia onlus in cooperation with Museo Storico di Bergamo/Associazione Amici del Museo Storico di Bergamo/Fondazione Serughetti La Porta/Ufficio Scolastico Territoriale di Bergamo, 21.03.2016
   j. Symposium “Borderscape as an Interdisciplinary Concept”, Université du Luxembourg, 08-09.04.2016

   b. selected to compete for the Tiger Awards competition for short films at the 45th International Films Festival of Rotterdam (IFFR), 27.01-07.02.2016.

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d. *Coding and decoding borders* exhibition 13.04-31.05.2016 at Faculté d’architecture La Cambre/Horta, Brussels

e. Festival Internacional de Cine de Murcia (IBAFF), 01.-12.03.2016.


g. Film Society of Lincoln Center and The Museum of Modern Art, New York, 21.03.2016.


m. Indie Lisboa 13th Festival Internacional Cinema Independente 20.04-01.05.2016. Official Competition.

n. 13th Festival Internacional de Documentales de Madrid - Documenta Madrid, 27.-08.05.2016.

o. Hot Docs, Canadian International Documentary Festival, Toronto, 28.04-08.05.2016. Official Competition.

p. 13th Festival de Cine Africano (FCAT), Tarifa/Tangier, 12.05-04.06.2016.

q. 2nd Festival Internacional de Cine Filmadrid, Madrid, 02.-11.06.2016

r. 27th FID-Marseille Festival International de Cinéma, 12-18.07.2016.


4. *Everyday Borders*, 2015, 59 mins, made by the University of East London’s Centre for Research on Migration, Refugees and Belonging (UEL) 

   https://vimeo.com/126315982


5. *Out of the Border Box* with Gladeema Nasruddin, with involvement of Centre national de la recherche scientifique/Pacte (forthcoming).
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