Working Paper 2

A Situated Intersectional Everyday Approach to the Study of Bordering

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ABSTRACT
As a working paper, this is an incomplete review of the some of the theoretical and methodological issues that need to be examined when we approach complex, multi-faceted and comparative research on bordering from a situated, intersectional and everyday life practices approach. Accordingly, the paper starts by developing an epistemological situated perspective, starting with issues of situated knowledge and then moving also to situated imagination – something that since the publication of Anderson’s (1983) classic *Imagined Communities* is recognized as central to the study of boundaries and borders. It then moves to examine issues related to the application of an Intersectionality research approach and continues with the elaboration of the ‘everyday life’ approach to such a research. The last section of the paper before the short concluding methodological comment examines an interdisciplinary approach to the notion of ‘bordering’, encompassing both various constructions of individual and collective relationships between ‘self’ and ‘non-self’ which are part of the inclusion of social identities in the study of bordering to some of the elements emphasized when studying geographical and state ‘border work’.

**Introduction: Situated knowledge and imagination**

One of the cornerstones of feminist theory, in all its varieties, has been its challenge to positivist notions of objectivity and truth. There is a large variety of positions among feminists concerning these issues, starting from – in Sandra Harding’s term – ‘feminist empiricists’ (Harding 1993:51), who do not intend to challenge or reinvent the framework of ‘science’ as such but rather to do a better job in the existing one, up to post-modernist theorists who rejected any notion of objectivity and ‘truth’. Despite their differences, they have all challenged ‘the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere’ (Haraway 1991:189) as a cover and a legitimisation of a hegemonic masculinist positioning.

Among those feminist theorists who did not reject completely any notion of truth as such, standpoint theories were developed which claim, in somewhat different ways, that it is vital to account for the social positioning of the social agent. This accounting of the situatedness of the knowing subject has been used epistemologically in standpoint theories at least in two different ways. One which claims that a specific social situatedness (that in itself has been constructed in several different ways) endows the subject with a privileged access to truth. The other, closer to the theoretical view expressed in this paper, rejects such a position and views the process of approximating the truth as part of a dialogical relationship among subjects, who are differentially situated. In virtually all variations of standpoint theory, however, the reduction of knowledge to a simple reflection of its social basis has been rejected. As Nancy Hartsock (1997:371-3) asserted, the concept of the ‘feminist standpoint’ had been developed in the first place in order to oppose the view that social groups ‘see... the world in a particular way’ just because they exist ‘in a particular social location’. She reminds us that the concept of a ‘feminist standpoint’ was meant to contrast the epistemologically naïve notion of ‘women’s viewpoint’, that a ‘standpoint is a project, not an inheritance; it is achieved, not given’ and emphasizes that ‘the criteria for privileging some knowledges over others’ are not the subject matter of (the academic discipline of) epistemology but are ‘ethical and political’.
Most standpoint feminists, therefore, reject the notion of an automatic correlation between social location and standpoint. Dorothy Smith (1990) has most clearly emphasized the need to differentiate between social positioning and social practice. She claims situated knowledge is anchored in actual social practices (that are linked to but not reducible to certain social positionings), rather than immediately to social positionings. This can facilitate the recognition that a variety of practices can be related to the same positioning, as well as provide a basis for a dialogue with people who, although from other social positionings, share similar practices (as well as similar goals and values, as we will discuss further on) across borders and boundaries.

Another facet of the debate has been ‘the difference between the individual and the group as units of analysis’, to use Patricia Hill-Collins’ formulation (1997:375). Given the importance of the collective experience in the epistemological process, the definition of ‘a group’ is obviously one of the most important issues in standpoint theory. Due to differing understandings in this context, ‘group’ can refer to those who are commonly located in a particular positioning; belong to the same ‘identity community’; share a ‘social network’; or associate with a common ‘political community’.

While early formulations of standpoint theory define all ‘women’ as a grouping (as eg Dorothy Smith tends to do), gradually such groupings became first fragmented (for example, Hill-Collins [1990] talks about Black women) and then (notably via Sandra Harding’s reformulation of her position in her 1991 book) a more encompassing notion of difference and intersectionality is presented which notes that not all women hold the same views or share the same political goals, moral values or even the same interests. Moreover, such a position would also fail to allow agency space to individual women as subjects.

More recently, Silvia Walby (2001:498) argued that the uncritical use of the concept of ‘community’ in standpoint theory evokes exaggerated notions of ‘epistemological chasms’ between the groups that hold the situated knowledge. She reminds us that ‘the social’ is not exclusively (and not even primarily) constituted in ‘communities’ and warns that thinking too much in terms of communities ‘leads thinking about the social in too narrow and bounded a direction’. In her response to Walby, Joey Sprague (2001:528) also warned from a ‘simple version of standpoint theory’ that ‘breaks down into a kind of relativism that typically gets resolved by romanticizing the oppressed’. Standpoint theory indeed is not usually based on a strong and narrow concept of ‘community’ but on a much wider, more heterogeneous concept of dialogical relations among women as elaborated in standpoint theory probably first by Patricia Hill-Collins (1990).

As already mentioned, the standpoint that is expected to emerge from a specific positioning has sometimes – especially in earlier versions of standpoint theory – been expected to provide a privileged access to liberating insight, while the more common position seems to be – more modest and closer to the general academic debate on ‘sociology of knowledge’ – that it produces merely different insights. The ‘stronger’ claim as it has sometimes been made in the context of ‘identity politics’ has been (polemically) summed up by Hill-Collins as saying that ‘the more subordinated the group’, the ‘purer’ its ‘vision’ (Hill-Collins 1990:207). Some standpoint feminists
such as Zilla Eisenstein (1993) recommended for example specifically taking the positioning of women of colour and their multiple oppression as an epistemological starting point. This, however, was not intended to imply that only those who share a certain marginal or oppressed positioning would be able to really understand it (and therefore only women should study women, only Blacks should study Blacks etc) or even, enjoy thereby a privileged access to understanding society as a whole. The ‘ethnocentrism’ of such a position has been rejected by Harding (1993:59):

> The claim by women that women’s lives provide a better starting point for thought about gender systems is not the same as the claim that their own lives are the best such starting point (ibid.:58; italics added).

She points out that Hegel was not a slave, Marx and Engels not proletarians. She and other feminist theoreticians advocated that also people from the centre use ‘marginalized lives’ as ‘better places from which to start asking causal and critical questions about the social order’ (ibid:59). However, valuable as this exercise in imagining oneself into what one believes the worst conceivable social positioning certainly is, two problems remain. Firstly, as Hill-Collins rightly comments, the one worst positioning simply does not exist:

> Although it is tempting to claim that Black women are more oppressed than everyone else (…), this simply may not be the case (Hill-Collins, 1998:74).

Hill-Collins is right in her rejection of any mechanistic construction of hierarchies of oppression and her resulting call for a dialogue of people from different positionings as the only way to ‘approximate truth’. However, there is also a second problem. Even prioritizing non-hierarchically the ‘view from the margins’ might lead to underestimating the relevance of the knowledge of the dominant centre. Although the view from the margins produces other kinds of knowledge that are valuable (and often also more attractive to study) it is crucial for any emancipatory movement to understand the hegemonic centre and the ways people situated there think and act. After all, it is this most powerful position where most political decisions affecting the largest number of people in society come from. Not surprisingly, however, access to the study of hegemonic positions of power is the most difficult to attain. Emphasis on the importance of the lives of the most marginal elements in society can sometimes collude with the attempts of hegemonic centres to remain opaque, while at the same time to maintain the surveillance of marginal elements in society.

One element that is missing in the various discussions on standpoint theory relates to the question of how the transitions from positionings to practices, practices to standpoints, knowledge, meaning, values and goals, actually take place. As Marcel Stoetzler & I argued in our (2002) article one of the central ways in which these transitions and transformations take place is by various processes of imagining. Based on a critical understanding of ‘standpoint theory’ and the concept of ‘situatedness’ as outlined above, we argue for the expansion of feminist epistemology from (situated) knowledge to include also the notion of the (situated) imagination.

The faculty of the imagination not only conditions how sensual data are being transformed into conscious knowledge, but the imagination is also fundamental to why, whether and what we are ready to experience, perceive and know in the first place. The notion of the situated imagination would be closely related firstly, to Castoriadis’ (RERF) notion of the imagination as ‘creative’ of both the category
‘society’ itself and of the processes through which we perceive and know of it. Crucially, the imagination in this context is not straightforwardly a faculty of the individual but it is (also, or even primarily) a social faculty. Secondly, the situated imagination also encompasses Adorno’s (1978) concept of fantasy that preserves the wish and the (bodily) impulses in thought and knowledge. In Adorno’s concept, we see a reflection of a line of thought that reaches back via Freud to Spinoza (Gatens & Lloyd, 199). This tradition rejects the one-sided rationalist elimination of fantasy from mental processes and sees its epistemological importance as a gateway to the body on the one hand and society on the other hand.

The emphasis on the concept of imagination allows thus for an additional critical perspective on epistemology that should be particularly relevant to feminist discussions on corporeality and criticisms of one-sided, abstractly rational notions of understanding. It is particularly suitable for discussions of the everyday in general and everyday bordering in particular. It is not incidental that Ben Anderson’s classical study of nationalism talked about ‘imagined communities’. However, while Anderson himself claimed that nations are imagined communities ‘because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (Anderson, 1991 [1983]: 6).

This definition is problematic, however, because such an abstract form of community is necessarily based on an imagined abstract sense of simultaneity. In such an imagination, former and future generations are necessarily excluded while they are so central in nationalist imagery, whether their organizing principle is common ‘ethnic origin’ or not. Moreover, as Poole comments (1999:10), such a definition assumes that if the members could, against all odds, meet everyone in the nation face to face, imagination would have been redundant. Moreover, any construction of boundaries of belonging, of a delineated collectivity with its own boundaries that includes some people – concrete or not – and excludes others, involves an act of active imagination. This is so, especially in the way Castoriadis discusses imagination (1987). According to him, the whole classificatory system of signification is imagined, often pre-experienced and mostly pre-thought. We need a notion of the nation, which – as has been shown, can be constructed in many different ways – before we can determine if the people we meet belong to it or not (in the same way that we need a notion of masculinity and femininity before we determine whether the newly born baby is a boy or a girl).

The act of bordering, therefore, leans heavily on processes of situated knowledge and imagination. Before examining these processes in more detail, however, we need to go back to The debate, both sociological and epistemological, of whether or not, or to what degree, knowledge and meaning are bound to particular social locations and what is the relationship between these and any particular systems of power. For this purpose we need the notion of Intersectionality.

**Intersectionality**

Epistemologically, intersectionality (Crenshaw,1989; Brah & Phoenix, 2004; Lutz & al, 2010) can be described as a development of feminist standpoint theory which claims, in somewhat different ways, that it is vital to account for the social positioning of the social agent as described above. However,
Intersectionality theory was interested even more in how the differential situatedness of different social agents affects and is affected by different social, economic and political projects. In this way it can no doubt be considered as one of the outcomes of the mobilization and proliferation of different identity group struggles for recognition (Taylor, 1992; Fraser, 1995). However, as Intersectionality theory continued to develop and has been adopted in more and more disciplinary fields, from law to social policy to sociology and political theory, it stopped focusing exclusively on marginalized and racialised social groupings and has become a major theoretical and methodological research tool (McCall, 2005, Yuval-Davis, 2006). In this section of the paper I want to focus on three major issues relevant to the use of intersectionality in this way: The first relates to the division McCall (2005) makes between those approaches to intersectionality which she calls ‘inter-categorical’ and ‘intra-categorical’; the second relates to the relationships which should be understood as existing between the various intersectional categories; and the third relate to boundaries of the intersectional approach and thus the number of as well as which social categories should be included in intersectional analysis.

**Inter- or intra-categories?**

According to McCall, studies that have used an intersectional approach differ as to whether they have used an inter- or intra-categorical approach. By inter-categorical approach she means focusing on the way the intersection of different social categories, such as race, gender, class, etc., affect particular social behaviour or the distribution of resources. Intra-categorical studies, on the other hand, are less occupied in the relationships among various social categories but rather problematize the meaning and boundaries of the categories themselves, such as whether black women were included in the category ‘women’ or what are the shifting boundaries of who is considered to be ‘black’ in a particular place and time.

Unlike McCall, I do not see these two approaches as mutually exclusive and instead call for an intersectionality approach which combines the sensitivity and dynamism of the intra-categorical approach with the more macro socio-economic perspective of the inter-categorical approach. This is especially important in comparative research. I consider as crucial the analytical differentiation between different facets of social analysis – that of people’s positionings along socio-economic grids of power; that of people’s experiential, emotional and identificatory perspectives of where they belong; and that of their normative value systems. These different facets of intersectionality are related to each other but are also irreducible to each other as they have their own discursive ontological bases (Yuval-Davis, 2006). And as emphasized when discussing feminist standpoint theory, one should not assume direct causal relationship between the situatedness of people’s gaze and their cognitive, emotional and moral perspectives on life. For this reason it is not enough to construct inter-categorical tabulations in order to predict and, even more so, understand people’s positions and attitudes to life.

**The relationship between the social categories**

There is another reason for the inadequacy of using an inter-categorical approach on its own. Unless it is complemented with an intra-categorical approach, it can be
understood as an additive rather than a mutually constitutive approach to the relationships between social categories.

Although discourses of race, gender, class, etc. have their own ontological bases which cannot be reduced to each other, there is no separate concrete meaning of any facet of these social categories, as they are mutually constitutive in any concrete historical moment. To be a woman is different whether you are middle class or working class, a member of the hegemonic majority or a racialized minority, living in the city or in the country, young or old, straight or gay, etc. Viewing intersectional analysis in this way links the interrogation of concrete meanings of categories and their boundaries to specific historical contexts which are shifting and contested, rather than just to abstract ontological and epistemological enquiries. However, just assuming that any particular inter-categorical study would result in a full understanding of the specific constructions of any particular social category in any particular context, as McCall does, is also reductionist.

The boundaries of intersectional analysis and intersectional categories

While many black feminists (e.g. Crenshaw, 1989; Dill, 1983; Bryan et al., 1985) focus in their intersectional analyses on the triad boundaries of race, class and gender, others have added the specific categories they were interested in, such as age (e.g. Bradley, 1996); disability (e.g. Oliver, 1995; Meekosha & Dowse, 1997); sedentarism (e.g. Lentin, 1999); or sexuality (e.g. Kitzinger, 1987). In other works, however, feminists attempted to develop complete lists and included in them much higher numbers – for example, Helma Lutz (2002) relates to fourteen categories while Charlotte Bunch (2001) to sixteen. Floya Anthias and I (1983, 1992; see also Yuval-Davis, 2006b; Yuval-Davis, 2011a), strongly argue that intersectional analysis should not be limited only to those on its multiple margins of society, but rather that the boundaries of intersectional analysis should encompass all members of society and thus intersectionality should be seen as the right theoretical framework for analysing social stratification. There is a parallel here with the struggle of many of us during the 1970s and 1980s to point out (what these days seems much more obvious), that everybody, not just racialized minorities, have ‘ethnicities’ and that members, especially men of hegemonic majorities, are not just ‘human beings’ but are gendered, classed, ethnocized, etc.

In *Gender Trouble* (1990), Judith Butler mocks the ‘etc.’ which often appears at the end of long (and different) lists of social divisions mentioned by feminists, and sees it as an embarrassed admission of a ‘sign of exhaustion as well as of the illimitable process of signification itself’ (1990: 143). As Fraser (1995) and Knapp (1999) make clear, however, such a critique is valid only within the discourse of identity politics where there is a correspondence between social positionings or locations and identifications with particular social groupings. When no such conflation takes place, Knapp finds rightly that Butler’s talk

‘of an illimitable process of signification’ can be reductionist if it is generalized in an unspecified way … [and] runs the risk of levelling historically constituted ‘factual’ differences and thereby suppressing ‘differences’ on its own terms. (Knapp, 1999: 130)
Knapp’s critique of Butler clarifies again the crucial importance of the separation of the different analytical dimensions in which social divisions need to be examined, discussed above. Nevertheless, the question remains whether there are, or are not, in any particular historical condition, specific and limited numbers of social divisions that construct the grid of power relations within which the different members of the society are located.

As I mentioned elsewhere (Yuval-Davis, 2011), I have two different answers to this question which are not mutually exclusive. The first one is that while in specific historical situations and in relation to the daily lives of specific people there are some social divisions which are more important than others in constructing their specific positionings relative to others around them, there are some social divisions, such as gender, stage in the life cycle, ethnicity and class which tend to shape most people’s lives in most social locations while other social divisions such as those relating to disability, membership in particular castes or status as indigenous or refugee people tend to affect in this way less people globally. At the same time, for those who are affected by those and other social divisions not mentioned here in particular historical contexts, such social divisions are crucial and thus rendering them visible needs to be fought for. This is a case where recognition – of social power axes, not of social identities – is of vital political importance.

My second answer relates to what Castoriadis’ ‘creative imagination’ that underlies any linguistic and other social categories of signification. Although certain social conditions may facilitate this, the construction of categories of signification is, in the last instance, a product of human creative freedom and autonomy. Without specific social agents who construct and point to certain analytical and political features, the rest of us would not be able to distinguish them. Rainbows include the whole spectrum of different colours, but how many colours we distinguish depend on our specific social and linguistic milieu. It is for this reason that struggles for recognition always also include an element of construction and it is for this reason that analyzing the relationships between positionings, identities and political values are so important (and impossible if they are all reduced to the same ontological level). This should be one of the important – if daunting tasks when studying what can appear ‘messy’, entangled. and incoherent everyday lives in which processes of bordering continuously are taking place.

**The notion of ‘the everyday’**

Mike Featherstone (1995) has tried to summarise, in spite of lack of consensus among the different theorists who focused on the everyday, those characteristics which are most frequently associated with everyday life (which he differentiates from what he calls ‘heroic life’):

a) An emphasis on routines, taken for granted experiences, beliefs and practices; the mundane ordinary world which is untouched by great events and the extraordinary.

b) A view of the everyday as the sphere of reproduction and maintenance, a pre-institutional zone in which the basic activities which sustain other worlds are performed, mainly by women.

c) An emphasis on the present which provides a non-reflexive sense of immersion in the immediacy of current experiences and activities.
d) A focus on the non-individual embodied sense of being together in spontaneous common activities outside or in the interstices of the institutional domain; an emphasis on common sensuality, being with other in frivolous playful sociability.

e) An emphasis on heterogeneous thinking and knowledge, the disorderly babble of many tongues in which speech and the magic worlds of voices are valued over the linearity of writing. Syncretic and non systematic knowledge, what Agnes Heler (1984) describes, after Plato, as doxa (general opinion grounded in daily routines), rather than the episteme (scientific knowledge which aims to provide lasting truths).

This approach to the everyday life constructs it basically as a particular domain of social life. Others have sought to comprehend the historical processes which have led to the increasing differentiation and colonization of everyday life. The Frankfurt School (Held, 1980) and Lefebvre (1987) focused on the commodification and instrumental rationalization of everyday life. Heller (1984) has drawn attention on the ways in which the heterogeneity of everyday life has been subjected to processes of homogenization. The everyday is where the modern finds its material and complex expression but always in relation to older forms. Emerging forms exist along the dominant resident forms, sometimes in a dissonant relationship and sometimes in a more compatible and supportive roles. However, Henry Lefebvre (1991:97), has argued that everyday life, which is in a sense residual, is defined by ‘what is left over’ after all distinct, superior, specialized, structured activities have been singled out by analysis, and must be defined as a totality.

Elias (1987) discussed the process of differentiation whereby specialist functions previously carried out by the group as a whole become separated – specialists in violence control (warriors), knowledge (priests) and eventually economic and political specialists as well as cultural, scientific etc. These are not automatic processes but linked to particular conditions of the society’s state formation and the mobilization of political and other power resources. However, Schutz (1976), Garfinkel (1967) and other ethnomethodologists view everyday life as the ultimate reality in which different worlds of meaning are being negotiated. Ben Highmore (2012) edited four volumes in which everyday life is treated as a critical concept in cultural and media studies. He argues (p.6) that a critical approach to everyday life is to see it as ‘the mutual testing of theory by social life and social life by theory.’ Moreover, as Certeau, (1984) argues, and Highmore agrees, in cultural productions, such as novels or films, the everyday functions as the foundational context for practices that clearly move beyond the everyday.

It is within this construction of the everyday life that the study of everyday bordering needs to take place. It is important to emphasize, however, that everyday life and the sense of ‘normalization’ that can accompany it takes place in all times, all places, and by all social agents which take part in any social life, whether in peace or war time, city or country, universities or refugee camps. As Highton claims, while the ‘everyday’ is the realm of habit and repetition, domesticity, of our attempts to meet our daily needs and thus can be seen as the location of stability, maintenance of continuity, it is also an arena of conflict and struggle. A struggle aimed at maintaining continuity, accommodating the constant disruption of tradition and the production of the new; struggles between classes, genders, ethnicities etc, between producers and
consumers, human desire and obdurate and exhaustible world. It points to the material actuality of living through conflict and change. It's often the site of invisible hurt of discrimination, of constant negotiation of a changing world, of our attempts to live.

There is no way to carry out ‘an objective’ analysis of any of these social situations of the everyday but rather, any attempt ‘to approach the truth’ (Hill-Collins, 1990) would involve a dialogical construction of the different situated narratives of the social agents involved, which would involve their situated knowledge and imaginations in which their social positioning, their emotional attachments and identifications as well as their normative value systems would be involved. As Agnes Heller claimed, we cannot learn everything about the structure of a given society from the everyday life of any one man, indeed of any one class (or any other grouping or collectivity). But it can tell us about the general structure of society and its generic development – about the available range of possibilities.

This theoretical and methodological approach would be of particular importance when we examine processes of ‘bordering’.

**Bordering**

In the EUBorderscapes project description, bordering is defined as ‘the everyday construction of borders through ideology, cultural mediation, discourses, political institutions, attitudes and everyday forms of transnationalism. In our reading, bordering is, by nature, a multilevel process that takes place, for example, at the level of high politics, manifested by physical borders and visa regimes, as well as in media debates over national identity, legal and illegal immigration and language rights. Within this context, borders can be read in terms of: 1) a politics of identity (who is in, who is out), 2) a geographical definition of difference (defining who is a neighbour, a partner, a friend or rival) and 3) a politics of interests (in which issues of economic self-interest, political stability and security play a prominent role). Another important and closely related element in bordering is the embedding of everyday border-crossing experience and issues of family, gender, sexuality and cultural in personal understandings of borders.

The bordering perspective is thus based on a notion of conceptual change that involves shifts from largely functional to cognitive and symbolic perspectives on borders. Additionally, “bordering” highlights interconnections between territorial and relational perspectives in border research; it recasts and re-frames political landscapes and social arenas. The process of bordering is closely linked to identity-formation and identity-politics because it creates socio-cultural, political and geographic distinctions. A bordering perspective can, for example, also reveal much about how the EU is being constituted as a political community, as a model of regional co-operation and a geopolitical actor.

This is a long and detailed definition which is at the heart of the project description. In this section of the paper, however, I want to deconstruct some of the issues mentioned in it as well as to enrich them and connect them to the issues of intersected situated knowledge and imagination of everyday life discussed above. In
particular I want to focus on issues of identity and difference which are constructed as central to 'borderwork' as well as those of situated bordering and ordering.

Identity and difference

In my work (Yuval-Davis 2011; IDENTITITY PAPER??), identities and identity politics occupy specific roles in the constructions of belonging and the politics of belonging. Identities should be understood as specific forms of narratives regarding the self and its boundaries while identity politics are political projects of belonging promoted by specific social agents which construct specific collective boundaries around particular identity narratives. Identity narratives usually involve dialogical processes (which are subject, in their turn, to intra-group power relations dynamics) in the construction of normative discourses within which identities are performed, while such discourses are at least part of the collective resources being used in the dialogical process of identity constructions.

The issue, however, is not just the manner in which identity narratives are being produced, but also whether their production implies any particular relationship between self and non-self. Judith Butler (1993) argues that construction of identities depends on excess – there is always something left outside, once the boundaries of specific identities have been constructed. In this sense all identities are exclusive, as well as inclusive assuming difference as well as similarity.

One might argue that such a statement amounts to no more than a linguistic truism. However, an important counter argument to that of Butler would be Jessica Benjamin’s claim (1998) that by incorporating identifications into the notion of the subjective self, psychoanalysis has put in doubt the clear separation of self and non-self. Moreover, it can be argued that similar reservations to the total separation between self and non-self are implied in the theorizations of the in-between ‘becoming’ of the dialogical approach (Bakhtin, 1981). Charles Cooley argues (1912:92) that ‘Self and other do not exist as mutually exclusive social facts’. The way in which identities are perceived to be constructed within pre-determined discourses in the performative approach which gains authorisation via repetition, also throws doubt on the clear separation of self and non-self in the construction of the subject.

And yet, psychoanalysis also dedicates a central space in its theorizations to the moment in which the baby, or the child, acquires a sense of a separate self. Similarly, the relationships between ‘me’, ‘us’ and the individual or collective ‘other’, are often at the heart of various narratives of identity. This apparent incongruity can be explained by the fact that the argument re the partial non separation of self and (individual or collective) non-self relates to the original processual moment of the construction of identity narratives. The separation relates to the contents of what these narratives usually say on the nature and the boundaries of the ‘self’ they construct.

This corresponds with Lacan’s view that the moment of the construction of the subject is also the moment of the realization of the separateness of self from m/other, but that this moment is imaginary, a fantasy, and therefore also the moment of self alienation (Lacan 1936; Rose, 1982). What Lacan calls the ‘mirror stage’ is the
metaphorical (or real) moment in which the mother holds the mirror in front of the child and s/he recognizes her difference from the mother as the non-self. At the same time, the mother is also the one who guarantees the validity of the fictitious self to the child. Fictitious, as Hall points out (1996), because the image in the mirror is frozen in time, a fixed image, unlike the perpetual ongoing movement and change of the actual child. I would argue that the Lacanian mirror image (and that of other psychoanalysts, including Winnicott’s (1967), for instance, according to whom the mother does not hold the mirror to the child but embodies the mirror herself) is fictitious also in another way, to the extent that their notion of difference and separateness learned in this moment of mirror recognition (or, rather, attribution) is that of sexual difference. The image of the body can [and does, in real social life] teach us also of many other embodied elements of social difference relating to ethnicity/race, age, class etc as well as those of sex and gender.

Unlike many psychoanalysts, social psychologists like Cooley (1912) and Mead (1934) have used the reflexive image in a much more generic social way. In the dialogical way in which they describe the construction of self, the reflexivity is based on the perception of how significant others perceive the self – and in this model it is not just ‘the mother’ but all significant others. Or – as in Jean Paul Sartre’s play on hell: No Exit (1989) – all available others, under conditions of total institutions (Goffman, 1968) extreme racialization (Fanon, 1967), and other conditions in which ‘forced identities’ (Chhachhi, 1991) are constructed.

These issues are crucial to processes of bordering. Whatever the significance for the construction of self identity, individual or collective, the mere recognition that others exist, creates the need not only to assess in what ways and to what extent one is different from the others but also for a decision, explicit or not, of how to treat these others. As Zygmunt Bauman argues (1995), such a decision is pre-cultural, emerging once there is a realization that others exist. Although, as I have argued (2006a), the normative level, just as the positionality level, cannot be collapsed into the identificatory level of belonging, people’s values and ethical decisions play a crucial role in the way identities are constructed, contested and authorized.

This is why Frosh & Baraitser (2003), following Levinas (1985) and Benjamin (1998), call the move from separating from the other via the mirroring stage to recognition of the other, an ethical act. However, unlike them, I would argue that recognition is a double-edged act, as rejection as well as acceptance of the recognized ‘other’ is possible. Moreover, the act of recognition itself constructs boundaries which can operate among constructions of ‘us’ as well as those of ‘me/us’ and ‘them’.

Identity theories often emphasize that identities are relational, the necessary ‘excess’ mentioned by Butler above. However, highlighting the fact that this relationality is not homogenous and can be very different in nature, is of vital importance for any theorization of identity, belonging and their constructions of boundaries and borders. I would like now, therefore, to outline briefly four generic relations of the self and non-self in which recognition has very different implications to bordering work: ‘me’ and ‘us’; ‘me/us’ and ‘them’; ‘me/us’ and ‘others’; ‘me’ and the transversal ‘us/them’. However, whatever kind of boundaries are constructed between the ‘me’ and the ‘not me’, it is vital to emphasize that not only are those boundaries shifting and contested, but also that they do not have to be symmetrical. In other words, inclusion
or exclusion are often not mutual, depending on the power positionality and normative values of the social actors as well as, and in relation to, their cognitive and emotional identifications.

‘Me’ and ‘us’

Most people in most times would consider themselves ‘naturally’ to belong, to be part of, particular familial, local, ethnic and national collectivities. Ghassan Hage (1997:102) claimed that for a person to feel ‘at home’ requires the combined effect of familiarity, security, community and a sense of possibility. This sense of belonging, therefore, of feeling at home, reflects an existence of a permeable boundary between ‘self’ and ‘us’ which, by definition, is not imagined as exclusionary. There can be occasions in which the crucial boundaries for the identity constructions are those of ‘us’ rather than those of the individual self and the boundaries between ‘me’ and ‘us’ can even disappear altogether. An extreme illustrative example for this is the readiness of (some) parents to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their children or of (some) soldiers to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the ‘homeland’. In such constructions there is no possible identity narrative of self which would not be constructed in relation to and as part of the familial or the national ‘we’. So much so, that the identity narrative (who is ‘me’) can sustain the biological end (i.e. death) of the individual self rather than the contemplated threatened end of the collective self – ‘us’.

‘Me’/‘us’ and them

The illustrative example above describes a situation in which the identity narratives construct dividing boundaries between individuals and collectives and others in a dichotomous, zero-sum way. This is characteristic to situations of extreme conflict and war in which the individual’s fate is perceived to be closely bounded with their membership in particular collectivities. In such situations the individual’s agency, their value system, their particular locations within the collectivity, even their actions, can be perceived to be irrelevant, by one or both sides. The relationality of the identity construction is that of complete exclusion and negation and is often accompanied by the demonization of ‘the other’. It is important to emphasize, however, that such exclusionary and inferiorizing identity boundaries can also exist within the psyche in the Benjamin (1998) sense, as Franz Fanon (1967) and others talked about black identities.

‘Me’/‘us’ and the many ‘others’

It is of crucial importance, however, not to reduce all others into ‘the Other’. In identity narratives which are related to most daily situations, there are no such dichotomous divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and that people’s social worlds are of much more complex natures, with a whole range of distinctions and relations between people, from close identification and association, to total indifference, as well as rejection and conflict. Paul Gilroy’s notion of ‘conviviality’ (2005) relate to the fact that in many social contexts identity boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ can become banalized and accepted. Chantall Mouffe (2000) talks about agonistic ‘friendly enemies’ as essential to the functioning of a democratic society. Moreover, as Ali Rattansi (2007) demonstrates, even among racist individuals, not every
narrative relating to the others is racialised in every context. The relationality of identity narratives is much more complex than that, especially in discourses of everyday life.

‘Me’ and the transversal ‘us’

Discourses of belonging often relate to membership in ‘primordial’ collectivities or to other long term spatial, professional or friendship groupings and networks. Transversal politics developed as an alternative to identity politics and are often aimed at establishing a collective ‘us’ across borders and boundaries, in which membership is bounded by solidarity that is based on common emancipatory values. As I have elaborated elsewhere (1994; 1997; 2006c; please see also Cockburn & Hunter, 1999), transversal politics is based on a dialogical standpoint epistemology, the recognition that from each positioning the world is seen differently, and thus any knowledge based on just one positioning is ‘unfinished’ [to differentiate from ‘invalid’] (Hill-Collins, 1990). Thus, the only way to approach ‘the truth’ is by a dialogue between people of differential positionings, and the wider the better.

Transversal politics also follow the principle of the encompassment of difference by equality. The recognition, on the one hand, that differences are important but, on the other hand, that notions of difference should be encompassed by, rather than replace, notions of equality. Such notions of difference are not hierarchical and assume a-priori respect to others’ positionings – which includes acknowledgement of their differential social, economic and political power.

Transversal politics, like the situated epistemology presented earlier in the paper, differentiates – both conceptually and politically - between positioning, identity and values. People who identify themselves as belonging to the same collectivity or category can be positioned very differently in relation to a whole range of social divisions (e.g. class, gender, ability, sexuality, stage in the life cycle etc). At the same time, people with similar positioning and/or identity, can have very different social and political values. The boundaries of transversal dialogue are those of common values rather than those of common positionings or identifications. As such, the participants in transversal politics constitute one variant of what Alison Assiter calls (1996) ‘epistemological communities’, in which the boundaries of the community are constructed around boundaries of knowledge and values rather than membership in collectivities.

These different constructions of the relations between self and non-self are crucial when analyzing situated everyday narratives of bordering and border-crossing. As Nash & Bryonie (2010) claim, they include social, economic and cultural dimensions and not, or not just the intense political symbolism of borders. Borders acquire double meaning as state boundaries and as symbolic social and cultural lines of inclusion and difference, material and imagined, physical and cultural. They are based both on collective historical narratives and individual identity construction of self in which difference is related, but not reducible to, space.

Van Houtum et.al. (2005) use the term ‘b/ordering’ to refer to the interplay between the ordering (of chaos) and border-making. Physical borders are not there only by tradition, wars, agreements and high politics but also made and maintained by other
cultural, economic political and social activities. Everyday ‘bordering and ordering’ practices connive to create and recreate new social-cultural boundaries and divisions which are also spatial in nature. Everyday lived experiences include intersections, differentiations and similarities. Intersectional perspectives pay attention to how gender, age and ethnicity work together and mutually constitute each other through diverse categorizations and selected signs in different ways. What matters and to whom and how some are made more stable than others.

Doreen Massey (1994:149) used the term of power geometry to address new images of space related to movements, flows and globalization, highlighting that such analysis include ‘how different social groups and different individuals are placed in very distinct ways in relation to… flows and interconnections’. Power geometry is not only about who moves and who does not but also about who is in a position of control in relation to movement. Who is allowed to be where? Who is part of the community or not? As Rumford (2008) points out borders are much like a computer firewall - they perform intelligent filtering of immigrants, being open for the attractive and closed for the unwanted. As Taylor (1994) suggests, a state will often strive to expand its spatial horizons in terms of economics while it’s often inward-looking in terms of culture or security policy.

In the de- and re-bordering processes borders are territorially displaced and border controls are, in principle, being carried out by anyone anywhere – by loyal inhabitants who call the police when they spot illegal trespassers; the all-encompassing surveillance technologies; flight companies and more and more social agencies in the public sphere from health organizations to educational ones. Borders are thereby conceptualized as practices that are situated and constituted in the specificity of political negotiations as well as the everyday life performance of them, being shifting and contested between individual and groupings as well as in the constructions of individual subjectivities.

As Paasi and Prokkola (2008) argue, borders are not ‘located’ merely in border areas but are everywhere in societies in various forms of ‘banal flagging’ of the national in everyday life (Billig 1995). Emotional bordering is loaded in national flag days and other national iconographies and practices – and this is the ‘location’ of the borders. Active ‘borderwork’ may deconstruct established and existing forms and codes of national socialisation in some locations. On the other hand, borders are also crucial to what can be called the discursive landscape of social power constructions which manifest themselves in material landscapes, ideologies and national performances all over the territory.

However, in specific border zones, the geographic state border itself becomes embedded in everyday life and in the meanings attached to the local, as well as national, cultural environment, traditions, social habits and emotions. While it can be easy for people to cross the actual border, the border largely defines the spatial understanding of the local context. People make sense of their border-related social world (Doevenspeck, 2011). The construction of meanings of borders can range from a desired barrier against the demonized other and as means of exclusion to its conception as the institution that maybe in need of reform but is essential to economic survival. Border narratives should be read through their historicity and relationality. Bordering practices and social divisions affect one another, are
constantly changing and can include as well as exclude. The ‘border’ and the divisions stemming from it are fluid, contextual and spatially manifested in the community and its relations with the state (Aure, 2011).

Andersen, Klatt & Sandberg (2012) argue that borders should be seen as made by the performance of internal regulatory practices which challenge mobility across borders rather than considering them as pre-given. Examining the complexity of these processes as well as their sometimes abstract sometimes very concrete nature, they label it ‘the border multiple’, composed of Janus-faced, contested and contradictory narratives at different levels of practice, be it in the realm of memory and as imagined borders, in the realm of the political discourse and geopolitics or in practices enacting borders in the functional realm of administration. They include not only individuals in their everyday lives practices but also discursive-material actors which can collude or contest and interfere with each other across or on the same side of the border.

A methodological concluding remark

The analysis of bordering as part of everyday life situated narratives and practices is part of a wider turn within contemporary social theory which implies (Schatzki, 2001:1) ‘a shared understanding of practices as embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity’ and thus a focusing on practices as the place to study the nature and transformation of their subject-matter. Ben Anderson (1998) called this methodological approach ‘the inverted telescope’ – using micro-scale everyday bordering practices to both conceptualize and visualize what borders are at a more general level. By using this methodological approach within a situated intersectional epistemological perspective, it would be possible for our research project to construct a dialogical performative analysis of the multi-vocal, mutually constitutive, shifting and contested meanings of contemporary bordering processes in Europe, whether in metropolitan areas or in borderlands.

Which brings us back to the question discussed much earlier in the paper concerning the debate between the intra- and inter-categorical approach to social research raised by Lesley McCall. My argument is that McCall’s inter-categorical comparative research methodology on the structural level, has to be supplemented with intra-categorial comparative research which would explore how these different analytical dimensions are being connected or not in different situated gazes of people with differential identities and normative political views. In other words, we have to interrogate the assumptions of both case and variable methodologies, reject naturalization of any constructions of social divisions or assume prioritisation of any of them, such as class or gender. This might create complex, multi-layered methodologies which would require cooperation of researchers with similar mind but in different locations, but the political economy of European research is already moving in this direction, and at least we should be able to make use of it for the purpose of the appropriate intersectional stratification studies.
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